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ABSTRACT 
Many managers ask them self “Why our transformational efforts fail? Why? We did 
everything in a full harmony with the best business practice learnt in business schools 
and collected during our experience.” However, the fact is that the transformation of 
troubled companies as the Bulgarian State Railways is a very demanding process 
hindered by many internal and external factors. Theories of organizational adaptation 
as well as Organizational Ecology discuss the challenges from the right perspective: 
They consider organizational inertia and process of spontaneous institutionalisation 
major obstacles any reorganization necessitated by environmental drifts has to deal 
with. The power of the factors undermining the reorganisations is so strong that in most 
cases the management will probably fail. The research looks at the major factors that 
affect the fitness of the corporation and describes the attempts of the managers to 
recover the going concern status of the enterprise. The study investigates the 
Hypotheses that the adaptive capacity and the speed of reorganisation of the troubled 
BSRG decline with: (1) the length of service of the inertial management, (2) the 
strength of the limits imposed on the company performance by the institutionalised 
collective labour agreements, (3) the strength of its organisational opacity and asperity, 
and (4) the intensity of the conflicting institutional demands presented by the internal 
and the external audience. The real problem is that the transformation of BSRG from 
a company on the verge of bankruptcy to a financially sustainable company took long 
eight years and the cost of the reorganization turned to be enormously high.  
However, while confirming to certain extent the validity of the Theory of population 
Ecology, the dissertation simultaneously presents managerial approaches that 
increase the likelihood of organisational survival by improving the adaptive capacity of 
the enterprise. 
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Chapter One 
Transformation of Troubled Organisations: The Synthesis 
of Organisational Adaptation and Organisational Ecology 
Chapter 1 presents the main theories that this thesis uses as a foundation for the 
research. The first part presents an overall view of the organisational change in 
organisational ecology and organisational adaptation paradigms, the type, the location, 
the content and the process of change. The second part examines the ambidexterity 
theory, contingency theory, structural inertia theory, and the institutionalisation theory 
in organisational change. The third part deliberates some aspects of the organisational 
change process. The fourth part is an attempt to designing a practice-informed 
synthesis of ideas explaining the transformation of troubled organisations.  
1.1. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: PARADIGMS, TYPES, LOCATIONS, 
CONTENT, AND PROCESS.  
Organisational Ecology vs. Organisational Adaptation  
The study of the adaptive capabilities of the troubled BSRG is a practice-informed 
synthesis of ideas developed by the two major contemporary concepts of 
organisational change. 
The population ecology theory holds that the change in the main features of 
organisations occurs through the selection and replacement process, i.e., the creation 
of new organisations and organisational forms and the replacement of old ones 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Freeman and Hannan, 1983; McKelvey, 1982). 
Darwinian mechanisms in organisational populations depend on the degree to which 
those ostensibly in command can control change in organisational structures (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). Hannan and Freeman (1984) postulate that Darwinian arguments 
to changes in organisational populations will partly depend on the tightness of coupling 
between individual intentions and organisational outcomes. “At least two well-known 
situations generate loose coupling: diversity of interests among members and 
uncertainty about means-end connections. When members of an organisation have 
diverse interests, organisational outcomes depend heavily on internal politics, on the 
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balance of power among the constituencies. In such situations, outcomes cannot easily 
be matched rationally to the changing environment.  
When the connections between means and ends are obscure or uncertain, carefully 
designed adaptations may have completely unexpected consequences. Moreover, 
short-run consequences may often differ greatly from long-run consequences. In such 
cases, it does not seem realistic to assume a high degree of congruence between 
designs and outcomes” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  
The most important issues about the applicability of evolutionary–ecological theories of 
organisations according to Hannan and Freeman concern the timing of the change. 
They continue that learning and structural inertia must be considered in a dynamic 
context. “Can organisations learn about their environments and change strategies and 
structures as quickly as their environment change?” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The 
key issues are: 
First, the temporal pattern of changes in key environments – are typical changes small 
or large, regular or irregular, rapid or slow?  
Second, the speed of learning mechanisms – how long does it take to obtain, process, 
and evaluate information on key environments? 
Third, how quickly can an organisation be reorganised?  
The idea of structural inertia implies that organisations respond relatively slowly to the 
occurrence of threats and opportunities in their environments. Inertia is very high when 
the speed of reorganisations is much lower than the rate at which environmental 
conditions change. “Thus the concept of inertia, like fitness, refers to a correspondence 
between the behavioural capabilities of a class of organisations and their 
environments” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  
The concept of population ecology theory is compelling as the ability of the 
management to develop a systematically correct vision, and foresight is practically very 
problematic. Even when the executives read the environmental dynamics correctly, 
they cannot systematically achieve what they aim to.   
Adaptation theory, on the contrary, proposes that organisational transformation 
results from executive decisions (Carley and Svoboda, 1996).  “The survival and 
prosperity of an organisation depend on adaptation to the environment and the 
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acquisition of necessary resources. Adaptation improves by anticipating consumer 
needs and desires, assessing the actions and plans of competitors, evaluating possible 
constraints and threats and identifying marketable products and services that the 
organisation has unique capabilities to provide.  
Survival and prosperity also depend on the efficiency of the transformation process 
used by the organisation to produce its products and services. Efficiency is increased 
by finding more rational ways to organise and perform the work, and by deciding how 
to make the best use of available technology, resources, and personnel. Some 
examples of leadership responsibilities include designing an appropriate 
organisational structure, determining authority relationship, and coordinating 
operations across specialised subunits of the organisation”  (Yukl, 2013)  
The intellectual movement that believes in organisational adaptation postulates that 
adaptive capabilities improve over time due to learning and reputation and 
organisations can adapt to environmental change (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2008).   
Organisations scan the changing environment, formulate proper strategic responses 
and attempt to adapt to environmental drift in order to ensure positive performance and 
long-term existence. Leaders or dominant coalitions make decisions responding to 
external threats and opportunities, and influence corresponding changes (March and 
Simon, 1958, Thompson, 1967, Cyert and March 1963). Overall, the adaptation camp 
of organisational change theories includes multiple, sometimes contradictory 
(Donaldson, (2006, p 28)) concepts, and it is hard to define (Lewontin, 1978).  
The following parts outline the most pertinent aspects of contingency theory, 
ambidexterity theory and institutional theory, which are appropriate for the study of 
troubled organisation. 
The two opposing camps of population ecology theory and adaptation theory produce 
conflicting positions about the idea of fundamental change. The adaptations theories 
argue that change is possible because the environment is not something immutable 
and managers can be active agents of it. Population ecology theory argues that change 
is impossible because of structural inertia, which is a feature of all organisations 
(Garcilazo, 2011).  
Scott (1981: 204) claims that the selection and adaptation perspectives are not so 
different.  
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“…the natural selection perspective seems to us to be particularly useful in focusing 
attention on the core features of organisations, explaining the life chances of smaller 
and more numerous organisations, and accounting for changes in organisational forms 
over the long run. By contrast, the rational selection of resource dependency approach 
emphasises the more peripheral features of organisations, is better applied to larger 
and more powerful organisations and stresses changes occurring over shorter periods 
of time.”  
The doctoral thesis follows the idea of convergences of both theories. On the one hand, 
the adaptation theory describes the mechanisms and the tools through which the 
organisations attempt to transform themselves when the environment changes. On the 
other hand, the ecological theories portray challenges that are at least partly outside 
the control of executives in time of reorganisations. The outcome of the change 
depends on the dominance of one or more of the forces described by both theories.   
Why do organisations change?  
When organisations initiate significant reorganisations, it is vital to know the reason 
behind such a decision. Most of them drop in the subject of either adaptation or ecology 
theory. March (1982) and Burgelman (1994) remind us that a change sometimes 
occurs unintentionally as a by-product of other decisions and actions within the 
organisations. Merton (1936) points out that attempts at organisational change often 
take unexpected turns and lead to transformations other than those intended. The 
thesis looks into the factors that have led to the crisis of the BSRG and follows the 
development of these factors in the reorganisation period using the theory outlined 
below.  
Internal Factors 
Some of the symptoms of industrial sickness or explanations of failure observed by 
researchers are: poor leadership (Balgobin and Pandit 2001, Walshe 2004); 
operational inefficiency, past managerial mistakes, inertia leading to poor adaptability, 
erosion of competitiveness, non-availability of resources (Barker and Duhaime 1997, 
Bibeault 1982, Pearce and Robbins 1993); product failure, poor diversification, poor 
control systems, cost slippage (Panchali 2005). It is ironic that, even though 
management has direct control over all these functions, more than 80 percent of 
business failures arise due to management's inefficiency to control the internal 
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functions of business (Scherrer 2003). The most common errors of bad management 
described in the restructuring literature are a failure to keep pace with changes in the 
marketplace, lack of operating controls, overexpansion, and excessive leverage 
(Bibeault, 1982). 
Hannan & Freeman (1984) develop the so-called “structural inertia theory which 
asserts that organisations become increasingly inert over time as procedures, roles, 
and structures become well-established. This theory denotes that the likelihood of 
organisational change decreases with an organisation’s age. Structural inertia theory 
also predicts that the probability of change increases once a change occurs since the 
“clock” of inertia is essentially restarted when structures, roles, and procedures are 
regenerated in the process of change. The two predictions have been empirically 
supported (Amburgey et al. 1993). Hannan & Freeman (1984) argue that large 
organisations would be less likely to change due to the bureaucratic structure that 
typically accompanies size. However, others contend that larger organisations may be 
more likely to change because of their greater access to resources (Kimberly 1976, 
Aldrich & Auster 1986).    
External Factors 
The developments in the external environment identified by researchers as causing 
industrial sickness are: adverse governmental or controlling authority behaviours, 
unfavourable market conditions, industrial unrest, insufficient or excessively costly 
inputs, fluctuations in commodity prices, natural disasters (Panchali 2005); changes in 
international markets, unforeseen competition, financial market instability and 
technology changes (Manimala 1991, Khandwalla 1992, Pearce and Robbins 1993, 
Scherrer 2003); increased domestic and foreign competition, product or service 
innovations by competitors, changes in customer expectations (Balgobin and Pandit 
2001, Walshe 2004); innovations in technology, recessionary conditions (Barker 2005), 
and so on. 
Some studies combine the logic of structural inertia with attention to environmental 
constraints and opportunities. They find that many innovations require new 
organisational capabilities and that these are often difficult to put in place (Tushman & 
Anderson 1986, Henderson & Clark, 1990).  An essential aspect of the organisational 
actions is that some organisations are implicitly assumed to be action-oriented, waiting 
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for an attractive opportunity while other organisations do not change until almost forced 
to do so by resource depletion or another crisis. Logically, troubled companies, which 
are the subject of the study drop into the second category. 
"The reasons for most crisis situations are not simple, and the more time passes before 
the crisis is addressed, the more areas of business are affected, so a quick fix to the 
problem is seldom the solution to the problem. When lawyers, accountants and 
financial experts who restructure the business from their point of view handle 
turnarounds, they are rarely successful. Business is highly complex: what is done in 
one area of business affects the others, and it is rare that has only a single effect. A 
team of area-specific experts is not sufficient to treat a corporate crisis that has many 
different symptoms and causes. Problems will be overlooked, because of lack of 
knowledge and understanding about the complexities behind the business. This is why 
most turnaround efforts fail. A structured approach is needed" (Kristofer Limbersky, 
2011).  
As the theory of inertia postulates (see page. 13) organisational viability depends on 
the history of the events that affected the inflow and outflow of resources to and from 
the organisation. As such, it recognises that some organisational episodes can have 
lasting consequences. Correspondingly, the thesis goes into the reasons for the crisis 
of the BSRG, the role of the parties that drives them, and the role they play later on 
over the reorganisation period. 
Change Types and Change Locations  
The type of change and the location of the change are vital because in every situation 
the arguments of one of the theories, the adaptation theory or the ecology theory, are 
stronger. Thus, the interplay between the powers described by the two theories has a 
different effect on the transformational results. Depending on the type of change and 
the location of the change, the executives have more control or less control over the 
whole process of transformation.  
Balogun and Hailey, (2004) formulate four types of change: adaptation, evolution, 
reconstruction, and revolution. They describe change as having two aspects – nature 
and scope. The nature of change is either incremental or a big bang. Incremental 
change usually influences a part of the organisation over a longer period, whereas a 
big-bang change usually happens when organisations suffer crises. The main change 
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scopes are transformation and realignment. The distinction between them is that while 
transformation cannot be handled within the existing paradigm, realignment can. There 
is no substantial change in the central assumptions and beliefs in an organisation for 
realignment to take place.   
                                                           Scope of   
   Transformation   Realignment   
   Incremental   
Nature   
                             Big Bang   
Figure 1. Strategic change types (Balogun and Hailey 2004).   
 
Figure 1, shows that both evolution and revolution are transformational in the scope of 
change. Evolution is incremental and describes prolonged periods of growth, with no 
significant disturbance. Revolution depicts substantial turmoil with a big bang nature 
(Greiner, 1972). This is the case of reorganisation of troubled companies, which is the 
subject of the study. It often occurs in a relatively short space of time and needs a rapid 
response. This quick change may encounter much resistance, and people may find it 
difficult for some time to accept such changes.  
Mintzberg et al., (1998) divided all types of change into two categories: strategic 
change and organisational change, varying from conceptual to concrete in each four-
hierarchy level. Strategic change category, presents changes in vision, positions, 
programs, and products, whereas organisational changes comprise systems structure, 
culture, and people changes, each ranging from highly formal behaviour to rather 
informal, overt to implicit. It is implied that managers must complement effective 
strategic change by the relevant organisation change at a similar level. As we can 
envision, the turnaround reorganisations include both strategic and organisational 
change.  
Hannan and Freeman (1984) consider core and periphery features of organisational 
changes. Core organisational change contains four hierarchical features: 
organisational mission change, then authority structure, next technology and finally 
marketing strategic change. Hannan, Polos, and Carroll (2003a) particularise the 
Evolution   Adaptation   
Revolution   Reconstruction   
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extensiveness of subsequent changes, which follow the initial change in the 
organisation. Changes in the core compel adjustments in related units of the 
organisation. It is called a cascading change and accounts for the indirect opportunity 
cost associated with the change transition. Consequently, core changes lead to other 
cascading changes throughout the whole organisation while a periphery change will 
not. Dobrev et al. (2003) suggest that selection and adaptation models be considered 
in terms of the different consequences of core vs. periphery change. Core change is 
better explained by an ecological view and is more disruptive, while periphery change 
is best described by adaptation theories and has fewer risks (Singh et al., 1986, Scott, 
1981). Turning around a problematic company would not only require significant core 
changes but would also entail attention to peripheral issues and structures.  
According to Wang (2011) contrasting the four types of strategic changes with the core 
and periphery concept of change indicates some similarity among them. Incremental 
change is more like periphery change, whereas the big bang is more like core change. 
Transformation can be considered as initiating internal organisational change, while 
realignment results from an organisation reacting to the external environment  
Barnett and Carroll, (1995) postulate that due to inertial pressure, organisations 
seldom initiate core structural changes. The core change is unpredictable and 
increases the probability of organisational crisis and death. Amendments in peripheral 
structures may lead to a lower risk of mortality. Greve (1999) argues that core change 
makes the firm subject to a liability of change, less efficient internal function, inferior 
external legitimacy, and worse performance until the process of rebuilt transmission is 
completed because internal routines and links with the environment disrupt. Balogun 
and Hailey (2004) believe that most transformational change happens through a more 
evolutionary path because revolutions reshape the whole organisation and are difficult 
to attain. However, they argue that in any organisation’s life cycle, periods of relative 
tranquillity will be punctuated with times of frame-breaking change. Similarly, Tushman 
et al. (1997) argue that most organisations are forced at some point to undertake 
discontinuous or frame-breaking change.  
Change Content and Process   
Organisational change is a transformation of an organisation between two points in 
time (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). Change content portrays what actually happens in 
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organisational changes. The critical aspect of change comes from comparing the 
organisation before and after the transformation. (Barnett and Carroll, 1995: P219). 
Significant transformational change consists of radical modifications in a single 
element or many elements of the structure. Change process denotes how change 
occurs and is implemented. Amburgey et al., (1993) has highlighted the importance of 
studying the process effect. The process of change refers to the way transformation 
occurs – the speed, the sequence of activities, the decision-making and 
communication system, the resistance encountered, and so forth. (Barnett and Carroll, 
1995: P219). Dobrev et al. (2003) postulate that in order to understand the effect of 
the change process, it is necessary to consistently account for the interplay between 
the environmental and internal forces, which modify a transformation. They link inertia 
to disruptive process effects and imply that the content effect of change occurs 
independently, with the process effect prolonging the length of the transformation. The 
consequences of change are also the costs associated with the disturbance caused 
by the process of change, which could reduce the advantages of any positive content 
effects. Thus, the distinction between process and content is essential analytically 
(Barnett and Carroll, 1995), and both are examined in this study.  
1.2. AMBIDEXTERITY, CONTINGENCY, STRUCTURAL INERTIA AND 
INSTITUTIONALISATION IN ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
The concepts outlined below could create a synthesis of ideas that offer a deeper, more 
multi-faceted understanding of managerial challenges and potential actions that may 
facilitate the transformation of troubled organisations. Such a synthesis assembles a 
theoretical model of considering the transformational process. When a troubled 
company initiates a complex transformational process, the executive will attempt to 
understand the interaction between the environmental shifts and organisational status. 
They would try to reconfigure internal and external resources to adapt the organisation 
to the new reality and recover the current concern status. For that purpose, in the most 
optimistic scenario, they would apply the best business practices available. However, 
the train on which the executives would play is not free of hurdles.     
Ambidexterity theory 
Organisational ambidexterity refers to “the ability of an organisation to both explore and 
exploit, to compete in mature technologies and markets where efficiency, control, and 
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incremental improvement are prised and to also compete in new technologies and 
markets where flexibility, autonomy, and experimentation are needed” (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2013 p. 2).  Organisations achieved ambidexterity in a sequential fashion by 
shifting structures over time to accommodate the conflicting alignments required for 
innovation and efficiency and to align the structure with the firm’s strategy (Duncan 
1976). Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) argued that in the face of rapid change, sequential 
ambidexterity might be ineffective and organisations needed to explore and exploit 
simultaneously. Dynamic capabilities are defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997, p. 516)” or “the capacity of an 
organisation to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base (Helfat, et al., 
2007, p. 1). “As such, dynamic capabilities, manifest in the decisions of senior 
managers, help an organisation reallocate and reconfigure organisational skills and 
assets to permit the firm to both exploit existing competencies and to develop new ones 
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Taylor & Helfat, 2009). In this way, organisational 
ambidexterity presents a complex set of decisions and routines that enable the 
organisation to sense and seize new opportunities through the reallocation of 
organisational assets” (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013).  
Research has shown that to manage contradictory demands of exploration and 
exploitation requires leaders who can balance the competing pressures of different 
organisational architectures. Gilbert (2005) found that the success problem was not 
the allocation of sufficient resources (e.g., investment) but the failure of the 
organisation to change the processes necessary to use these resources effectively. To 
be successful at ambidexterity, leaders must be able to orchestrate the allocation of 
resources between the routine and new business domains.  
Contingency theory 
Contingency theory is a part of the adaptation philosophy. In periods of hectic 
reorganisations, it gives a partial explanation of the reasons for successful and 
unsuccessful transformations. The theory focuses on the fit between organisational 
context and structure to explain performance. Organisations could be successful and 
have better survival chances only if “a goodness of fit” exists between the 
organisational structure and the contextual demands of the external environment, such 
as size and technology (Daft, 1983; Johannes M. 1992).   
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The theoretical model of Structural Adaptation to Regain Fit (SARFIT) formulates ideas 
about contingency dynamics. In SARFIT an organisation only remains in fit temporarily, 
until the surplus resources from the fit-based higher performance produce expansion. 
This increases contingency variables such as size and diversification, leading the 
organisation into misfit with its existing structure. The status of misfit provokes 
structural adaptation into a fit, which later on leads to a further expansion in misfit. As 
the organisation moves between fit and misfit, so it has resultant higher and lower 
performance, respectively (Donaldson, 2006). The organisation may attain not full-fit, 
but quasi-fit when a structure only partly fits the contingency. Hetero-performance 
theory (Donaldson, 2001) postulates that fits to higher levels of the contingency 
produce higher performance than fits to lower levels of the contingency.  
Leaders influence organisational performance through making decisions about 
competitive strategy, organisational structure, and management programs (Yukl, 2008; 
Yukl & Lepsinger, 2004). Top executives usually have primary responsibility and 
authority for decisions about competitive strategy and the creation or modification of 
formal programs, systems, and structures (Hambrick, Nadler & Tushman, 1998; Hunt, 
1991). However, a coordinated effort by leaders at all levels in the organisation is 
necessary to ensure effective implementation of a strategy, improvement program, or 
management system. How much influence top executives can have on the 
performance of their organisations is determined in part by internal and external 
constraints on their decisions and actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein 1987). Discretion is 
limited when internal factions and coalitions have sufficient power to block changes a 
leader wants to make (e.g., labour unions), or there is a strong organisational culture 
that is resistant to change. Large organisations with strong bureaucracy and 
standardised ways of doing things have inertia that is difficult to overcome. Discretion 
is constrained by influential external stakeholders who can dictate conditions.  
The situational approach assumes that different attributes (e.g., traits, skills, behaviour) 
will be effective in different situations and that the same attribute is not optimal in all 
situations (Yukl, 2013). Research findings generate an extensive list of both: traits 
more likely to be found in the derailed managers and traits typical of the successful 
managers. “Some managers were unable to shift from a focus on technical problems 
to the more strategic perspective needed at a higher level of management. Some 
derailed managers had technical expertise only in a narrow functional area, and they 
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advanced too quickly to learn the skills needed to perform higher-level jobs effectively. 
Successful managers usually had experience in a variety of different types of situations 
where they acquired a broader perspective and expertise in dealing with various types 
of problems” (Yukl, 2013).  
Adaptive leadership is an emergent, interactive dynamic that is the primary source from 
which adaptive outcomes are produced in a firm. It originates in struggles among 
agents and groups over differing needs, ideas, or preferences; it results in movements, 
alliances of people, ideas, or technologies, and cooperative efforts. Adaptive change 
is produced by the clash of the present, but incompatible ideas, knowledge, and 
technologies; it takes the form of new insights and creative ideas, learning, or 
adaptation. A familiar form of this change occurs when two interdependent individuals 
who are debating conflicting perceptions of a given issue suddenly, and perhaps 
simultaneously, generate a new understanding of that issues - this can be considered 
an "aha" moment. (Uhl-Bien, Marion, McKelvey 2007).  
Theory of Structural Inertia  
The following paragraph describes one of the most potent forces able to limit the 
adaptive capability of the top executives significantly. The so-called structural inertia is 
a crucial concept opposing adaptation theory. Some of the sources of structural inertia 
and the effects on the transformation of the BSRG are analysed in the next Chapters 
of the thesis.  
Age-related structural Inertia. Age-related structural inertia is a fundamental concept 
in organisation theory. The theory presents explanation of a variety of organisational 
phenomena as (1) the positive relation between organisational age and the failure 
hazard, (2) the observation that older organisations tend to have more trouble adapting 
to the changing environmental conditions, or (3) the fact that the innovations of older 
organisations are similar to their previous innovation efforts (Barnett and Carroll (1995); 
Carroll and Hannan (2000); Sørensen and Stuart (2000); Gilbert (2005)).    
The Le Mens, Hannan, and Polos (2015a), explanation for age-related structural inertia 
is based on the notion that people have strong tendencies to prefer the status quo both 
inside and outside organisations. Why?   
First, people have a natural tendency to like what is familiar to them: this is the mere-
exposure effect (Zajonc 1968). Second, people learn from experience, which leads 
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their job-related performance to increase with time. This, in turn, increases the 
perceived costs of change. Third, people come to like their environments because not 
doing so would create an uncomfortable state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 
1957). The motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance together with a ubiquitous self-
enhancement motive leads people to see themselves as competent and even to 
systematically overestimate their competence (Aronson, 2007). This overoptimistic 
bias does not apply to the same extent for future jobs, and people will likely predict 
their competence and job satisfaction to be lower after the implementation of 
organisational change. Fourth, organisational change creates much uncertainty. 
However, people are risk-averse and ambiguity averse. Fifth, even if the change did 
not induce any uncertainty, it would likely imply that some aspects of the job would 
improve while others become less attractive. However, people are subject to the 
endowment effect that makes them systematically prefer the status quo, even if an 
outsider would view the new option as equally attractive as the older one (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Sixth, people might anticipate 
feeling regret if they do not resist the change and their upcoming situations turn out to 
be inferior to the status quo. 
The above factors predict that individuals will be progressively resistant to change as 
they become more familiar with the prevailing state of affairs. Therefore, they assume 
that each individual in the organisation becomes increasingly likely to oppose a change 
in any architectural feature value the longer she or he has been exposed to it. Le Mens 
et al. (2015a) explanation most closely resembles explanations that focus on routines 
and organisational memory. They point out that organisational members will oppose 
change when management tries to implement it.  
Hierarchy of Inertial Forces. Hannan and Freeman, (1984) conceptualise 
organisational structure as composed of hierarchical layers of structural and strategic 
features that vary systematically in flexibility and responsiveness. They determine the 
following rough hierarchy of organisations from the perspective of resource 
mobilisation: (1) stated goals – the ground on which legitimacy and other resources 
are mobilised; (2) forms of organisational authority and the basis of exchange between 
members and the organisation; (3) core technology, especially as encoded in capital 
investment, infrastructure, and the skills of members; and (4) marketing strategy in a 
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broad sense – the kinds of customers to which the organisation orients its production 
and the ways in which it attracts resources from the environment.  
Hannan and Freeman, (1984) expect the likelihood of change by transformation to 
decline as one proceeds up the hierarchy. An organisation’s initial configuration on 
these core features commits it to a certain form of environmental dependence and a 
long-term strategy. Although organisations occasionally manage to change positions 
on these dimensions, such changes are both rare and costly and expose an 
organisation to greatly increased risks of death. Thus, these characteristics serve as a 
possible basis for selection and replacement within populations of organisations.  
Scot (1981) calls peripheral any structures outside the core of a company, the detailed 
arrangements, by which an organisation makes links with its environment and tries to 
buffer its technical core (for example joint ventures and interlocking directorates). 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) believe that properties of organisational charts and 
patterns of specific exchange with actors in the environment are more plastic than the 
core set. They can be transformed, because attempts at changing them involve 
relatively little moral and political opposition within the organisation and in the 
environment and do not raise fundamental questions about the nature of the 
organisation. Inertial forces on peripheral and buffering activities tend to be weaker 
than those on core features are. However, in times of turnaround reorganisations, when 
the hostility gets high, there is a high probability that the collisions about core changes 
spread out into the area of peripheral and buffering activities.       
Obsolescence, drifting tests, and organisational life chances. Classical selection 
theoretical thinking postulates that organisations generally become obsolete as they 
age because of (1) environmental drift and (2) organisational inertia (Ranger-Moore 
1997, Hannan et al. 2007). Environments drift because (new) rivals introduce superior 
technologies, designs, and strategies (Utterback and Abernathy 1975, Tushman and 
Anderson 1986) and because audience tastes change (Simmel 1904), but ageing 
organisations cannot adapt well to such changes due to increasing inertial pressures. 
As a result, performance starts to decline with age at some point. This pattern of decline 
in organisational performance at old age is commonly called liability of obsolescence. 
This phenomenon has been documented empirically in analyses of the hazard of 
organisational mortality (Barnett 1990, Barron et al. 1994) and rates of innovation 
(Sørensen and Stuart 2000).  
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Le Mens et al. (2015b) focuses on “intra-organisational processes rather than on 
selection processes that imply that older organisations are less robust to changing 
environmental conditions.” The Le Mens et al. (2015b) model proposes that 
organisations obtain the resources that matter for organisational survival from the 
audiences that they cater to. This external audience consists of actual and potential 
customers, actual and potential organisational members, and, more generally, any 
individual, organisation, or governmental agency that controls resources useful to the 
organisation and also takes an interest in the category.  
A producer obtains resources from the relevant audiences when what it offers them is 
more appealing than what its competitors offer. Moreover, an offer tends to be 
appealing to the extent that it fits the tastes of the audience. The central idea is that 
when tastes drift, an ageing producer has more and more trouble adapting its offer to 
maintain an acceptable fit with the audience’s taste. At some point, the offer becomes 
so inconsistent with the audience’s taste that the producer can no longer capture 
enough resources from its audience to overcome its fixed cost structure. When this 
happens, an organisation’s stock of resources starts to deplete, and the hazard of 
organisational failure starts to increase. 
An ample stock of (financial, material, and social) resources buffers the organisation 
from failure; but a small stock provides little buffer causing failure hazards to be 
elevated (Levinthal 1991). Whether the hazard of failure increases or decreases with 
ageing, therefore, depends on the sign of the net flow of resources from the audience. 
Organisational viability depends on the history of the events that affected the inflow 
and outflow of resources to and from the organisation. As such, it recognises that some 
organisational episodes can have lasting consequences (Carroll and Hannan 1989). 
For example, a decrease in organisational performance (e.g., due to organisational 
change) will have long-term effects on the trajectory of organisational capital, and thus 
organisational viability. This is consistent with existing empirical evidence (Amburgey 
et al. 1993). 
Based on extensive prior theory and research (Hannan and Freeman 1984, Barron et 
al. 1994, Dobrev et al. 2001, Sørensen and Stuart 2000), Le Mens et al. (2015a) 
assume that organisations become more inert as they age. In their framework, strong 
inertia translates into low adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity declines with age and 
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ultimately becomes very low, as producers get old. Organisations can adapt to 
changing conditions, but their adapting capacity declines with age.  
The onset of Obsolescence. In the framework of Le Mens et al. (2015a), the speed 
at which inertial forces come into play depends on the speed of drift and the 
organisation’s adaptive capacity (its initial level and the rate of decay). Once adaptation 
speed falls below the drift speed and stays there, the producer has lost its alignment 
with the audience. Then it is only a matter of time, until the intrinsic appeal of its offer 
starts to fall, followed by the decline of actual appeal, fitness, and finally organisational 
capital and the corresponding rise in the failure hazard. 
Structural inertia is so strong that even when after the intended reorganisation the 
fitness of the company has recovered the mentality produced by it would put under 
question the existence of a troubled company or at least part of its business.  
Institutionalisation theory  
The following paragraph describes a powerful force able to limit the adaptive capability 
of the top executives significantly: institutionalisation. Institutional theories consider 
organisations as affected by institutions built up in broader environments or as affected 
by the institutionalisation built into their own histories. Modern sociological 
institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001; 
Jepperson, 2002; Hasse & Kruecken, 2005) considers organisations as substantially 
empowered and controlled by institutional contexts, and these contexts go far beyond 
a few norms or network structures.  
Organisations facing conflicting institutional demands operate within multiple 
institutional spheres and are subject to multiple and contradictory regulatory regimes, 
normative orders, and cultural logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008). This makes compliance 
impossible to achieve because satisfying some demands requires defying others 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Competing demands “are, also, likely to be imposed on 
organisations because of the existence of a few powerful referents that do not have 
enough power to dominate the field on their own and resolve conflict, but have enough 
power to constrain organisations to take their demands into account.”  
Institutional demands permeate organisational boundaries through two central 
mechanisms. First, actors located outside the organisation who disseminate, promote, 
and monitor the demands across the field, can convey them. These external actors 
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might be located in professional organisations, regulatory bodies, or funding agencies. 
They exercise compliance pressures on organisations using resource dependence 
relationships (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When 
organisations depend on the main institutional referents for resources, such as funds, 
staff, or license to operate, they are likely to comply with what these stakeholders 
expect from them to secure access to these critical resources. Second, institutional 
pressures also manifest themselves internally as a result of hiring and filtering practices 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional demands are conveyed by staff members, 
executives, board members, or volunteers who adhere to and promote practices, 
norms, and values that they have been trained to follow or have been socialised into. 
Organisational members who have been socialised or trained into a specific 
institutional logic are likely to be committed to defending it should it be challenged 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2002).  
Spontaneous Institutionalisation. According to Le Mens et al. (2015), as 
organisations age, their invariant features get spontaneously institutionalised. On the 
one hand, people learn the routines, collect experience, get familiar with the 
environment, develop a liking and start feeling comfortable in it, because it generates 
certainty, stability, and reduces stress. On the other hand, people are afraid of the 
uncertainty of organisational change and some less attractive aspect of the job that 
might result from the transformation.  In other words, “endowment effect makes them 
systematically prefer the status quo, even if an outsider would view the new option as 
equally attractive as the old one” (Le Mens et al. (2015). Moreover, “internal audience 
members are tied in a dense network and can generate serious cultural opposition to 
any change of these taken for granted feature values” (Liu, Polos, Hannan 2016). 
Hannan, Polos, and Carrol (2007) call the probability of such resistance “asperity” and 
argue that the higher an organisation’s asperity, the slower the organisational changes 
that affect the taken-for-granted feature values.  
Lio, Polos, Hannan (2016), develop a theory that focuses on the portfolio of types of 
offers in a particular market, rather than on the organisational features, as the subject 
of institutionalisation.  In their theory, “the institutionalisation takes place between the 
focal organisation and the relevant audience segments in that market, e.g., the 
customers, enthusiasts, critiques of the products of the focal producer.” They postulate 
that such external audience cannot directly generate asperity, but their taken-for-
22 
 
granted beliefs and expectations indirectly have a slowing effect on adaptive 
capabilities.  
Strategies addressing conflicting demands. Pache and Santos (2010) 
conceptualise organisations as complex entities composed of various groups 
promoting different values, goals, and interests. These groups play a significant role in 
interpreting and enacting the institutional demands exerted on organisations (Delmas 
& Toffel, 2008), as well as in making decisions in the face of these institutional 
constraints (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006).  
Oliver (1991) proposes strategies (listed in increasing order of resistance to the 
demands) available to organisations as they face institutional pressures.  
Acquiescence refers to the adoption of arrangements required by external institutional 
constituents. It can result from taken-for-granted norms, from the conscious or 
unconscious imitation of institutional models, or from the voluntary compliance to 
institutional requirements. Compromise means that organisations at least partially 
satisfy all demands by balancing competing expectations, conforming only to the 
minimal institutional requirements or actively bargaining alterations of the demands. 
Avoidance tactics include pure symbolic compliance, buffering institutional processes 
by decoupling technical activities from external contact or escaping institutional 
influence by exiting the domain within which the pressure is exerted. A more aggressive 
strategy, defiance, can be exercised through dismissing or ignoring institutional 
prescriptions, overtly challenging or contesting the norms imposed, or directly attacking 
or denouncing them. Finally, manipulation refers to three specific manipulation tactics: 
organisations may attempt to co-opt the sources of the institutional pressures, to 
influence the definition of norms through active lobbying, or, more radically, to control 
the source of pressure.  
Conflicting institutional demands may influence organisations at the ideological level, 
prescribing which goals are legitimate to pursue, or they might exert pressures at the 
functional level, requiring organisations to adopt appropriate means or courses of 
action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1991; Townley, 2002). 
To understand how organisations respond to conflicting institutional pressures, it is 
essential to consider the extent to which the different sides of the conflict are 
represented internally (Kim et al., 2007). Pache and Santos (2010) postulate that the 
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nature of the institutional conflict (means versus goals) interacts with the degree of 
internal representation (absence, single, or multiple) to shape the experience of 
conflicting demands and influence the strategies mobilised by organisations in 
response.  
Conflicts over means only are not very challenging for organisations. They are 
peripheral and negotiable, and the likelihood of achieving a compromise is significant.  
The focus is on technical issues, and the demands are relatively peripheral for 
organisations. Conflicts over goals are more challenging for organisational members 
then conflicts over means because they threaten their core understanding of what the 
organisation is about. Independently of how demands are internally represented, it will 
be difficult to achieve a compromise on conflicting goals, since these are not easily 
negotiable. In the absence of internal representation of the demands, avoidance may 
indeed be viable as the mildest way to resist institutional demands without jeopardising 
legitimacy. Such situations are frequent for organisations that rely on a variety of 
external funding sources to survive since different funders might hold distinct views of 
what the organisation is about and what it stands. Organisations may also resort to 
defiance strategies when the tensions experienced by organisational leaders are too 
high to be treated with avoidance.  
When one side of the competing demands is internally championed, organisations are 
likely to resort to avoidance strategies, since the internal champions of demand will 
find it easy and comfortable to circumvent those pressures for compliance they 
disagree with (Pache and Santos 2010). However, avoidance may not be viable over 
the long term, since a public divergence on the organisational goals may ultimately 
affect the organisation’s legitimacy. More proactive strategies, such as defiance and 
manipulation, may thus be mobilised. The organisational members may be willing to 
reject the contradicting demands and manipulate external stakeholders’ views, in order 
to make their own views prevail.  
The final configuration of the model is the internal representation of both sides of a 
goal-based conflict. In cases where one of the internal groups involved in the conflict 
clearly dominates, this power imbalance reduces the need to destabilise the opposing 
groups. The dominant group’s chances to succeed at manipulation will be high.  
In situations where the two internal champions of conflicting institutional demands are 
equally powerful, the high stakes involved in a conflict around goals, combined with the 
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competitive commitment of internal groups, are likely to lead to strong internal tensions; 
competing groups are likely to resort to proactive resistant strategies to reject the 
contested demands and destabilise the other group with the hope of achieving 
domination. Ultimately, one group might end up winning the ideological battle and take 
control over the other through manipulation strategies. If no clear winner emerges, 
dramatic outcomes may occur at the organisational level: organisations may 
experience escalations of conflict leading to organisational paralysis (such as long-
term strikes) or even more permanent organisational breakups (such as demergers, 
spin-offs, or organisational deaths).  
The above rational has universal application as the postulates are generally valid for 
all organisations in different industries. However, it is an exceptionally useful basis for 
consideration of the reorganisation process of troubled enterprises.   
1.3. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE PROCESS  
Change Cascades and Centrality  
Organisational Architecture. The theory presents architecture as collections of 
sentences about ontology (definitions of the units in architecture) and rules (statements 
of which units have authority over which other units). Such sentences are regarded as 
codes. Some codes matter significantly in the sense that violations are punished very 
severely, while others are handled with a lighter touch (Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003).  
It appears that organisational changes do frequently generate cascades of related 
shifts in the sense that a single initial change often begets a series of subsequent 
changes. Generally speaking, organisations with complicated patterns of 
interconnections among their units will generate longer cascades. Two elements are 
central. First, the number of stages of a cascade: the total time spent reorganising and 
the time span of a cascade will increase with the number of stages it contains. Second, 
the complexity of the pattern of connections among organisational units: the time spent 
reorganising within a cascade will be longer the more the pattern departs from the 
simple hierarchy. (Simon 1962).   
The critical aspect is the centrality of units. A units centrality in the architecture depends 
upon the central role of the units that it constrains. A unit is central to the extent that it 
constrains units that are themselves central. Thus, the most central unit in the flat 
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hierarchy is less central than the most central unit in the vertical hierarchy. Two units 
are connected in an architectural sense if the feature values of one govern and 
constrain the architectural codes of the other. The expected time reorganising by an 
organisation during a cascade that originates in a unit is proportional to the centrality 
of the unit.  
Periods of reorganisation are significant because devoting attention, time, and energy 
to reorganisation diverts members of an organisation from the tasks that generate 
revenues. Therefore, any durable change process entails substantial opportunity 
costs. Because management attention is focused on the change, opportunities are 
foregone; production is disrupted, relations with customers are left unattended as 
responsibilities are reallocated, and so forth. Each of these problems becomes more 
severe as reorganisation lengthens. The expected number of opportunities missed due 
to reorganisation and the hazard of mortality during a full cascade of reorganisations 
increases monotonically with the product of the organisation’s viscosity and intricacy 
(Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003).  
Intricacy, Opacity, Viscosity, Asperity 
Intricacy. A strong and complex pattern of interconnections among an organisation’s 
component units. Specifically, intricacy is the mean of the centralities of the units in the 
organisation.  
Viscosity. The expected time it takes an organisational unit to respond to induced 
architectural code violations and bring local architecture into code conformity. The 
expected total time for reorganising into a cascade with a random origin presumably 
equals the product of the organisation’s intricacy, and viscosity.   
Opacity. The theory assumes that reduced foresight about the exact structure of 
connections among units impairs the ability to calculate accurately in advance the 
costs and benefits of an architectural change to those in the initiating unit. This 
miscalculation can give a rosier-than-justified expectation and thus prompt agents to 
undertake some changes with potentially disruptive results. Limitations on foresight 
produce a systematic tendency to underestimate the length of reorganisations and thus 
to underestimate the costs and risks of change. Given such systematic 
underestimation, managers can easily choose to enter into changes that cost far more 
than the expected benefits of completing the change.  
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In many cases, an organisation’s structure imposes limits on what can be known. 
Information about some parts of an organisation is often unavailable in other parts and 
this is called “information impactedness.” Stinchcomb observes that local information 
usually does not “have to flow anywhere in a hierarchy, except in aggregated form as 
a “budget estimate.” Sometimes the hindrance to data flow arises from differences in 
the languages used in different parts of the organisation, which make it difficult for 
those outside a unit to interpret a full-disclosure description of the activities in an 
organisational unit. Other times, the lack of transparency arises due to strategic 
withholding of information. One component of the organisation is structurally opaque 
to another if the latter cannot readily see the interunit connections that flow from the 
former.  
The expected number of unforeseen induced violations of architectural codes in a 
random cascade presumably equals the organisation’s level of opacity. When 
violations cannot be foreseen, agents cannot plan comprehensively for reorganisation, 
and they cannot undertake as many adjustments in parallel. The fact that the 
unforeseen architectural code violations show up in mid-change causes slower 
adjustment, thereby extending actual periods of reorganisation. The expected duration 
of an unforeseen violation of architectural codes for a unit exceeds typically that of a 
foreseen one.  
Asperity. Changes that break codes specifying identities encounter cultural opposition. 
The reactions could emanate from a variety of possible sources including local 
tradition, professional norms, organisational form of membership, or other identity 
constraints. The critical observations are that cultural opposition generates turmoil and 
turmoil is likely to lengthen reorganisation periods. The strength of cultural opposition 
can be difficult to anticipate if those who initiate a change do not share in the 
organisational culture of the members. It makes sense to distinguish extensional and 
intentional consensus. An extensional reading of an architectural code corresponds to 
what is called the “letter of the law,” its literal meaning. In contrast, an intentional 
reading corresponds to the “spirit of the law.” Because codes are highly simplified and 
cannot provide a complete specification of architecture, the deliberate consensus is 
much more essential to smooth functioning than the extensional consensus.  
Asperity displays two defining characteristics. First, the cultural code must be 
restrictive in the sense that it allows only a narrow range of possible rules, structures, 
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or behaviours; many possibly functional alternatives are considered morally 
unacceptable. Second, the membership must understand and embrace the culture and 
be willing to enforce sanctions when violations of the code are detected. That means 
that the membership has a high level of cultural agreement about the architecture. The 
cultural asperity of the membership of one unit is higher than that of another within the 
same organisation if it has greater cultural homogeneity and a higher average degree 
of restrictiveness in members’ schemata. When an attempt to eliminate an induced 
architectural code violation comes into conflict with local culture code, the new 
architecture becomes morally suspect for a unit’s members. In such cases, there might 
be nothing operationally or mechanically wrong with the new code; indeed, the 
architectural change might very well prove beneficial, except for the cultural reaction. 
The probability that an induced architectural change mobilises cultural resistance to 
local architectural change usually equals the asperity of a unit’s culture. It usually takes 
longer for a unit to eliminate an induced violation of an architectural code when cultural 
resistance is stronger.  
Distance, Age (Tenure), Architectural Change and Adaptive Capabilities 
The theory postulates that all things being equal, ageing increases the length of time 
it takes to change the organisational architecture and the offers in the portfolio. 
However, according to Le Mens et al. (2015a), the distance between the existing 
portfolio and the new one should also be taken into account. “The larger the distance 
between the incumbent type portfolio and the new type, the more dramatic the 
organisational changes in the interface between the producer and its type-specific 
audience” (Lio, Polos, Hannan 2016). Similarly, the larger the distance between the 
compelling features of an organisation and the new architecture, the more dramatic 
the organisational change. The more considerable distance requires a longer time to 
reorganise the resources to achieve a new organisational structure. The theory 
postulates that the expected duration of reorganisation depends on the predictive 
capability of the organisation and whether the attempt for a change encounters cultural 
resistance (Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2007). Le Mens, Hannan, and Polos (2015a) refer 
to individual preference for the status quo as cultural resistance. Resistance varies in 
intensity from mild grumbling to unwillingness to cooperate in implementing change, to 
active efforts to thwart the change. Cultural opposition (asperity) generates turmoil; 
turbulence reduces the speed of reorganisation and increases the length of change. 
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The simple dynamic model of Le Mens et al. (2015a) demonstrates that the duration 
of exposure to organisational features by organisational members’ increases with 
organisational age even when there is turnover. The assumption that people are more 
resistant to change when they have been exposed to a feature for a long time is enough 
to imply a positive relationship between age and structural inertia. Moreover, the 
broader the distribution of cultural resistance within an organisation the lower is the 
potential speed of architectural change. The expected total time spent in 
reorganisations by an organisation’s units during a cascade with the random origin as 
well as the increase of mortality hazard due to an architectural change presumably 
increases monotonically with intricacy, opacity, and asperity, as well.  
1.4. PRACTICE INFORMED SYNTHESIS 
My experience with the transformation of the Bulgarian States Railways gives me a 
reason to propose a theoretical position, a kind of practice informed theory selection 
and synthesis, where I provide the argumentation for my theoretical contribution with 
the research.  
Managers of troubled companies usually would not have the ability to anticipate the 
timing and the nature of the environmental shifts that endangers the existence of the 
organisation. They would be an integral part of the status quo that already cannot 
fabricate products or services satisfying the tastes of the customers. Even if, after a 
significant delay, managers realise that the environment has changed they would not 
be capable of designing a strategy to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies to address rapidly changing environments. Managers of the 
companies that experience liability of obsolescence are a fundamental part of the 
dominating routines and competencies that prevent them from quickly and correctly 
reading the environmental dynamics and designing a proper response. While they are 
not only part of organisational inertia, they are also the leaders of the inertial thinking. 
As such, the executives of the companies experiencing lengthy declining performance 
could be named inertial managers.  
When the fitness of an organisation declines to the position of a troubled company and 
the going concern status is under question, the organisations’ ability to adapt to the 
environmental shifts would depend primarily on the leadership qualities. Adequate 
executive attributes are the main prerequisite increasing the likelihood of survival. A 
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new management, capable of understanding the changing environment and 
formulating proper strategic responses to ensure positive performance and long-term 
existence is necessary. Because the survival of an organisation is dependable on the 
capability of the leadership to reorganise it, the management appointed to turn a 
company around could be named transformational management. The transformational 
management must initiate big bang reforms, which include core and peripheral 
changes. These type of reorganisations will produce numerous cascades and will 
provoke strong internal and external opposition. The transformational leadership will 
not only have to understand the whole complexities behind the business but also be 
able to implement the changes dealing with the internal resistance and conflicting 
stakeholders’ demands. Such a situation requires skills and knowledge beyond the 
ordinary excellence of top managers.   
When a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, the appointment of transformational 
management is the only chance for the organisation to survive. The old cohort, 
however, would not surrender without any turbulence. It is not enough to substitute 
part of the top management (the board of directors for example), as the inertial thinking 
would typically control the whole architecture of the enterprise. It could be expected 
that the old cohort would try to preserve as much from the past as it is possible. They 
would prefer to save the status quo allowing only marginal changes in the company 
mission, vision, strategy, architecture, and operations and thus hoping to protect their 
dominance in a company that, as they would believe, at the end of the day would avoid 
insolvency. The resistance of the inertial management would not come from a well-
supported rationale, but from interests, fears, and emotions. 
Moreover, they would typically generate significant support at every corner of the 
organisation because a critical mass of employees would share similar believes and 
values. Asperity would inevitably generate a collision with transformational leadership’s 
intends. The confrontation between the opposing concepts of the inertial and the 
transformational management would reduce such company’s adaptive capabilities, 
postpone the fundamental reorganisations, lengthen the transformation process, 
upsurge the cost of the reforms and increase the mortality hazard.  
Transformation managers should be exceptionally skilful tactically to win the clash with 
the old cohort. They must be skilful enough to manoeuvre in a very hostile environment 
where internal audience prepares for the combat of their lives. Even when the 
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transformational managers win the battle with the inertial management, they will face 
a harsh reality. 
The competence of the new leadership would have crucial importance. If the attributes 
of the management could not meet the demands of the transformational project, one 
more troubled company will disappear. It is, however, not very realistic to expect that 
all the managers would possess the attributes needed by a transformational manager. 
They may attain not full-fit to the profile of the transformation manager, but quasi-fit 
when attributes only partly fit the contingency (similarly to SARFIT page 11). As in the 
Hetero-performance theory, (page 11) fits to higher levels of contingency will produce 
higher performance than fits to lower levels of contingency.  
In the best-case scenario, when managers are empowered with all the required 
knowledge and skills, they will begin to apply the best business practices available to 
transform the enterprise. In the light of the adaptation theory, this should lead to finding 
more rational ways to organise and perform the work, and by deciding how to make 
the best use of available technology, resources, and personnel. Transformational 
managers will attempt to create an appropriate strategy, redesign the business 
process, adapt the organisational structure, re-determine the authority relationship, 
and improve operations. However, even if the attributes of the management are 
suitable to exercise the reshuffle, the complete reorganisation will face hard 
challenges. The combination of quasi-fit and the listed below blockers of the 
reorganisation will reduce the adaptive capability of the organisation, thereby 
prolonging the reorganisation and increasing the mortality hazard. The major obstacles 
would be: 
First, structural inertia and spontaneous institutionalisation will generate asperity driven 
by the internal audience. This asperity could have various sources and manifestations. 
Among the instances would be the established rules, regulations, routines, and norms 
that have guided the company’s operations for many years and possibly decades. The 
danger that any reorganisation would bring to an end the prevailing state of affairs 
grounded on long-lived values, interests and believes would be an extra source of 
resistance, potentially coming from the employees. Another reservoir of opposition 
would be organised internal groups and societies like the trade unions for example. 
Assembled: rules, norms, regulations, employees and trade unions will create a 
significant part of the internal environment.   
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Second, the external audience could indirectly exercise influence on the reorganisation 
actions and processes. The regulating and funding bodies could have a deadly impact 
on the adaptive capability of organisations. They can postpone the allocation of 
resources crucial for the success of the reforms or block the initiatives of the 
transformational managers because of lack of capability to understand the complexity 
of the transformation, misunderstanding, or just because of private or group interests 
intended to keep parts of the status quo. Various other stakeholders like customers, 
local authorities and interest groups for example could intervene at any time in the re-
organisational process objecting the restructuring measures that the transformational 
management aims to implement. Transformational managers would apply different 
strategies to address the conflict demands of the internal and external audience of 
companies. However, they would face limitations whose scope and magnitude would 
depend heavily on contingency.  
Third, intricacy, opacity, and viscosity of a troubled company would challenge the 
process of transformation additionally by further decreasing the adaptive capability and 
the speed of reorganisation. The transformational managers would not only have 
limited knowledge about the troubled company, but their attempts to understand the 
puzzles would be hindered by the reduced foresight about the exact structure of 
connections among units and the content of their productivity.  
Fourth, a transformation never happens overnight, and the leadership would 
experience many shifts. In the process of transformation, the transformational 
leadership would change both the organisation and itself. Managers come and go. For 
some reasons, they change employment. However, any change in the membership of 
the transformational leadership would change the attributes of the team as a whole. 
Potentially, managers who stay longer with the company might change their attitudes 
and values, as well. Some of the top managers might show features that have not been 
apparent at the beginning of the process of reorganisation. They might get used to the 
company, start feeling comfortable where they are, or even, after some time, find out 
that their interests are well satisfied. In other words, transformational managers could 
lose the last battle, the one with themselves. They might gradually turn to be swallowed 
by structural inertia and become crusaders of the newly spontaneously institutionalised 
status quo, whose integral part they believe they are. Even when managers have all 
the necessary attributes they might face a reality that reduces an organisation’s 
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adaptive capability, increases the time and the cost of change and upsurges 
organisation’s mortality hazard. At the end of the day, the troubled company may find 
itself mentality where it was before the reorganisation, albeit the recovery of the going 
concern status. 
The doctoral study applies the above practice-informed synthesis of the adaptation and 
the ecology theories to study the transformation of the troubled BSRG. Five hypothesis 
are tested in the research:  
Hypothesis 1. The adaptive capacity of the troubled Bulgarian States Railways Inc. 
declines with the length of service of the inertial management and increases with the 
length of service of the transformational management.  
Hypothesis 2. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG to adjust to environmental 
drift declines with the strength of the limits imposed on the company performance by 
the institutionalised collective labour agreements. 
Hypothesis 3. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries to 
adapt promptly to the environmental drifts declines with the strength of its 
organisational opacity and asperity. 
Hypothesis 4. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG declines with the intensity 
of the conflicting institutional demands presented by the key stakeholders.  
Hypothesis 5. The adaptive capacity of a troubled organisation declines with its age, 
but some critical factors and events improve it. Management’s activities could improve 
the adaptive capacity of the BSRG.  
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Chapter Two 
The Crisis and the Outcomes of the Change 
2.1. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BSRG’ REORGANIZATION  
Political Context. The decade between 2010 and 2020 is a strange combination of 
turbulence and stability. The newly formed centre-right party GERB won the 
parliamentary elections of 2009 and from then on dominated the governance of 
Bulgaria with few exceptions. The party was re-elected three times.   
After the elections in 2009, the new government aimed at improving state finance by 
following conservative fiscal policy and reorganizing some public systems. The severity 
measures required after the stagnation of the Global Financial Crisis led to massive 
protests and the resignation of the cabinet in early 2013, months before the end of 
GERB's term. 
In the early elections the former leading party GERB received highest vote from the 
people. This was the first time since 1989 that a ruling party was re-elected 
nevertheless painful and unpopular reforms had to be implemented. However, as 
GERB received only 97 of the 240 seats, and failed to make a coalition, they refused 
the mandate, handing it down to the next party - Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).   
Only two weeks after its initial formation the BSP government came under criticism and 
had to deal with large-scale protests. The protests continued over the lifetime of the 
government and led to early parliamentary elections held on in October 2014. GERB 
remained the largest party, winning 84 of the 240 seats with around a third of the vote. 
Eight parties won seats, the first time since the beginning of democratic elections in 
1990 that more than seven parties entered parliament. GERB formed a coalition with 
the Reformist Bloc, had a partnership agreement for the support of the Alternative for 
Bulgarian Revival, and also had the outside support of the Patriotic Front. A majority 
approved the cabinet of twenty ministers. The ruling centre-right party dominating the 
coalition continued to follow the conservative agenda initiated by the end of 2009.  
In April 2017, new early elections took place after the ruling party lost the president 
elections in October 2016 and the opposition threw the government out of challenge. 
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GERB won the elections for third time winning 95 of the 240 seats and formed a new 
coalition this time with the Patriotic Front.  
Economic Context. The turbulent economic development of the country from the 
years after the beginning of the new millennium continues in the first years after the 
country's accession to the EU. In the period 2007-2008, economic growth amounted 
to 6.7% annual average, noting an acceleration from the annual average increase of 
5.8% recorded in the period 2000-2006. The economic downturn in 2009 was followed 
by a protracted period of sluggish economic recovery, in which the growth of the 
economy did not cross the threshold of 2%. It was only after 2014 that economic growth 
accelerated, albeit remaining far below (only about 3%) the levels observed before the 
crisis. In this way, the country continues the process of convergence with EU income 
levels, albeit at relatively slow rates. Gross domestic product per capita reached 49.2% 
of the EU average in 2017, marking an increase of almost 10 percentage points 
compared to 2007. 
Economic recovery in the country runs in parallel with remedial processes of 
eliminating economic imbalances. The chronic current account deficit declined rapidly 
after 2007, and in 2011 became a surplus for the first time after the profound 
institutional changes in the 90-ies of the last century. After the registered two-digit 
average annual inflation in 2008, the price level in the country exhibits relative stability 
and the accumulated inflation in the last ten years reaches only 9.2%, which gives 
Bulgaria a quarter-6th place in the EU for the stability of the price level during the period 
considered, but further increases the difference in price levels between the country and 
the community.  
In 2016, the government drafted a dedicated action plan with measures that included 
regulatory changes and aimed at easing the conditions for doing business in the 
country, the results of which were evident as early as 2016, when private investment 
marked substantial growth. The inflow of foreign direct investment in the country 
remains far from pre-crisis-registered levels, the main factors of which (global trends, 
change in investors ' propensity to take risks, etc.) should be sought beyond the 
national framework. Bulgaria remains in the EU's forehead on the indicator borrowed 
foreign direct investments, with the size of the economy (GDP). 
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The currency board continues to be a stability factor. In the period 2007 – 2018, the 
country's foreign exchange reserves continued to rise, reaching 25.1 billion euro at the 
end of 2018. In the years following the introduction of the currency board, the country 
conducts prudent and conservative fiscal policy, based on the principles of fiscal 
sustainability and strict fiscal discipline. Government expenditures amounted to 37.3% 
of GDP on average for the period 2007-2017, with 47.6% of GDP on average for the 
EU.  
Consistent and prudent fiscal policy-making over the years has led to a relatively low 
amount of sovereign debt. Despite its significant increase during the period considered, 
mainly due to developments in the banking system in 2014, Bulgaria remains one of 
the EU Member States with the lowest general government debt. The value of the 
indicator reached 22.6% of GDP in 2018, almost threefold lower than the critical value 
under the Maastricht criteria.  
A stable and predictable macroeconomic environment is one of the main advantages 
of the country. The research Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 of the World 
Economic Forum puts Bulgaria on the 25th place in the world and 11th place in the EU 
under this indicator. In this way, over the last ten years the country has managed to 
improve its performance by more than 20 positions globally and with 4 positions within 
the EU. 
Transport and railways. In 2017, Land transport services (road and rail transport) 
ensured the transport of 98.3% of the cargoes and 62.3% of the passengers in the 
country, demonstrating the leading role of this mode of transport for the whole sector 
in the country. The total length of railway lines in 2017 is 4 030 km. The density of the 
railway lines in the country is 0.0363 km/km². In 2015 Bulgaria had the seventh highest 
percentage of electrified railway lines from the EU Member States, with data showing 
that in 2017, 71.2% of the existing railway lines in the country were electrified (67.7% 
in 2007).  
The opening of the railway market in the country leads to the entry of private railway 
companies for freight transport. The market for rail freight transport in Bulgaria is one 
of the most open to competition: The main operator's competitors have a market share 
of 48.8%, the third highest level in the EU. Rail services continue to be perceived as 
one of the most poorly functioning sectors, with the satisfaction of rail users being the 
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lowest in the EU. Despite investments in rail infrastructure in recent years, there remain 
limitations and challenges 
A major problem for the development of the sector is the need to improve the 
operational and technical parameters of the railway infrastructure in a manner 
consistent with the service demanded and the safety requirements. A significant part 
of the railway lines in the country are constructed with geometric parameters, 
construction and facilities, suitable for the development of speed only up to 100 km/h. 
Speed over 100 km/h allow only 17.2% of the main directions, with only in some 
segments of the railway network it is possible to achieve a speed of 160 km/h. As of 
2017, the projects for modernization of the railway line were completed in the areas of 
Septemvri – Plovdiv and Dimitrovgrad – Svilengrad, as well as the rehabilitation of 
separate sections of the railway line Plovdiv – Bourgas. It should be noted that the 
increased permissible speeds up to 160 km/h for passenger trains and up to 120 km/h 
for freight trains at the railway sections where projects are carried out.  
For rehabilitation or modernisation may not improve the railway service if there is no 
overall improvement in the technical characteristics of the rolling stock of railway 
undertakings. Traffic speeds still do not sufficiently meet the international commitments 
made for the development of rail transport. The number of train delays increased, and 
in 2015 late 47% of domestic long-distance trains and 55% of international trains. The 
average technical speed for the movement of passenger trains is one of the lowest in 
Europe. This contributes to the poor state of the sector, while the movement of the 
railway network in the country is slow and uncomfortable. To ensure the safety of 
movement in many sections, it is not possible even the projected speed to be reached.  
The general condition of the rolling stock in the country's railways is also at an 
unsatisfactory level. A significant proportion of locomotives, passenger and freight 
wagons operated on national railway infrastructure are obsolete. Overall, a key factor 
in the quality of the service offered is the poor condition of the available rolling stock, 
which does not meet European standards in terms of comfort, hygiene and quality and 
is, for the most part, operationally incompatible with European standards and 
requirements and cannot exploit the full potential of rehabilitated and modernised 
railway infrastructure (Analysis of the socio-economic development of the country after 
its accession to the European Union, Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria, January 2020). 
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2.2. THE BULGARIAN STATE RAILWAY CRISIS   
In 2011, the railway industry in the EU, represented by 55 passenger and freight 
companies, had an annual turnover of more than EUR 50 billion and EUR 350 billion 
in assets. In the same year, out of 43 companies providing financial information, 23 
generated a loss of EUR 3.6 billion (International Union of Railways). In the last 
decade, some railway undertakings were restructured to improve performance and 
avoid bankruptcy. However, the results of many of the restructuring efforts were 
questionable.  
The Bulgarian State Railways is one of the railway companies in a process of 
reorganisation. After the end of Communism in 1989, the company lost its monopolistic 
position because of the growing competition in the transportation industry. In 2009, it 
was a 120 years old, large corporation with 15,439 employees, EUR 218 million 
turnover, and EUR 514 million in assets, with historically developed culture. (Audited 
consolidated financial statements BSRG for the period 2002—2017) 
At the end of 2009, BSRG had archaic management, the financial health of the 
company was feeble, and the assets were heavily depreciated and depleted. The 
company collided with the economic crisis, which drastically reduced transport 
volumes; the heavy industry was crippled due to the restructuring of the economy; the 
population was concentrating in large cities; road transport was favoured by weaker 
regulation and lower charges for infrastructure access. 
At the end of 2009, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. All the areas of the 
business were affected by the crisis:  
1. The company had outstanding debts of EUR 425 million while the net assets 
amounted to EUR 380 million. The debts made 77% of the assets, a very 
unfavourable capital structure (Audited Financial Statements 2002—2009 BSRG).  
2. The loss came to EUR 34 million (15% of revenues). EUR 12.5 million of it was in 
the BSRF, and EUR 5.3 million of it was in the BSRP (Audited Financial Statements 
2002—2009 BSRH, BSRP, and BSRF) 
3. The excess capacity of 348 locomotives, 7,887 freight wagons, 683 passenger 
coaches, 754 properties and nearly 6,600 (out of a total of 15,439) employees, was 
generating significant fixed costs. The company was overstaffed because of the 
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severe decline of its workload (Audited Financial Statements 2002—2009 BSRG; 
Plan for Restructuring and Financial Stabilisation of Holding BSR Inc.). 
4. The rolling stock was 30-40 years old, which was impeding any improvements in 
the service quality. 
5. The underfunding by the state amounting to EUR 153 million for the period 2002—
2009, was offset by an increase in liabilities to suppliers and creditors (Annual 
reports PSO contract 2002-2010). 
6. The railway infrastructure was obsolete, and some parts were undergoing intensive 
overhauls, which led to an uncompetitive average speed of 50 km/h and 
interruptions driving away passengers and transporters alike.  
7. The organisational structure was unnecessarily complicated. It consisted of 4 
companies, 315 organisational units and 9 levels of hierarchy. The complexity was 
reducing the visibility over business activities which, made it difficult to implement 
the changes (Organisational charts BSRG, BSRF and BSRP 2009). 
8. The maintenance of the rolling stock was cumbersome as 11 enterprises for the 
repair of wagons and locomotives were spun out of BSRG in the period 1999-2000. 
In 2008, the contract for maintenance of DMU was unilaterally cancelled without 
securing an alternative.  
9. The company had EUR 30 million overdue receivables, including EUR 16 million 
from the Serbian, Macedonian and Greek railways (Audited Financial Statements 
2009 BSRG). 
10. During the inventory taking in 2011, 1133 freight wagons were discovered as 
missing (Inventory taking 2011). 
11. The working conditions in the depots were poor due to dilapidated and non-
renovated buildings. 
12. The cooperation with educational institutions that produce professionals for the 
railway industry was more or less discontinued. 
 
The management undertook wide-ranging reorganisation to turn the company around. 
However, additional problems emerge in the course of the reorganisation (Audited 
Financial Statements 2002—2017 BSRG): 
1. EUR 34 million penalty interest on liabilities (from before 2010) to banks, suppliers 
and National Revenue Agency for the period 2010 - 2016.  
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2. EUR 12 million increased fees by NRIC and EUR 2 million from a cancelled 
agreement. 
3. EUR 4.2 million for storage and safekeeping of excess capacity assets. 
4. 29 court cases related to circumstances before 2010, with a total exposure of EUR 
128 million and EUR 1 million of legal expenses for 2010-2016. 
5. Eight new competitors emerge in rail freight transport. 
 
The reforms driven by the transformational management generated a cascade of 
changes, confronted organisational opacity and provoked robust asperity. The 
following chapters deal with the analysis of the measures undertaken by the 
transformational leadership and the reaction of company’s stakeholders. The positive 
outcome of the reorganisation is what engenders robust research interest in adaptive 
capabilities and effects of inertia on transformation speed and fitness of the BSRG and 
its subsidiaries.   
2.3. THE OUTCOME OF THE REORGANISATION (CONTENT CHANGE)  
 
Core structural changes 
BSRG developed two detailed business plans: the first one for the period 2010—2014 
(Plan for Restructuring and Financial Stabilisation of Holding BSR Inc.) and the second 
one for the period 2015-2022 (Plan for Restructuring and Development of Holding 
BSR Inc. Group). The results of the reorganisations are: 
Mission and Vision Change. BSRH, BSRP, and BSRF approved new organisational 
missions and visions via the Plan for Restructuring and Development of Holding BSR 
Inc. Group adopted in 2015. Each company within the Group adopted its mission and 
vision relevant to the type of services provided and to the competitive market position.  
“The mission of BSRF is to be the most effective and eco-friendly carrier of heavy loads 
and at long distances, and to offer flexible services to all industries in Bulgaria and the 
region.” “The mission of BSRF is to offer an integrated and safe transport service to 
passengers in and outside of Bulgaria, aiming to achieve 50% non-subsidised revenue 
in the long term”.  
Marketing Strategy Change. New organisational strategies were approved in BSRH, 
BSRP, and BSRF via the Plan for Restructuring and Development of Holding BSR Inc. 
Group adopted in 2015. Each company in the Group adopted its strategy relevant to 
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the type of services provided and to the competitive position on the market. However, 
they were identical.  
“The management team (BSRF) uses a classic approach of the resource-oriented 
strategy consistent with the competitive situation on the market. Resources provide a 
full competitive advantage, but only when applied in an appropriate way to the market 
dynamics.” “We (BSRP) use the classic approach of resource-oriented strategy, 
consistent with the competitive situation in the market. Resources give full competitive 
advantage only when applied adequately to market dynamics.” 
Organisational Structure Change. The organisational structure was simplified from 
4 to 3 companies, from 9 to 7 levels of hierarchy and from 315 to 204 structural units 
for the period 2009-2017.  
On 24 September 2010 BSR Traction Rolling Stock (Locomotives) Ltd. was 
transformed through a merger into Holding BSR Inc. By a protocol decision No. 151, 
dated 22 October 2011, issued by the Minister of Transport, Information Technology 
and Communications, the company name was changed from Bulgarian State Railways 
(BSR) Inc. to Holding Bulgarian State Railways (HBSR) Inc.   
Technology Change. Until 23 May 2011, Holding BSR Inc. rented out its rolling stock 
to its subsidiaries to enable them to carry out cargo and passenger transport services 
and to provide them with locomotive traction, thereby earning revenue. Through the 
conversion of Holding BSR Inc., the ownership of cargo and passenger wagons and 
locomotives was transferred to the subsidiaries BSRP and BSRF, as it was necessary 
for the conduct of their business: provision of cargo and passenger railway transport 
services in the country and abroad. 
Additional changes to the technology of the business that affect the way, in which 
BSRF, BSRP provide the passengers and freight transportation services, took place in 
the company. Marketing, planning, and budgeting systems were entirely changed, 
supply chain systems and logistics were renovated, control systems were further 
developed, and some business units and structures were either eliminated or 
transformed. 
An example of the changes introduced by BSRF management is the optimisation of 
the shunting activity and outsourcing part of it through partnerships with other providers 
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of freight transportation services “including shunting associated with the processing of 
"single cargo" for the needs of all carriers.” Holding BSR Inc. remained the owner of all 
non-operating assets owned by the company at the time of the reorganisation and was 
to carry out all the transactions of management and operation of these assets. That 
was a change in the technology of the work in the company.  
 
The financial outcomes of the reorganisation  
The going concern recovery. The debts of the BSRG were reduced by 54%, from 
EUR 434 million in 2009 to EUR 190 million in 2018. However, EUR 101 million is due 
to the State, and the government has permission to increase the equity capital with 
precisely the same amount (done in 2019). Correspondingly, the overall indebtedness 
of the BSRG is EUR 89 million, down by 79%. That represents the normalised capital 
structure of the company with payables due only to suppliers and staff. The loss of 
BSRG was reduced from EUR 34 million in 2009 to EUR 8 million in 2017 and expected 
to be EUR 3 million in 2018. The recreational business unit was turned around to 
generate a small profit instead of a loss of EUR 1 million in 2010. The loss generating 
units – Parcels delivery, BSR Sped (freight broker), Rila Bureau (ticket sale point) – 
were closed. EUR 30 M of hard-to-collect receivables accrued before 2010 were 
written off (Audited Financial Statements 2002—2017 BSRG). 
Excess capacity reduction. The excess labour capacity was reduced as the number 
of employees was reduced from 15,439 by the end of 2009 to 9,444 by the end of 
2017. In other words, 5,995 employees were dismissed. Some of the excess assets 
— 91 properties (12% of all excess ones), 177 locomotives, 2 233 freight wagons and 
351 passenger coaches (31% of all excess ones) were sold out for a total amount of 
EUR 22.5 million (Audited Financial Statements 2009—2017 BSRH). 
Service quality. The company's substantial fixed costs and the priority to repay the 
debts in order to secure the going concern status of the company blocked all attempts 
to invest in any service improvement. From 2010 to 30 April 2018 EUR 320 million was 
paid out as a principal, penalty and regular interest charges. This enormous capital, 
remitted by BSRG, could have been directed to the acquisition of new rolling stock and 
investments in the company. This is the reason for the poor service quality and the 
poor working conditions. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology of the study. The research of the 
transformation of the Bulgarian States Railways and its subsidiaries is not part of the 
academic “battle” between Positivism and Constructivism. Although the study 
predominantly uses observable and measurable facts, the last part of it is entirely 
dependent on qualitative methods and author’s observations. This kind of mixture of 
methods explained in the following pages is only due to the efforts to present the whole 
research problem in the best possible way. 
3.1. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES    
The research is a combination of three different approaches.   
The first is a theory-driven study where the usage of theories that are intuitively 
appealing allows understanding the complex organisational change process. The 
summary of these theories is provided, and insights are generated from concepts and 
constructions.  
The second is an illustration of the relevance and the application of these concepts in 
real life. A conclusion is made on how these constructions explain much of the 
observed outcomes.  
The third is the so-called managerial component representing all the challenges as 
predicted by the theory and a kind of idiosyncratic assessment of the actual situation. 
It explains what the story was, what the recipe was, what the medication that the 
management applied was and why.  
The causal story gives some answers to the why questions, but the intuition about 
how to win the game is similar to how a General works on a battlefield. The leader 
makes assessments based on experience, but they also improvise because 
sometimes it is a must. The third part is more like storytelling about what happened 
and the thoughts the leader had. Initially, the goal is to understand this complex 
phenomenon, and they do it in two steps: first, by looking at the theories and what 
these theories predict, and secondly, by applying these theories. The next step is to 
derive the strategy. 
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Moreover, the strategy is sometimes planned to some extent and in a way it is a kind 
of emergent strategy based on the considerable amount of time, thinking how to deal 
with this and how to deal with that. When I reflect on my decision-making process, 
this is best described as autoethnography. 
Perhaps a useful analogy could be the following: theories of organisational change, 
adaptation, and environmental selection in combination with the assessment of 
challenges and constraints lead to a development of organisational change strategy, 
and to setting goals and targets. The implementation process is more similar (in 
military terms) to tactics: an understanding what tactical decisions are both useful to 
achieve the strategic goals and minimise the (often fairly adverse) process effects of 
organisational restructuring, strategic reorientation etc. While the strategy is to be 
studied in a theory-informed, quantitative manner, tactics require a more sensitive, 
context-driven, and multi-faceted approach, to capture the somewhat intuitive nature 
of day-to-day decision-making. 
The logic of this research is as follows: here is a complex change phenomenon, here 
are the theories that deal with such phenomena, this is the way how the theories 
apply, this is what they reveal, and this is the way how leader’s diagnosis leads to 
therapy. 
The general research objective is theory-oriented. However, it has also an essential 
practical orientation. Explicitly, it seeks greater predictive validity in organisational 
change theories and is aimed at testing the broader implications of the 
institutionalisation theory, the inertia theory and the leadership parts of the 
contingency theory. Exclusive interest presents the effect of inertia, asperity, and the 
conflict demands of both external and the internal audience, and the re-organisational 
activities on the adaptive capabilities measured through company’s fitness 
(performance). All of them are considered through models that incorporate both 
ecological and managerial (adaptation) theories. It also considers the effect that 
organisational features have on the change processes of a troubled company. 
This study aims to comprehend the drivers of the crises of the Bulgarian State 
Railways Inc. that led the company to the verge of bankruptcy, the factors that block 
the reorganisation process and limit the adaptive capabilities, the components of the 
reorganisation, and the success factors that supported the organisational change.  
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3.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Serial studies in organisational change predict a meagre success rate of attempted 
organizational transformations. The research problem is that even though the 
expected outcome of the reorganisation of the BSR was a failure the management 
find a way to succeed against not so favourable odds. Theory states it would be hard 
to deal with the power of the trade unions, the conflicting demands of the stakeholders, 
and the opacity and the resistance. Moreover, how to overcome the practical 
challenges that show up in the change process is a big issue. The research explores 
the obstacles and how the management manoeuvre the boat in such rocky waters.  
The study examines the organisational features reducing the adaptive capabilities of 
the troubled BSRG. The strength of these features and the effects they have on the 
fitness of the company and the speed of reorganisation, lead to conclusions that could 
be valid for the entire population of distressed organisations. Also, the research 
produces insights into mechanisms that could potentially facilitate the reorganisation 
process and improve companies’ adaptive capabilities and fitness.  
 3.3. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The research question is “Why are attempts at organisational change controversial, 
how is the change process hindered and how are the challenges overcome?”  The six 
objectives outlined below are supposed to facilitate the process of addressing the 
research question and achieving the research aims: 
1. To examine and describe the various internal and external reasons driving the 
crisis of BSRG and the attempt to transform the organisation;  
2. To review and explain the type, the location and the content of the change in the 
light of the ecological and adaptation theories. I also distinguish the effect of 
change content from the change process in the BSRG; 
3. To supply descriptive evidence about the key factors that reduced the adaptive 
capabilities and slowed down the reorganisation of BSRG;  
4. To develop a dynamic financial performance measurement model that describes  
the single effect of the critical factors reducing the adaptive capabilities and the 
interactive effect of the proposed organisational changes;   
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5. To analyse the relationship between change length and change outcome through 
the lens of managerial theory and ecological theory. 
6. To identify practical managerial implications and to raise business managers’ 
awareness of any potential blockers of organisational changes. And, in this way to 
assist the managers in troubled companies in formulating a proper approach to 
organisational change. 
3.4. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research follows a combination of three different methodological approaches. 
The first stage is a literature search for dependable theories explaining the 
organisational change and application of these theories in order to understand what 
they reveal about the practical situation.  
The second stage consists of an analysis of the situation in the BSRG. This is the 
application part of the process when the goal is to derive concrete predictions. The 
idea is not to predict the outcome, because managers know what the outcome should 
be, it is more to predict what the difficulties are. This part is the application of the theory 
and its practical implications. It is about the theoretical framework and conclusions 
derived from the theoretical framework.  
The third stage builds on the first two steps:  
(1) First, the diagnostic in the medical process is available. The general theory allows 
us to identify what the issues are, all the investigations are done, the situation is 
assessed, and the diagnosis is made. 
(2) Second comes the practical challenge of how to get around to all this. Even though 
there are no universal recipes because every single case has all sorts of 
idiosyncratic features, the use of autoethnography as a methodology allows 
describing what solutions the leaders have found to overcome the challenge of the 
reorganisation.  
The research uses a complex methodology – one is the deductive part, which is a kind 
of theory. First, derive the theoretical conclusions then applying such conclusions in 
practice and this is more like applied research where what I check is what the theory 
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predicts concretely. Finally, comes the description of solutions applied in a particular 
situation.  
The next part presents the concrete methods of the research.   
Case study. The research question informs the method used in the study. The study 
of the transformation of the Bulgarian State Railways employs a case study research 
method.  
Yin, (2009) recommends the use of case study methods when (1) “how” and “why” 
questions are being proposed, (2) the investigator has little control over events, and 
(3) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, particularly 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident. The case 
study design is also valid because the “how” and “why” research questions in this study 
are to be dealt with by tracing them over time and are less likely to depend on a survey.  
Eisenhardt cited in Grunbaum (2007), explains that the case study focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings. It is shown that the objects 
of case studies are usually strategic decisions, organisational structures, functions, 
processes, and organisational performance. Pitt (2005) recommends using a general 
model in a particular case and examining each posted link critically to better 
understand how the organisation functions. Correspondingly, this research explores 
the influence of the management attributes, conflicting demands of both the internal 
and the external audience, the trade union’s exercise of power, and the impact of 
intricacy and opacity of the organisation on the speed of reorganisation in the setting 
of the rail industry, by using a case study approach.  
Qualitative assumptions. The use of qualitative methods makes it possible to 
identify insights, but some of them can be wrong. Some management decisions turn 
out to bring success while others lead to failure and this is evidence of randomness. 
Therefore, proof is needed. The qualitative judgments in the study support the 
development of assumptions where there are good reasons to believe that these 
assumptions are valid. A significant amount of qualitative evidence supports them. 
Based on the assumptions are developed five hypotheses, and they are justified by 
quantitative analysis.  
Quantitative analysis. Most of the quantitative analysis in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 
however, does not apply statistical methods. Instead, the testing of the hypothesis 
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materialises via a comparative analysis presenting the difference between the actual 
financial performance of the company and the potential financial performance.  
Potential financial performance results from the alternative scenarios proposed by the 
management and included in the transformational plans. The quantitative analysis 
does not use statistical methods but uses statistical information. Altman Z-Score test, 
calculated over a number of years, under two alternative scenarios, presents the 
impact of the conflicting stakeholders’ demands, the opacity of and the resistance in 
the company on the fitness of the BSRG and its subsidiaries, allowing conclusions 
about the adaptive capability and the speed of transformation.  
The reasons why statistical methods are not useful in these parts of the research are 
the following:  
1. The research is testing hypotheses, which are not statistical, and they are not 
tested with statistical methods. However, they are still tested with quantitative 
methods.  
2. The research is based on quantitative information concerning the entire 
population, and no statistical sampling is necessary. 
3. Because the research includes the entire population, the stochastic lows do not 
act, and the concept of statistical errors is not valid. The research uses reporting 
statistics and derives alternative modifications from concrete proposals of the 
management or other parties involved in the process.    
4. The research involves the entire population. Therefore, the quantitative analyses 
are more precise without using statistical methods. The direct measurement of the 
effects is valid without any need for statistical methods.  
5. The probabilities of the alternative modifications are not statistical probabilities. 
They are constructed from real situations with two possible alternative scenarios 
one of which materialises.   
Still, the following statistical techniques and methods are applicable in Chapters 4 and 
6 of the research: 
1. Creation of databases and use of descriptive statistical techniques for processing 
and presentation of data (Chapter 6) 
2. Statistical grouping of data by different parameters characterising the units of the 
population (Chapter 6).  
48 
 
3. Statistical methods: factor analysis, Varimax, Helvig’s composite indicator, 
parametric test method, correlation analysis (Chapter 4). 
 
Qualitative methods. Qualitative methods have a supporting role in the research and 
are applicable in the following two instances.   
1. They support the development of qualitative assumptions. Based on the 
assumptions are derived the five hypotheses that are justified by quantitative 
analysis.  
2. Presenting the lessons learned from the reorganisation of the BSRG and its 
subsidiaries and the solutions of the encountered problems (Chapter 9).  
The qualitative methods include:  
1. Content analysis of various documents: strategies, plans, budgets, reports, 
analyses, correspondences, and all other relevant documents.  
2. The autoethnographic method gives insights about the developed assumptions 
and insights about the medication applied in the reorganisation of BSRG.  
 
3.5. RESEARCH STRATEGY   
The five hypotheses (presented in the next part) originate from propositions that 
express a deterministic relation. A deterministic relation presumes that if the value of 
the independent concept changes, the value of the dependent concept will always 
change in a predicted way. Dul and Hak (2008) formulate propositions that express a 
deterministic relation between concept A and concept B as: 
If A is higher, then B is higher. 
This type of relation is depicted in Figure 2 as a continuous increasing relation 
between A and B: B increases with A. The deterministic relation between A and B 
could also be a continuous decreasing relation, depending on the proposition. A 
deterministic relation between A and B is not always a continuously increasing or 
decreasing relation. It can also be a relationship that is partly increasing and partly 
decreasing. For a deterministic relation, it only matters that there is one specific value 
of B for one specific value of A. (Dul & Hak, 2008) 
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Figure 2 
Scatter plot of 
instances indicating a 
continuous 
increasing 
deterministic 
relation between 
concept A and 
concept B 
 
“A proposition that expresses a deterministic relation implies that for every single 
instance in the domain the proposition is true according to the theory. This means that 
the proposition can be tested in a single instance. The preferred strategy for testing a 
deterministic relation is the experiment. If an experiment is not feasible, the 
longitudinal single case study or the comparative case study is the second-best 
strategy. In the longitudinal single case study the independent concept in the single 
case changes “naturally” with time, and the corresponding dependent concept for 
each moment in time is measured (either in real-time or post hoc)” (Dul & Hak, 2008). 
In Chapter 4, which deals with the management prototypes, the above notion takes 
place as the financial performance (the dependent variable) is measured post hoc 
whereas the management prototype (the independent concept) changes with the 
time.  
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 the usage of experimental scenarios allows comparing the real 
performance of the company with the potential performance that could have 
materialised in the case of adoption of the management propositions. The alternative 
scenarios present the real potential outcome of the situation in case the other parties 
had ignored their proposals and had accepted the initiatives of the management. 
Chapter 8 presents the effect of the combination of all the causal factors analysed in 
the previous chapters.  
3.6. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS  
Assumption 1. The reorganisation and performance depend on the management 
prototype. Two antagonistic management prototypes are present in the process of 
restructuring of the BSR: the old cohort trained in obsolete system reasonably similar 
Concept A 
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to that in the army and the more up-to-date transformational management that has the 
diverse professional background, education, and experience.  
Hypothesis 1. The adaptive capacity of the troubled Bulgarian States Railways Inc. 
declines with the length of service of the inertial management and increases with the 
length of service of the transformational management.  
Assumption 2. Trade unions and performance. Trade unions could block or postpone 
the transformation of organisations. Collective labour agreements could generate 
resistance that reduces the speed of transformation, increases the cost of change and 
could increase the mortality hazard during and after the reorganisation  
Study hypothesis 2. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG to adjust to 
environmental drift declines with the strength of the limits imposed on the company 
performance by the institutionalised collective labour agreements. 
Assumption 3. Change process and performance. Once environment drift and the 
internal inertial pressures compromise the corporate architecture, and the company 
fitness declines, reorganisation appears to be the last option. However, opacity and 
cultural resistance have a significant influence on the speed and cost of the 
transformation of distressed organisations in hectic periods of reorganisations. 
Study Hypothesis 3. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries 
to adapt promptly to the environmental drifts declines with the strength of its 
organisational opacity and asperity. 
Assumption 4. Conflicting stakeholders’ demands influence the performance of 
troubled organisations in times of change. The process of transformation of the BSRG 
was framed by the conflicting demands of the most powerful agents of both the internal 
and the external audience. The conflicting claims in the limited surge space 
predetermined the timing of the change. The intensity of the conflicting institutional 
demands in BSR is higher when they have significant control over decision-making 
and a substantial negative impact on the organisation’s fitness.  
Hypothesis 4. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG declines with the intensity 
of the conflicting institutional demands presented by the key stakeholders.  
Assumption 5. Reorganisation success factors and fitness. Age is critical to adaptive 
capabilities. When the tenure of an organisation in the market increases, its speed of 
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movement in the market space declines. However, the presumption is that some 
crucial events and appropriate activities of the management could potentially amend 
the age of an organisation.  
Hypothesis 5. The adaptive capacity of a troubled organisation declines with its age, 
but some critical factors and events improve it. Management’s activities could improve 
the adaptive capacity of the BSRG.  
3.7. VARIABLES BY HYPOTHESIS  
Hypothesis 1. Management prototype and performance 
1. Independent variable – critical attributes of inertial vs. transformation 
managers. 
2. Dependent variable – organisation’s fitness. 
3. Control variable – a situation demanding reorganisation.  
4. Operationalisation – in a given situation, different traits lead to reorganisation 
success or failure.  
5. Causal mechanism – the inertial management deteriorates the fitness of the 
troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries and reduces the speed of transformation 
while the transformational management improves company’s fitness and 
increases the reorganisation speed.  
Hypothesis 2.  Trade unions and performance  
1. Independent variable – trade unions’ strength. 
2. Dependent variable – organisation’s fitness. 
3. Control variable – organisation’s size. 
4. Operationalisation – controls over decision making as encoded in the 
organisational status quo through the collective labour agreements.  
5. Causal mechanism – collective labour agreements deteriorate the fitness of 
the troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries and reduces the speed of 
transformation.  
Hypothesis 3. Conflicting stakeholders’ demands and performance  
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1. Independent variable – the strength of the conflicting stakeholders’ demands. 
2. Dependent variable – organisation’s fitness. 
3. Control variable – the situation demanding reorganisation. 
4. Operationalisation – conflicting institutional demands limit decision making and 
execution options for managers.   
6. Causal mechanism – conflicting institutional demands deteriorate the fitness 
of the troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries and reduces the speed of 
transformation.  
Hypothesis 4. Change process and performance  
5. Independent variable – company’s opacity and resistance. 
6. Dependent variable – organisation’s fitness. 
7. Control variable – the situation demanding reorganisation. 
8. Operationalisation – opacity, and resistance delay reorganisation and could 
block the transformation of a troubled company.   
7. Causal mechanism – opacity and resistance deteriorate the fitness of the 
troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries and reduces the speed of transformation.  
Hypothesis 5. Critical success factors and fitness 
1. Independent variable – critical success factors and events related to the 
reorganisation. 
2. Dependent variable – organisation’s fitness. 
3. Control variable – the situation demanding reorganisation. 
4. Operationalisation – As the tenure of an organisation on the market increases, 
the speed of its movement in the market space declines. However, some critical 
factors and events could amend the age of an organisation. Taken-for-granted 
features and beliefs do not hold as before, and people tend to neglect the status 
quo to a certain extent. Secondly, internal audience members are not tied in a 
very dense network any longer, and the cultural opposition they can generate is 
not as efficient as before. The momentum holds, at least for a given period, but 
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when appropriately used it can allow a sustainable change of organisational 
features. 
5. Causal mechanism – when appropriately used, critical success factors and 
events could improve the company’s fitness. 
3.8. RESEARCH DATA AND SOURCES: A CRITICAL EVALUATION    
Data sources 
1. Company archives are the principal sources of evidence regarding the change 
in the Bulgarian State Railways.  
2. State agencies – the National Statistical Institute, the Railway Administration 
Executive Agency, the Ministry of Transport and other relevant institutions 
provide additional information. 
The data sources are part of the reference works section. 
Data types 
1. The archives offer thorough information about different aspects of work 
including plans, budgets, financial reports, organisational architecture, collective 
bargaining agreements, interactions with stakeholders, board decisions, staff 
records, etc. 
2. State agencies provide information about trends in the transportation industry 
and railway sector, as well as data about economic trends, competition, 
governmental decisions and policy. 
Availability, reliability, confidentiality, and biases 
1. Company archives provide readily available information and no confidentiality, 
conflicts, resolutions, or data cleaning issues need consideration. The data is 
reliable. However, the completeness of the information is not 100% indisputable.   
2. State agencies provide available and reliable information. Confidentiality and 
access to data is not an issue for the CEO of BSRG Inc. 
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3.9. RESEARCH MEASUREMENT     
The financial performance of the BSRG and its subsidiaries, as a dependent variable, 
reflects the alternative scenarios of the change. As one of the aims of the research is 
to measure the adaptive capability, an appropriate estimate is the overall fitness of the 
BSRG and the subsidiaries. The KPIs that present the financial performance of the 
company are EBITDA, EBIT, net profit, equity, assets and debts. Altman's Z1 score 
gauges the fitness of the enterprise and allows comparisons reflecting the cost and the 
speed of reorganisation. In the first scenario, the fitness of the companies reflects the 
effect of the obstacles in the process of reorganisation. The cost of delay of change 
including the internal expenses – penalties charges, labour cost, postpone savings, 
and so on, and the external opportunity costs such as the lost opportunities to repay 
the debts early on, portray the overall cost of inertia, asperity, and opacity in the 
institutionalised company. The fitness of the BSRG and its subsidiaries reveals the 
effects of the measures undertaken by the management in the second scenario. 
3.10. DATA ANALYSIS     
The data analysis in Chapter 4 follows the case study logic for a predicted continuously 
increasing or decreasing relation: comparing the rank orders of the independent 
variable with the dependent variable. “The hypothesis is confirmed if the two rank 
orders are exactly the same, assuming that both rank orders have been compared in 
the direction from low to high, or in the reverse direction, that is predicted by the 
hypothesis. If the rank orders differ, the hypothesis is rejected. 
Rank orders might differ considerably or only slightly (e.g., when the rank orders differ 
only for two measurements out of a large number). If the rank order differs only slightly, 
it is tempting to conclude that the hypothesis is almost confirmed. This is only 
acceptable if, in a large number of instances, only a few exceptions occur, and a 
pragmatic deterministic view is chosen. Normally the hypothesis is rejected if the 
predicted pattern does not match with the measured pattern” (Dul & Hak, 2008).  
The data analysis in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 follows the logic of experimental quantitative 
comparisons of two alternative scenarios:  
The first (inertial) scenario presents the real financial performance of the company form 
the beginning of the transformation in 2010 up to 2018 when the status of a troubled 
55 
 
company is almost not relevant any longer. In this scenario, the financial performance 
of BSRG and its subsidiaries reflects the outcomes of the reorganisation as it was 
taking place. 
The second (transformational) scenario presents the alternative development of the 
reorganisation that could have taken place if the stakeholders (including the trade 
unions) had accepted the proposals of the management and the opacity of the BSRG 
and its subsidiaries did not exist. This scenario presents experimentally the outcomes 
of the reorganisation under the condition that the inertia, asperity, and opacity did not 
exist. 
1. The first four hypotheses (described above) are tested by investigating the causal 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables.  
2. Each of the hypotheses, the management prototype, the trade unions’ power, the 
opacity and resistance, and the conflicting stakeholder's demands, is tested with 
two antagonistic independent variables. The two antagonistic variables reflect the 
organisational changes over time. The resulting fitness outcomes are compared to 
verify the hypothesis.  
3.11. RESEARCH THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS       
1. Broadly speaking, the research contributes to the understanding of the applicability 
of structural inertia theory, institutionalisation theory, contingency theory, and 
change theory.  
2. The research brings new insights into inertial forces resulting from management 
prototypes, trade unions, the spontaneous institutionalisation of stakeholders’ 
demands and the cultural aspects of such transformation blockers as opacity and 
resistance. 
3. More specifically, the research tests and brings insights into three types of 
processes that can delay or prevent a change in organisations: 
a. The research contributes to the understanding of the internal (taken-for-granted 
features) and the external (audience) aspects of institutionalisation. Particular 
focus is given to internally and externally generated asperity that slows down 
the organisational changes. The external audience cannot directly generate 
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asperity, but their taken-for-granted beliefs and expectations indirectly have a 
slowing effect on adaptive capabilities.  
b. The research contributes to the understanding of the transformational process 
including consequences of opacity and resistance, i.e., sluggishness of 
response.  
c. The research contributes to the understanding of certain aspects of the political 
process by examining the effect of conflicting stakeholders’ demands on 
adaptive capability.  
4. The research contributes to the understanding of the critical success factors 
facilitating the process of transformation of troubled organisations like the BSRG 
and its subsidiaries. The research illustrates mechanisms capable of reducing the 
age of organisations and improving their adaptive capabilities.  This knowledge is 
transferable and applicable in diverse populations across various industries and 
different countries.  
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Chapter Four 
Management Prototype and Company Performance 
Contingency theory postulates that alternative management prototypes affect the 
adaptive capabilities of organisations in different ways. The relevance of this adaptive 
concept is even higher in times of emergency and reorganisations. The following 
Chapter 4 illustrates the two management prototypes, which are present in the top 
management of the BSRG at the time of crisis and reforms. Comparative analysis 
allows contrasting the financial performance of the company under the two antagonistic 
managements: the inertial management and the transformational management.   
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Two antagonistic management prototypes are present in the process of restructuring 
of the BSRG. The old cohort was trained in an old system that was similar to that in 
the army. The problem with every army is that its soldiers are ready for the last war, 
yet not for the next one, because all their experience and everything they were taught 
of is in the past. They are not open to the future. In other words, the “derailed inertial 
management” is imprinted with norms institutionalised a long time ago. 
Transformational management has a diverse background, education at various 
universities, and varied kinds of experience. The transformational management has a 
less entrenched set of expectations, less well established knows, and more flexibility, 
more openness because of its diversity and heterogeneity. This more flexible and more 
goal-orientated approach results in better performance. The transformational 
management is not established like an army, but like a business, they have to survive 
in the competitive environment and have to perform the same way as any other 
business. In addition, it is about an entirely different mind-set, a completely different 
complex of values and orientation. In the army, it is vital to maintain tradition and stick 
to established norms because that is what constitutes the social order. This is a 
prototypical case of imprinting. The background and the education you have tells you 
the values you have to pay attention to, the essential things you have to focus on, as 
well as the non-important ones.  
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The goal of the leadership part of the research is to measure, how management 
prototype affects the adaptive capability of the BSRG. The government appoints the 
board of directors of BSRG. However, in reorganisation-free periods the overall 
governance of the corporation depends on the internal process as even the top 
managers are recruited internally. 
In a situation demanding reorganisation (control variable), different traits lead to 
reorganisation success or failure (operationalisation). In other words, the set of critical 
attributes of the two types of management present in the transformation process 
(independent variables) and the overall fitness of the organisation (dependent 
variables) are contingent on the situation. In the BSRG, the situation directly affects 
the leaders’ behaviour and the outcomes, and moderates the effects of leaders’ 
behaviour. The management is inertial when the negative impact on the fitness of the 
company is higher. The inertial management deteriorates the fitness of the troubled 
BSRG and its subsidiaries and reduces the speed of transformation while the 
transformational management improves the fitness of the company and increases the 
speed of the reorganisation (causal mechanism).  
Hypothesis 1. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG declines with the length of 
service of the inertial management and increases with the length of service of the 
transformational management.  
4.2. METHODOLOGY  
Top Management Profiles  
The profile of the top management of the BSRG is based on the methodology 
developed in the company under the guidance of the author of this thesis. The 
purposes of the methodology are twofold: on the one hand to serve the current 
research and on the other hand to support the senior management of BSRG “for 
analysis and development of expert capacities within the BSRG.” The methodology 
provides six indices to be monitored on an annual basis. For the purposes of this 
research, the six indices apply retrospectively while the management’s practical 
purposes, they apply perceptively, as well. The six indices are, as follows: 
59 
 
1. The average age of the top managers. The average age shows some trends towards 
reduction or increase in the age of the company’s top management, by professional 
areas and by companies. 
2. Total professional experience of the top managers. The overall professional 
experience indicates the professional experience accumulated by the top managers, 
by professional areas, and by companies. 
 
3. Professional experience of top managers within the BSRG. This monitors the 
professional experience in the BSRG as a share of the overall experience. An increase 
in this index would usually mean excessive encapsulation of skills within the BSRG 
system. While this may make sense in some specific professions, others will need a 
higher level of versatility in both professional and social experience, and import of third 
party’s experience, knowledge, and business practices. This is analysed by levels of 
professional areas and companies.  
4. Market economy business knowledge. The number of those who have acquired their 
education degrees upon 1990. Education degrees acquired upon 1990 make an 
essential indicator for the adequacy of knowledge acquired. Up to 1989, Bulgaria made 
part of the former socialist countries’ block, and education was highly ideological, with 
market economy or management in market economy conditions being non-existent at 
all. This is analysed by levels of seniority, professional areas, and companies.  
5. Educational diversity. The number of higher education institutions from which 
managers are recruited. This monitors the portfolio of education institutions and 
qualifications ensuring managers’ basic skills. A smaller number of repeated 
institutions and qualifications may put some limits to versatility and quality of 
employees’ skills. It would be useful to search for a balanced mix of institutions 
providing staff to railways, even in the case of specialised professions. This is analysed 
by levels of professional areas and companies. 
6. Professional adequacy. Adequacy of competences for the top management 
positions. Adequacy of competences and positions shows the extent to which 
professional experience and education levels of respective top managers match 
requirements for the position held by them. This monitors adequacy both in staff 
development and promotion within the BSRG’ companies and adequacy in the case of 
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external selection by third party companies. This is analysed by levels of professional 
areas and companies. 
Senior management. Senior executives influence the development of the entire 
company. They lay down the company’s strategic goals, draw up measures for the 
implementation thereof, control the achievement of the outcome and remain 
responsible for it. Senior management includes (1) members of the Board of Directors, 
(2) managers of BSRG subsidiaries, and (3) heads of directorates and head of the 
Legal Department at the BSRG and its subsidiaries 
Adequacy of the Top Managers to the Occupied Positions 
The BSRG is a company operating all across the country. In 2010, it managed assets 
worth over EUR 500 million, has over 15,000 employees and an annual turnover of 
over EUR 200 million. In order to manage such a company when it is on the verge of 
bankruptcy, it is essential to have experience in optimisation, restructuring and overall 
business transformation of companies, and their development and market expansion. 
Determining what the adequacy of positions held comes after an assessment of 
qualifications and managerial experience over the years of Board of Directors’ 
members. A methodology was drawn up to assess each member’s qualifications and 
experience. This methodology uses a scale of grade points to avoid the subjective 
factor and to get an overall note by periods. Correspondingly, managers holding 
leading managerial positions at the BSRG management from 2002 through 2018 are 
included in the classification. 
Qualifications. Qualifications are determined by the educational level acquired by 
each of the members of the BSRG Board of Directors. (Points are accumulated to a 
maximum value of 15) 
1. 0 points – in the case of higher education degree at an expert level: the 
education is not adequate to the position held; education, which is not about 
knowledge in business management (philosophy, sports, and other majors, 
which may not contribute to company’s management); 
2. 3 points – in the case of a Bachelor’s degree related to business or in the case 
of a Master’s degree in an area excluding business management. 
3. 1 point – for postgraduate, business management related qualifications 
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4. 2 points – in the case of a Master’s degree in an area related to business 
management; education in engineering including managerial skills; 
5. 2 points for a second degree, Master’s, relative to business management; 
6. Another 5 points for one of the following professional qualifications:  
 in marketing: CPM (Certificate in Professional Marketing), PCM 
(Professional Certified Marketer), CMMP (Certified Marketing Management 
Professional);  
 in Human Resources: CIPD (Certificate in Personnel Practice),  SHRM-CP 
-- (Society of Human Resource Management Certified Professional), HRCI-
HRMP (Human Resource Management Professional);  
 in Finance: ACCA, CMA (Certified Management Accountant); 
 in general management: Master of Business Administration (MBA).  
7. Another 2 points for education degrees acquired at any university from the 
Financial Times Top 100, institutions of international recognition;  
8. Another 3 points for two or more of the above-mentioned professional 
qualifications or business management related Doctor’s degree. 
Managerial experience. Managerial experience is determined according to the 
positions related to the management of a big and complex enterprise. Table 1 below 
shows that professional and managerial experience could bring 10 points maximum.   
Table 1. Note yielded from experience accumulated at positions held in companies: 
 Simple processes Complex processes 
Level Senior Medium Expert  Senior Medium Expert 
Big 8 6 2 10 8 2 
Average 6 4 2 10 6 2 
Small 4 2 2 6 4 2 
 
9. While points are not aggregated, the maximum value selects out of all positions 
held before the reference period. For example, if someone has been involved 
in the senior management of a big and complex company for 2 years (which 
yields them 10 points), and then he or she moved to the senior management of 
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a big company with simple processes (8 p.), they will anyway yield 10 points for 
the time prior the reference period. 
10. The points for a position also yield if the employee has had at least 2 years of 
identical general experience accumulated in one or more companies. 
11. If ministers or deputy ministers have no experience in business companies, they 
will get a maximum of 6 points; directors and heads of departments in ministries 
will get: 4 p.; experts: 2 p. 
12. Complex processes - the company manages a combination of activities: 
extraction, purchase, production, wholesale, retail, services; or the company 
has sizeable geographical coverage: international offices or coverage of large 
cities in Bulgaria 
13. Big company: over EUR 25 million annually; average company: over EUR 3 
million annually. 
14. Experience gained in the process of project management in the area of 
management consulting (strategy, organisation, marketing, finance except for 
fiscal and accountancy matters) or mergers and acquisitions will place it on the 
same footing with experience gained at the senior management of companies 
that were customers under such projects. Experience gained as a consultant 
under such a project (except overall responsibility for the project) will place it on 
the same footing with experience gained in the medium management of 
companies that were customers under such projects. 
Specific experience. Specific experience is gained in the transformation and growth 
of companies in the market economy environment (either 3 p. or 5 p. are selected) 
15. 3 p. at least 2 years of management experience at director or manager level 
directly responsible for successful transformation or notable development of 
revenues of a small to medium company, also includes managing of similar 
(such tasks and such companies) projects designed for mergers and 
acquisitions or management consulting 
16. 5 p. at least 2 years of management experience at director or manager level 
directly responsible for successful transformation or notable development of 
revenues of a big company, also includes managing of similar (such tasks and 
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such companies) projects designed for mergers and acquisitions or 
management consulting 
The total of points determines the adequacy of positions held. Adequacy is divided 
into three groups. Scale applicable to a Board of Directors and senior management: 
1. From 0 to 19 points: inadequate; 
2. From 20 to 24 points: adequate; 
3. From 25 to 30 points: excellent.  
The collection and the storage of data is described in Appendix 1  
Data Sample 
BSRH. The total number of vacancies qualified as top management in the BSRH for 
the period 2002-2017 is 78. The number of vacancies varies throughout the years 
because of the changes in the organisational structure. The organisational chart for 
the period 2002-2007 includes regional subunits that after the reorganisation became 
an integral part of the Passengers and Freight subsidiaries. In 2011, the locomotive 
depots were also included in the structure of the two subsidiaries. Because of all those 
transformations, only six top vacancies remain in the Holding: the Executive Director, 
the Finance Director, the HR Manager, the Recreational Units Director, and the 
Director of the Vocational Training Centre and the Director of the Attestation Centre. 
Part of the top managers have occupied the same position or different positions for 
several years. The total number of people that have occupied the 72 vacancies is 86. 
Therefore, the total number of managers researched is 86.  
BSRP. The total number of vacancies qualified as top management in BSRP for the 
period 2007-2017 is 32. The number of vacancies varies throughout the years because 
of the changes in the organisational structure. The total number of people that have 
occupied the 32 vacancies is 69 people. Therefore, the total number of managers 
researched is 69.  
BSRF. The total number of vacancies qualified as top management in BSRF for the 
period 2007-2017 is 20. The number of vacancies varies throughout the years because 
of the changes in the organisational structure. The total number of people that have 
occupied the 32 vacancies is 44. Therefore, the total number of managers studied is 
44.  
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Adjustments to the collected data. As the changes in the management in the 
companies that are part of BSRG do not coincide with the annual reporting cycle, some 
adjustments were necessary to distinguish between the inertial and the transformation 
types of management. In 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2017, some overlap existed between 
the two management types. The main reason for such overlap was the change of the 
governments. Every change of the governments resulted in the appointment of new 
top management in BSRG. Therefore, in order to depict the trends observed in each 
of these years it was necessary to eliminate one of the management teams – either 
the inertial or the transformational.  
In 2009, the first appointment of a representative of the transformational team took 
place at the beginning of October, and only two more managers were appointed until 
the end of the year. Thus wise, those people were eliminated from the statistical data 
for the management for the year 2009.    
In the first quarter of 2013 began the process of exchange of the transformational 
management with representatives of the inertial management. The process ended by 
1 August, and the inertial management dominated the year. The transformational 
management is therefore absent from the statistical data for the year 2013.  
In mid-November 2014, the transformation management replaced the inertial 
management. However, the transformation management is not part of the statistical 
data for this year, because the inertial management entirely dominated the company. 
In 2017, the transformation management was out of the office for three months. 
However, the inertial management was not included in the statistical data for this year, 
because the transformational management dominated the year. 
The analysis performed bellow reflects the adjustments described above.  
 
4.3 HR PROCESS AND OUTCOMES  
James Baron and Michael Hannan scrutinise the path-dependent character of 
employment relations – “that is, the powerful and enduring effects of early events on 
the subsequent evolution of HRM” The Stanford Project on Emerging Companies 
examined the premises and conceptions held by the founders of the young emerging 
organisation. The founders were asked whether they had a particular “organisational 
model or blueprint in mind when they founded the company.” The SPEC data shows 
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that “the founders’ blueprints have had a profound effect on the day-to-day practices 
of their organisations.” The SPEC data indicate that the founders’ blueprint better 
predicts some present-day practices than does the blueprint espoused by the present-
day CEO. Baron and Hannan emphasised that “organisations and, in particular, their 
HR systems exhibit strong path dependence. Early decisions and actions shape 
subsequent outcomes in ways that the architects of organisations may not have 
envisioned or adequately anticipated.” 
The above concept is useful for the evaluation of the effect of the HR blueprint on the 
change outcomes in the BSRG’s reorganisation. At the beginning of the reorganisation, 
the transformation leaders developed a blueprint intuitively for the development of the 
transformation management as an obverse to the inertial management.   
By the end of 2009, a new chairperson joined the Board of directors of the BSRG. At 
that time, the company was in technical bankruptcy. The goal of the new chairperson 
was to initiate a reorganisation aiming to rescue the company and return it to the status 
of a going concern. One of the initial goals was to recruit a new management team 
capable of initiating and implementing the reorganisation. The top management, i.e. 
the Board of directors, initiated the whole recruitment process.  
Baron and Hannan used face-to-face interviews with the founders of the emerging 
companies to collect the necessary data when they investigated the organisational 
blueprints for success in the SPEC project. Similarly, the author of the doctoral thesis 
describes the HR blueprint at the beginning of the reorganisation of the BSRG, as he 
was the driving force in developing it.  
The ideal blueprint was very close to the methodology for considering the adequacy of 
positions held by the members of the Board of Directors (described above). However, 
that was an idealistic approach. The actual process of recruitment of top managers 
was neither smooth nor entirely consistent. The reasons for the deviation from the 
idealistic approach were as follows.  
First, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the salaries were very 
unattractive.  
Second, the challenge of managing a troubled company was too heavy for most 
potential managers. They did not want to face such big trouble.  
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Third, many managers did not want to work for state-owned companies. The state-
owned enterprises had a bad reputation.  
Fourth, the recruitment efforts were limited to the level of activity of the managers who 
decided to come on board.  
As a result of the above, the recruitment process entailed many compromises and the 
managers recruited for the top management positions did not meet many of the 
requirements included in the ideal blueprint. However, as a whole, the application of 
the methodology brought about many positive results.    
 
4.4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT PROFILES  
The analysis presents the six indices included in the methodology: (1) Average age, 
(2) Total professional experience, (3) Professional experience within the BSR Group 
of companies. (4) Market economy business knowledge, (5) Educational diversity, (6) 
Professional adequacy.  
These six indicators construct the prototypes of the transformational vs. the inertial 
managements that run the company in the period 2002—2017.  
1. Average age 
The period between 2002 and 2009 in BSRG, and between 2007 and 2009 in BSRP 
and BSRF was the time of significant increase in operating losses and a tremendous 
increase in the total indebtedness. During that time, the inertial management managed 
the company, which was why the enterprise is on the verge of bankruptcy by 2009. 
The change began in 2010 when the transformation management launched a rescue 
plan and initiated the first reorganisation.  
Holding BSRH.  The average age of the top managers for the period 2002-2017 is 
47.9. The average age for the period 2002-2009 is 49.7. The average age for the period 
2010-2017 goes down to 45.2 years (see Fig. 3). The trend for the period 2002-2017 
clearly shows that the age of the top managers goes down when the transformational 
management dominates the company. Important is the fact that in 2010 when the 
reorganisation begins the average age of the top managers goes sharply down from 
53 years in 2009 to 42 years in 2010. However, the average age goes sharply up to 
48 and 49 in 2013 and 2014, respectively, when the inertial management again runs 
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the company. Later on, in 2015, the average age goes down with the onset of the 
second term of the transformational management and begins to increase with the 
ageing of the managers.  
 
Fig. 3 Average age in BSRH 
 
BSRP. The average age of the top managers for the period 2007—2017 is 49.7 years. 
The average age for the period 2007—2009 is 55 years. The average age for the 
period 2010—2017 goes down to 49 years. The trend for the period 2002—2017 
clearly shows that the age of the top managers goes down when the transformational 
management runs the company (see Fig. 4). Noteworthy is the fact that after 2010 
when the reorganisation begins the average age of the top managers goes steadily 
down from 54 in 2009 to 46 in 2015. Later on, in 2016, the average age begins to 
increase at a tempo close to the normal process of ageing.   
 
Fig. 4 Average age in BSRP 
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BSRF. The average age of the top managers for the period 2007—2017 is 48.8. The 
average age for the period 2007—2009 is 48. The average age for the period 2010—
2017 goes slightly up to 49. Unlike in the BSRH and the BSRP, the trend here is 
increasing – the average age of the managers goes slowly up but lags behind the 
logical biological increase of the average age. However, in 2010 and 2011 when the 
transformational management runs the company, the average age remains under the 
increasing trend. In 2013 and 2014, when the inertial management manages the 
company again, the average age of the top managers goes sharply up above the trend. 
Later on, with the onset of the second term of the transformational management, the 
average age drops down from 52 years in 2014 to 48 years in 2017 and remains below 
the trend line (see Fig. 5). The increasing trend line is entirely due to the average age 
of the inertial management.   
Fig. 5 The average age in BSRF 
Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies: BSRH, BSRP and 
BSRF. At the beginning of the reorganisation, the average age of the transformational 
managers is lower than the average age of the inertial managers. The years 2013 and 
2014 are an essential indication of the tendencies related to the average age of the top 
managers and the prototype of the inertial management in each of the three 
companies. In 2013, the government changed, and the transformation management 
was replaced with the same people who were part of the inertial management. They 
managed the company almost until the end of 2014. The Figures 1,2,3  above show 
that in 2014 the average age of the top managers in all the three companies increased 
in accordance with one of the typical features of the inertial management – higher age 
compared to the age of the transformational management.   
Average age conclusion: transformational management tend to be younger than the 
inertial management.  
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2. Total professional experience  
BSRH. The total average professional experience of the top managers for the period 
2002-2017 is 22.9 years. For the 2002-2009 period, it is 25 years. In addition, for the 
period 2010-2017 it goes down to 19.6 years. The trend for the period 2002-2017 
clearly shows that the average professional experience of the top managers goes 
down when the transformational management runs the company. Notable is the fact 
that in 2010 when the reorganisation begins, it goes sharply down from 28 years in 
2009 to 16 years in 2012 (well below the trend see Fig. 6). However, the total average 
professional experience goes sharply up to 23 years in 2013 and 2014, respectively, 
when the inertial management runs the company again. In 2015, i.e. when the 
transformation management is reinstated, the average age goes down to 20 years. 
Later on, the total average professional experience increases with time.   
Fig. 6 Professional experience of top managers in BSRH 
 
BSRP. The total average professional experience for the period 2007-2017 is 26 years. 
For the 2007-2009 period, it is 31 years.  Subsequently, for the period 2010-2017 it 
goes down to 25 years. The trend for the period 2007-2017 clearly shows that the total 
average professional experience of the top managers goes down when the 
transformational management runs the company (see Fig. 7). Remarkable is the fact 
that in 2010, i.e. when the reorganisation begins, it goes steadily down from 30 years 
in 2009 to 23 years in 2015. However, the total average professional experience goes 
up to 27 years in 2014, when the inertial management runs the company again. In 
2015, when the transformation management is reinstated, the average age goes 
sharply down to 23 years. Later on, the total average professional experience begins 
to increase with time.   
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Fig. 7 Professional experience of top managers in BSRP 
 
BSRF. The total average professional experience for the period 2007-2017 is 25 years. 
For the 2007-2009 period, it is 25 years. Subsequently, for the period 2010-2017 it is 
25.4 years. Unlike in BSRH and BSRP, the trend here is increasing: the total average 
professional experience goes slowly up, but behind the relevant passage of time (see 
Fig. 8). Noteworthy is the fact that after 2010, i.e. when the reorganisation begins, it 
goes down from 26 years in 2009 to 23 years in 2011. However, the total average 
professional experience goes up to 28 years in 2013 and 2014, respectively, when the 
inertial management again runs the company. In 2015 when the transformation 
management is reinstated, the average age goes sharply down to 24 years. Later on, 
the total average professional experience begins to increase with time. However, the 
average professional experience of the transformational management remains under 
the trend line. The increasing trend line is entirely due to the average age of the inertial 
management.   
Fig. 8 Professional experience of top managers in BSRF 
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Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies the BSRH, the BSRP, 
and the BSRF that at the beginning of the reorganisations the total average 
professional experience of the transformational managers is lower than the total 
average professional experience of the inertial managers. The years 2013 and 2014 
are an essential indication of the tendencies related to the average professional 
experience of the top managers and the prototype of the inertial management in each 
of the three companies. In 2013, the government changed, and the same people who 
were part of the inertial management replaced the transformation management. They 
managed the company almost until the end of 2014. The Figures 4, 5 and 6 above 
show that in 2014 the average age of the top managers in all the three companies 
increased in accordance with one of the typical features of the inertial management – 
higher total average professional experience compared to the experience of the 
transformational management.   
Total average professional experience conclusion: the transformational managers tend 
to have fewer years of professional experience than the inertial managers do.  
3. Professional experience within BSRG 
BSRH.  The average professional experience of the top managers in BSRG for the 
period 2002-2017 is 15.3 years. For the 2002-2009 period, it is 18.3 years. 
Subsequently, for the period 2010-2017, it is 8.3 years. The trend for the period 2002-
2017 clearly shows that the average professional experience of the top managers in 
BSRG goes down when the transformational management runs the company. Notable 
is the fact that in 2010, i.e. when the reorganisation begins, it goes sharply down from 
20 years in 2009 to 4 years in 2012 (well below the trend see Fig. 9). However, the 
total average professional experience in BSRG goes up to 12 and 13 years in 2013 
and 2014, respectively, when the inertial management runs the company again. In 
2015, when the transformation management is reinstated the average professional 
experience in BSRG goes sharply down to 7 years. Later on, the average professional 
experience in BSRG begins to increase with the typical passage of time.   
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Fig. 9 Professional experience of top managers within BSRG in BSRH 
 
BSRP. The average professional experience of the top managers within BSRP for the 
period 2007-2017 is 20.9 years. For the 2007-2009 period, it is 29 years. Subsequently, 
for the period 2010-2017 it goes down to 20 years. The trend for the period 2007-2017 
clearly shows that the average professional experience of the top managers within 
BSRG goes down when the transformational management runs the company (see Fig. 
10). Noteworthy is the fact that in 2010, when the reorganisation begins, it goes sharply 
down from 29 years in 2009 to 18 years in 2011. However, the total average 
professional experience within BSRG goes up to 23 and 22 years in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively, when the inertial management again runs the company. In 2015 when 
the transformation management returns to the office, the average professional 
experience within BSRG goes sharply down to 16 years. Later on, the total average 
professional experience begins to increase with time.   
Fig. 10 Professional experience of top managers within BSRG in BSRP 
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BSRF. The average professional experience of the top managers within BSRF is 20.5 
years. For the 2007-2009 period, it is 23 years. Subsequently, for the period 2010-
2017 it goes down to 19 years. The trend for the period 2007-2017 clearly shows that 
the average professional experience of the top managers in BSRG goes down when 
the transformational management runs the company (see Fig. 11). Remarkable is the 
fact that in 2010 when the reorganisation begins, it goes sharply down from 24 years 
in 2009 to 18 years in 2011. However, the total average professional experience in 
BSRG goes up to 25 years in 2014, when the inertial management again runs the 
company. In 2015 when the transformation management returns to the office, the 
average professional experience in BSRG goes sharply down to 16 years. Later on, 
the total average professional experience begins to increase.   
Fig. 11 Professional experience of top managers within BSRG in BSRF 
 
Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies, BSRH, BSRP and 
BSRF, that at the beginning of the reorganisations the total average professional 
experience of the transformational managers within BSRG is lower than the 
professional experience of the inertial managers within BSRG. The years of 2013 and 
2014 are an essential indication of the tendencies related to the average professional 
experience of the top managers in BSRG and the prototype of the inertial management 
in each of the three companies. In 2013, the government changed, and the 
transformation management was replaced with the same people who were part of the 
inertial management. They managed the company almost until the end of 2014. The 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 above show that in 2014 the average professional experience of the 
top managers in all the three companies increased in accordance with one of the 
typical features of the inertial management – higher total average professional 
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experience within BSRG compared to the experience of the transformational 
management.   
Total average professional experience in BSR conclusion: the transformational 
managers tend to have fewer years of professional experience within the company 
than the inertial managers do.  
 
4. Market economy business knowledge 
Holding BSR. The total number of managers who graduated before the year 1990 as 
a percentage of the total number of managers varies between 6% and 90%. For the 
2002-2009 period, it varies between 5% and 14%. This indicates that managers 
running the company at that time graduated predominately before the year 1990. For 
the period 2010-2017, the percentage of graduates after 1990 varies between 33% 
and 90%, with 90% in 2012. However, it goes down to 33% in 2013 and 45% in 2014 
respectively, when the inertial management runs the company again. In 2015 when 
the transformation management is reinstated, the percentage goes sharply up to 75%. 
The trend for the period 2007-2017 clearly shows that the percentage of graduates 
after 1990 goes up when the transformational management runs the company (see 
Fig. 12). This increase of the managers who graduated after 1990 indicates that more 
managers are educated in the logic of business management in market economy 
conditions when the transformational management dominates the company. 
Fig. 12 % of top managers graduated after 1990 in BSRH 
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running the company at that time graduated predominately before the year 1990. For 
the period 2010-2017, the percentage goes up to 71% in 2015 and declines to 68% by 
the end of the period. However, the percentage of graduates after 1990 stagnates in 
2014, when the inertial management runs the company again. In 2015 when the 
transformation management is reinstated, the percentage goes sharply up from 50% 
to 71%. The trend for the period 2007—2017 clearly shows that the percentage of 
graduates after 1990 goes up when transformational management runs the company 
(see Fig. 13).  
Fig. 13 % of top managers graduated after 1990 in BSRP 
 
BSRF. The total number of managers who graduated before the year 1990 as a 
percentage of the total number of managers varies between 33% and 64%. For the 
2007-2009 period, it varies between 36% and 42%. This indicates that managers 
running the company at that time graduated predominately before the year 1990. For 
the period 2010-2017, it increased to 64%. The trend for the period 2007-2017 clearly 
shows that the percentage of graduates after 1990 goes up when the transformational 
management runs the company (see Fig. 14). 
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Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies, BSRH, BSRP and 
BSRF. The percentage of post-1990 graduates is higher when the transformational 
management dominates the company compared to the percentage of graduates after 
1990 when the inertial managers run the company. The years 2013 and 2014 are an 
essential indication of the tendencies related to the graduates and the prototype of the 
inertial management in each of the three companies. In 2013, the government 
changed, and the transformation management was replaced with the same people who 
were part of the inertial management. They managed the company almost until the end 
of 2014. The Figures 10, 11 and 12 above show that in 2014 the percentage of 
graduates after 1990 in all the three companies decreases in accordance with one of 
the typical features of the inertial management – fewer managers educated in the logic 
of business management in market economy conditions.  
Percentage of educated in market economy conclusion: the transformational 
managers tend to have more graduates educated in the logic of business management 
in market economy conditions compared to the inertial managers.  
5. Educational Diversity  
BSRH. The percentage of diversity of Universities calculated as the number of 
Universities divided by the total number of managers year by year varies between 
105% and 250 %. The percentage for the period 2002-2009 is between 105% и 120%. 
The percentage of diversity of Universities for the period 2010-2017 varies between 
113% and 220%. However, the percentage of diversity goes down to 113% in 2013 
and 119% in 2014 respectively, when the inertial management again runs the 
company. In 2015 when the transformation management is reinstated, the percentage 
goes sharply up to 250%. The trend for the period 2007-2017 clearly shows that the 
percentage of diversity goes up when transformational management runs the company 
(see Fig. 15). In 2015 when the percentage is 250%, eight managers have graduated 
from 20 different Universities in Bulgaria and abroad. This increase of diversity 
indicates that managers have a broader knowledge in the logic of business 
management in market economy conditions when the transformational management 
runs the company. 
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Fig. 15 % of diversity of graduated Universities by top managers BSRH 
 
BSRP. The percentage of diversity of Universities varies between 143% and 111%. 
For the 2002-2009 period, it is between 143% and 111%, and it declines year by year. 
The percentage varies between 119% and 138% for the period 2010-2017 (see Fig. 
16). The percentage of diversity goes up after 2010 when the transformational 
management runs the company. However, the percentage of diversity goes down to 
127% in 2013 and 130% in 2014 respectively, when the inertial management runs the 
company again. In 2015 when the transformation management is reinstated, the 
percentage goes up to 136%. In 2016, the percentage goes down because some 
transformational managers left the company.  
Fig. 16 % of the diversity of graduated Universities by top managers BSRP 
 
BSRF. The percentage of diversity of Universities varies between 107% and 120%. 
For the 2002-2009 period, it is between 108% and 109%. The percentage of diversity 
varies between 107% and 120% for the period 2010-2017. However, the percentage 
of diversity goes down to 107% in 2013 and in 2014, when the inertial management 
runs the company again. In 2015 when the transformation management is reinstated, 
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the percentage goes up to 118%. The trend line shows clearly that the percentage of 
educational diversity goes up when the transformational management dominates the 
company (see Fig. 17).  
Fig. 17 % of the diversity of graduated Universities by top managers BSRF 
 
Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies, BSRH, BSRP and 
BSRF, that the percentage of educational diversity is higher when the transformational 
management dominates the company. The years 2013 and 2014 are an essential 
indication of the tendencies related to the diversity and the prototype of the inertial 
management in each of the three companies. In 2013, the government changed, and 
the same people who were part of the inertial management replaced the transformation 
management. They managed the company almost until the end of 2014. The Figures 
15, 16, 17 above show that in 2014 the percentage of diversity in all three companies 
decreases in accordance with one of the typical features of the inertial management – 
less diversity in education.  
Percentage educational diversity conclusion: transformational managers tend to have 
higher educational diversity compared to inertial managers.  
6. Professional adequacy  
BSRH.  The percentage of adequacy of managers to occupied top positions is 
predominantly 0% for the period 2002-2009. For the period 2010-2017, the percentage 
of adequacy goes up when the transformational management manages the company. 
It is 28% in 2010 and goes up to 60% in 2012. However, in 2013 and 2014, when the 
inertial management runs the company professional adequacy goes down to 7% and 
13% respectively. In 2015, i.e. when the transformation management is reinstated, the 
percentage goes sharply up from 13% to 88%. The trend line shows clearly that the 
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professional adequacy of the transformational managers is incomparably higher than 
that of the inertial management (see Fig. 18).   
Fig. 18 % of adequacy of top managers to occupied vacancies in BSRH 
 
BSRP. The percentage of adequacy to occupied positions by the top managers is 0% 
for the period 2007-2009. For the 2010-2017 period, the percentage of adequacy goes 
up when the transformational management runs the company. It is 6% in 2011 and 
goes up to 23% in 2016 (see Fig. 19).  
Fig. 19 % of the adequacy of top managers to occupied vacancies in BSRP 
 
BSRF. The percentage of adequacy to positions occupied by top managers is 0% for 
the period 2007-2009. For the period 2010-2017, the percentage of adequacy goes up 
when the transformational management runs the company. In 2011, it was 6 % and 
went up to 27% in 2016 and 2017. However, in 2014, when the inertial management 
runs the company professional adequacy goes down to 7% (see Fig. 20).  
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Fig. 20 % of adequacy of top managers to occupied vacancies in BSRF 
 
Conclusion. There is a clear trend in all the three companies BSRH, BSRP and BSRF, 
that the percentage of adequacy to occupied positions is incomparably higher when 
the transformational management dominates the company than when the inertial 
managers run the company. The years 2013 and 2014 are an important indication of 
the tendencies related to the professional adequacy and the prototype of the inertial 
management in each of the three companies. In 2013, the government changed, and 
the transformation management was replaced with the same people who were part of 
the inertial management. They managed the company almost until the end of 2014. 
The Figures 16, 17, 18 above show that in 2014 the percentage of adequacy in all 
three companies decreases in accordance with one of the typical features of the inertial 
management – inadequacy to occupied positions compared to transformational 
managers.  
Professional adequacy conclusion: the transformational managers are incomparably 
more adequate to the occupied vacancies than the inertial managers are.  
7. Grouping all the factors together 
BSRH.  Figure 21 below shows that the indicators for the professional experience of 
the transformational management in BSRH are below the general trend for the period 
2002-2017.  
Figure 22 below shows that when it comes to professional competence, 
transformational management’s level is above the general trend for the period 2002-
2017. The conclusions for the inertial management are just opposite to those valid for 
the transformational management: the level of professional experience is above the 
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trend line while the competencies are below the general trend for the period 2002-
2017.   
Fig. 21 Professional experience BSRH 2002 - 2017 
 
Fig. 22 Professional competence BSRH 2002 - 2017 
 
BSRP. Figure 23 below shows that the indicators for the professional experience of 
the transformational management in BSRP are below the general trend for the 2002-
2017 period. Figure 24 below shows that when it comes to the professional 
competence, the level of the transformational management matches or is above the 
general trend for the period 2002-2007. 
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The conclusions for the inertial management are just the opposite of those valid for the 
transformational management: the level of professional experience is above the trend 
line while the competencies are below the general trend for the period 2002-2007.   
Fig. 23 Professional experience BSRP 2007 – 2017 
 
Fig. 24 Professional competence BSRP 2007 - 2017 
 
BSRF. Figure 25 below shows that the indicators for the professional experience of 
the transformational management in BSRF are below the general trend for the 2007-
2017 period. Figure 26 shows that when it comes to professional competence, the level 
of the transformational management is on or above the general trend for the 2007-
2017 period.  The conclusions for the inertial management are just the opposite of 
those for the transformational management: the level of professional experience is 
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above the trend line while the competencies are below the general trend for the period 
2007-2017. 
Fig. 25 Professional experience BSRF 2007 - 2017 
 
 
Fig. 26 Professional competence BSRF 2007 - 2017  
 
Conclusion. The average age, total work experience, and experience in BSRG have 
a perfect convergence. The same is true for the percentage of graduates who have 
acquired their education after 1990, the percentage of variety of completed HEIs, the 
percentage of adequacy of positions held. The transformational managers have less 
professional experience and more competency than the inertial managers do.  
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4.5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TOP MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
The first two parts of the study aim to compare the performance of BSRG, BSRF and 
BSRP under the administration of inertial management juxtaposed to that of 
transformational management. The third part aims to establish whether a significant 
difference exists between the inertial and the transformational management 
performance indicators.  
Performance at the generation of the crisis 
The three Fig. 27, 28 and 29 below present the performance of the transformational 
and the inertial management for the period 2002-2018. The red colour presents 
company’s performance under the inertial management, and the blue colour presents 
company’s performance under the transformational management.  
All three Fig. 27, 28 and 29 demonstrate that the performance of BSRG, BSRF and 
BSRP worsens for each year from the year 2002 or 2007 to the year 2009. In BSRG, 
the profit of EUR 23 mln goes down to a loss of 34 mln. In BSRF, the loss of EUR 4 
mln goes down to a loss of EUR 13 mln. In BSRP, the net profit goes from zero to EUR 
6 mln.  
 
Fig. 27 Net profit (loss) of BSRG 2002 – 2018 
 
Fig. 28 Net profit (loss) BSRF 2007 - 2018 
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Fig. 29 Net profit (loss) of BSRP 2007 - 2018 
 
Conclusion. The inertial management in the three companies either cannot anticipate 
the signals from the environment or cannot adapt the companies to the environmental 
shifts. 
Performance at the time of reorganisation 
Let us now have a look at the period of reorganisation between 2010 and 2018. Fig. 
30 below shows the performance of transformational management and inertial 
management for the period 2009-2018. The loss of BSRG for 2009 is EUR 34 mln. 
However, the financial result for 2018 is a profit of EUR 3 mln. The trend line shows 
that the financial result steadily improves for the entire period when the 
transformational management runs the company. The only exception is 2014, which is 
when the inertial management manages the company, and the financial result goes 
from a loss of EUR 5 mln down to a loss of EUR 25 mln.   
 
Fig. 30 Net profit (loss) BSRG 2009 - 2018 
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The performance of the transformational management in BSRF (see Fig. 31 below) is 
very similar. The trend line goes upwards from a loss of EUR 13 mln in 2009 to a profit 
of almost EUR 1 mln in 2018. The only exception with a very sharp increase of the loss 
is in 2014, when the inertial management manages the company, and the financial 
result plunges from a loss of 2 mln down to a loss of EUR 11 mln. 
 
Fig. 31 Net profit (loss) BSRF 2009 - 2018 
 
The performance of the transformational management in BSRP (see the Fig. 32 below) 
is also similar although it is not as straightforward as in BSRF and on Group level. The 
trend line goes upwards from a loss of EUR 6 mln in 2009 to a profit of EUR 1 mln in 
2018. The only exception with a very sharp increase of the loss falls at 2013 and 2014 
when the inertial management manages the company, and the financial result drops 
from a profit of EUR 1 mln down to a loss of EUR 6 mln.   
 
Fig. 32 Net profit (loss) BSRP 2009 - 2018 
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Although the inertial management runs the company for less than one year and a half, 
from July 2013 to November 2014, the performance of BSRF, BSRP and BSRG 
declines simultaneously in all three companies.  
Another key performance indicator that presents the fitness of the company is the 
indebtedness. Fig. 33 below presents the dynamics of growing and declining 
indebtedness.   
 
Fig. 33 Indebtedness BSRG 2002 - 2018   
 
The debts of BSRG grow between 2002 and 2009 from EUR 101 mln to EUR 434 mln. 
This is a period when the company is run by the inertial management. However, the 
debts decline from EUR 434 mln to EUR 90 mln between 2010 and 2018. In this period, 
the transformation leadership dominates the company’s management.  
Conclusion. Under the management of the transformational management the BSRG, 
BSRF, and BSRP improve their net financial result and reduce the indebtedness to a 
reasonable level matching an adequate capital structure.  
Statistical analysis of key performance indicators  
The study aims to establish whether a significant difference exists between the inertial 
management and the transformational management performance indicators. In order 
to test this objective, by the quantitative employee performance metrics of the BSRH 
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management, their overall performance will be evaluated and will be determined 
whether it affects any of the key financial performance indicators of the Holding. 
In the following analysis, the usage of data only for BSRH is because: 
1. The critical reorganisation decisions are predominantly taken on a group level. 
2. The debts are accrued in BSRH.  
3. Costs are one of the key indicators, and some of them cannot be allocated to 
the subsidiaries for certain periods. 
4. Statistical data has longer time-period on group level and better presents the 
trends.     
The first step is to determine how many quality indicators will be used to evaluate the 
management. The initial information available with us is six quantitative variables of 
the management covering the period 2002-2017. 
 
Table 2. Key Management Performance Indicators 
 
 
In order to determine the number of qualitative variables and which quantitative 
variables to be included (into a set), factor analysis will be applied. The purpose of this 
statistical method is to determine the factors that are common to a set of variables 
among which correlation connections exist. These factors are called hidden because 
they are not directly observable, usually (Appendix 2 for more details).   
 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average 
age (years)
47 47 46 48 50 51 55 53 42 42 42 48 49 46 46 48
Professiona
l experience
(years)
22 21 21 24 26 27 31 28 18 17 16 23 23 20 20 21
Experience 
in BSR
(years)
19 17 16 16 19 18 21 20 7 7 4 12 13 7 7 9
% of
graduates 
after 1990 
6% 7% 14% 8% 6% 5% 5% 10% 64% 63% 90% 33% 38% 75% 78% 75%
% of
educational 
diversity
43% 35% 41% 36% 45% 53% 55% 70% 100% 100% 140% 100% 75% 213% 167% 150%
% adequacy 
to the
occupied 
vacancies 
3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 38% 60% 7% 13% 88% 78% 60%
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The number of hidden factors determines through the values of Eigenvalues in Scree 
plot.  
  
Fig. 34 Determination of the Number of Hidden factors  
 
The Determination of the Number of Hidden Factors Figure shows that the graph 
becomes flattered after the second factor and that determines that the number of 
hidden factors consist of two. As a result, the number of hidden factors is fixed to two. 
However, the Determination of Belonging to a Hidden Factor Table shows that the 
analysis attaches all six factors to only one hidden factor.  
Table 3.  Determination of Belonging to a Hidden Factor 
Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 
Average age (years) -.804 .586 
Work experience  (years) -.866 .481 
Experience  (years) -.981 .039 
% of graduets after 1990  .969 .163 
% variety of educational institutions 
.853 .502 
% adequacy for the management position  
.907 .374 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Therefore, the rotation is also needed (Appendix 2 for more details).   
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Table 4. Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 
average age (years) -.226 .969 
total length of service (years) -.341 .930 
length of service in the field of railway 
transport (years) 
-.717 .670 
% of those who have completed their 
education after 1990 
.841 -.510 
% of the variety of completed HEIs .974 -.177 
% adequacy of the positions occupied .931 -.309 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. a. Rotation converged 
in 3 iterations. 
 
Quantitative variables are attributable to the factor with the highest absolute value. The 
Rotated Component Matrix Table shows to which from the two hidden factors is related 
to the variable.  
 
Quality measure Quantitative variables 
QM1 Х1, Х2, Х3 
QM2 Х4, Х5, Х6  
 
After attributing the variables to the specific factors, they are named. After careful 
consideration of the essence of the matter to which the questions are addressed and 
what they generally expressed, they can be named in the following way: 
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Quality measure Name 
QM1 Professional experience 
QM2 Professional competence 
 
After determining the number of hidden factors, they are formed as a single indicator. 
Once the two quality measures are constructed, it is seen that, on average, their values 
with the transformational management are higher than those of the inertial 
management.  
Quality measure 1 is designed the way that when the value decreases, that means that 
the professional experience increases and vice versa, the bigger the value, the lower 
the experience of the managers in the BSRG system. The most experienced are the 
managers in 2008 and least experience are the managers in 2012.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 35 Quality measure 1 
 
Quality measure 2 is designed the way that the higher values mean higher professional 
competencies of the management. The most competent are the managers in 2015 and 
least competent the managers in 2002 - 2009.    
 
Fig. 36 Quality measure 2 
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The Group Statistics Table shows that the average value of the first quality measure 
with the inertial management is 0.368. With the transformational management, it is 
0.814. Similar to the second qualitative variable, the mean for the transformational 
management is higher than that for the inertial management. However, this still does 
not justify claiming that this difference is statistically significant, i.e., that it objectively 
exists.  
 
Table 5. Group Statistics 
 
Management N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Q1 Inertial  10 .368 .1839 .0581 
Transformational 6 .814 .1364 .0557 
Q2 Inertial 10 .303 .0691 .0219 
Transformational 6 .743 .1459 .0596 
 
Therefore, it will be checked whether the quality measures are statistically significantly 
higher with the transformational management compared to those with the inertial one. 
For this purpose, a statistical hypothesis test will be performed (Appendix 2 for more 
details).   
Table 6. Test Statisticsa 
 Q2 
Mann-Whitney U .000 
Wilcoxon W 55.000 
Z -3.254 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .000b 
a. Grouping Variable: Management 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
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The significance level of both tests Sig = 0.0% is less than the error risk of 1%, which 
gives reason to reject the null hypothesis for both qualitative measures, which in turn 
means that the quality measures with the transformational management are 
statistically significantly higher than those with the inertial one, and this can be 
confirmed with a 99%. 
Once proven that the quality measures differ with the two types of management, it will 
be determined how they affect the three financial performance measures of the 
Holding, such as EBITDA, EBIT, and DEBT.  
 
Table 7. KPIs BSRG 2002-2017 EUR thousands 
 
 
To account for the impact of each management, the financial performance indicators 
are attributed to the management they refer to. Then the dynamic order of financial 
performance indicators and the quality measures are divided into two periods – 
transformational and inertial management. Thus will be determined the direction of 
impact of each management on the financial performance indicators. This will be done 
through correlation analysis.  
The correlation analysis gives an answer to the question of the strength and direction 
of the relationship between the variables. It ranges from -1 to +1, and the closer it is to 
-1 / + 1, the stronger the relationship between the variables is. At 0, the relationship is 
missing. Provisionally, the factor can be named as per the following limits: 
0 < |R| < 0.3 – weak correlation 
0.3 < |R| < 0.5 – moderate correlation 
0.5 < |R| < 0.7 – significant correlation 
0.7 < |R| < 0.9 – high correlation 
0.9 < |R| < 1.0 - very high correlation 
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Table 8. Correlation relationships with inertial management 
 EBITDA EBIT Debt 
Q1 Pearson Correlation -.310 -.345 -.749 
Sig. (2-tailed) .383 .328 .013 
N 10 10 10 
Q2 Pearson Correlation .651 .022 .347 
Sig. (2-tailed) .041 .951 .326 
N 10 10 10 
 
 
The results of the correlation analysis are obtained at a 5% error risk. 
With the inertial management, a significant relationship is established between the first 
quality measure and the debt, and between the second quality measure and the 
operating profit.  
 
 
Fig. 37 Q1 and debt correlation  
 
The relationship between the first quality measure and the debt is characterised as a 
high reverse correlation. That means that when Q1 decreases, the debt increases and 
because the construction of the indicator is such that with its’ decrease, the 
professional experience within BSRG increases, that means that when the 
professional experience within BSRG increases the debt also increases.  The other 
correlation dependence that emerges is a significant correlation between the second 
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quality measure and the EBITDA. This means that when, on average, the professional 
competence does not change, this leads to an increase in EBITDA with the inertial 
management. However, this correlation makes no sense.  
 
Fig. 38 EBITDA and Q2 correlation  
No other significant correlation dependencies on the inertial management have been 
established. 
With the transformational management, a single significant relationship is established 
at a 5% risk of error, and it is between the second quality measure and the debt. 
Table 9. Correlation relationships with transformational management 
 EBITDA EBIT Debt 
Q1 Pearson 
Correlation 
.624 -.732 .754 
Sig. (2-tailed) .186 .098 .083 
N 6 6 6 
Q2 Pearson 
Correlation 
.325 .769 -.849 
Sig. (2-tailed) .529 .074 .032 
N 6 6 6 
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This means that when, on average, the professional competence increases, this leads 
to debt reduction with the transformational management.  
 
Fig. 39 Q2 and debt correlation  
 
Moreover, at a more significant marginal risk of error of 10%, there are significant 
feedbacks between the first quality measure and the gross profit before interest and 
taxes, a significant direct relationship between the first quality measure and the debt, 
as well as a significant relationship between the second indicator and the gross profit 
before interest and taxes.  
The general trend is that when the transformational management's professional 
experience increases, this leads to an increase in the gross profits and to debt 
reduction with the transformational management. As to the professional competence, 
improving the general professional competence leads to an increase in the gross profit 
and to debt reduction. 
Since the period of the transformational management is too short (only 6 years), it 
cannot be proved that there is a clear correlation between these few marginal 
differentiated relationships. 
Conclusion. It is noteworthy that there is inertia with the inertial management with the 
professional experience indicator, thus with each subsequent year the financial 
performance indicators deteriorate. With the transformational management, this inertia 
is absent and a year of additional experience leads to improved financial performance 
indicators.   
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CONCLUSION ON MANAGEMENT PROTOTYPE  
Inertial management 
Inertial Management Prototype. The Inertial top managers are older than the 
comparable newcomers in the company are. They have long professional experience 
predominately or entirely accumulated within the Bulgarian State Railways. The inertial 
top managers have graduated from a narrower set of Universities and do not have 
enough and relevant knowledge about doing business within a competitive 
environment and market economy. What is more important, they do not have sufficient 
professional competencies that are relevant for the positions they occupy within a big 
corporation.  
Inertial Management Performance. Inertial managers lack the competencies 
required to anticipate the environmental shifts, design appropriate strategic response, 
reorganise and restructure a troubled company to turn it around and recover its going 
concern status. The net financial result and the indebtedness of BSRG, BSRF, and 
BSRP get worse at the time of the inertial management. There is inertia with the old 
management, thus with each subsequent year of professional experience, the financial 
performance indicators deteriorate.      
Transformational Management 
Transformational Management Prototype. Transformational top managers are 
younger than the comparable inertial managers in the company are. They have shorter 
professional experience than the top inertial managers do. Moreover, it is 
predominately accumulated outside the Bulgarian State Railways. Transformational 
managers come from different companies and different industries. They have 
graduated from a broader set of Universities and do have more knowledge about doing 
business within a competitive environment and market economy than the inertial 
managers. What is more important, they do have a much higher level of professional 
competencies that are relevant for the positions they occupy within BSRG.  
However, the transformation management in the case of the Bulgarian State Railways 
transformation is not problem loss. As the analysis in section 3 shows, the professional 
competence of the managers is not optimal. The adequacy of the top managers in the 
BSRH is around 80%. However, the adequacy of the top managers in BSRF is 27%, 
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and the adequacy of those in the BSRP is around 14%. This fact cuts down on the 
adaptive capabilities of both companies.     
Transformational Management Performance. Transformational managers have 
more competencies needed to anticipate the environmental shifts, design appropriate 
strategic response, reorganise and restructure a troubled company to turn it around 
and recover its going concern status. The net financial result of BSRG, BSRF, and 
BSRP improve at the time of the transformational management, and the indebtedness 
goes down to a level presenting an adequate capital structure. As contrasted with the 
inertial management, each subsequent year of transformational managers’ 
professional experience leads to improvement of the financial performance of BSRG. 
That indicates the learning effect on the performance of the company.    
In the context of contingency theory, it proves that the transformational managers have 
attributes (e.g., traits, skills, behaviour) that make them more capable than the inertial 
managers of reallocating and reconfiguring organisational skills and assets to recover 
the fitness of the company. As organisational ambidexterity postulates the complex set 
of decisions and routines designed by the transformational managers (see Chapter 6) 
enabled the organisation to sense and seize new opportunities through the reallocation 
of organisational assets.   
The above data confirms the hypothesis that the adaptive capacity of the troubled 
BSRG declines with the length of service of the inertial management whereas it 
increases with the length of service of the transformational management.  
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Chapter Five 
Trade Unions’ Power and Adaptive Capabilities 
Trade unions exercise a major part of their power through the collective labour 
agreements (CLA). Chapter 5 illustrates the effects of the CLA on the financial 
performance of BSRG in the reorganisation period. Two possible scenarios are 
analysed and compared quantitatively: (1) the inertial scenario illustrates the financial 
effects of the CLA and (2) the transformational scenario demonstrates the executive 
alternative proposed by the management at the launch of the reorganisation.  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Organisational culture is very often ignored in the organisational research because it 
is hard to assess. However, the collective labour agreement is one of the sources of 
data where essential elements of the company culture are encoded. CLAs reveal the 
power distribution within the corporations. They institutionalise certain setup, declare 
to be unchangeable and the institutional constraints, (institutionalised aspects of CLA) 
prevent organisational changes. Thus, in the limited surge space, organisations’ 
performance tends to be worse when the managers have to adapt the organisation to 
the environmental shifts.  
Trade unions strive to take as much control over decision making as possible. Among 
the critical areas of trade unions’ influence are: (1) the inflow and outflow of people, (2) 
the process of selection, recruitment, education and career development, and (3) the 
mode of resource distribution via payroll, social benefits, and working conditions. 
Another significant influence arises from the privileges and protections of trade union 
leaders encoded as benefits in the collective labour agreement, at different levels of 
the organisational architecture. 
The power of trade unions in corporations is an integral part of spontaneous 
institutionalisation. As trade unions collaborate with politicians’ asperity that arises 
against organisational transformations origins in politics, especially in the state-owned 
organisations. However, the resistance against any change could have a devastating 
effect on corporate performance as necessary reorganisations could be blocked or 
postponed. The consequence of asperity on the speed and cost of the reorganisation 
of BSRG is investigated in the following parts of the Chapter. Comparative analyses 
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differentiate the labour agreements produced by the inertial and the transformational 
management of BSRG. 
The trade unions’ strength (the independent variable) is a cultural phenomenon, which 
in reorganisation-free periods grows with the age of the organisation. Arguably, the 
trade unions’ controls coded in the organisational status quo are higher when they 
have a significant impact on the fitness of the company (the dependent variable). The 
power of trade unions plays an important role in large organisations (size is the control 
variable). The privileges of trade unions’ leaders are encoded in the organisational 
status quo through the collective labour agreements (operationalisation). The stronger 
the CLAs’ limitations on the decision making the worse is the fitness of the company 
(causal mechanism).  
Study hypothesis 2. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG to adjust to the 
environmental shifts declines with the strength of the limits imposed on the company 
performance by the institutionalised collective labour agreements. 
5.2. METHODOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION BASIS  
The data source for the analysis of the effects of the trade unions power on the 
adaptive capability of BSRG includes the Collective Labour Agreements (CLAs) 
adopted between 2009 and 2017, the financial statements of the three companies in 
BSRG between 2009 and 2017 and the Labour Code (LC) effective in the period.  
The information on the leading indicators is summarised for each calendar year during 
the period for every subsidiary and BSRG as a whole. The effect of every article that 
exists in CLAs and differs from the same indicator in the LC is identified and analysed. 
The main areas where CLAs affect management’s activities are identified, and 
comparative analysis between the limitations of inertial and transformational CLAs are 
performed.  
The comparative analysis presents the difference between the company’s financial 
performance in the inertial and in the transformational scenarios. It provides data about 
the financial impact of the CLAs (the resistance of trade unions) on the adaptive 
capability and the speed of the reorganisation of BSRG.    
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5.3 COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
The Inertial (Ecology) Scenario 
The inertial scenario presents the traditional setup that has been historically 
institutionalised by the CLAs. This arrangement is announced to be unchangeable and 
the institutionalised aspects of the collective labour agreements, prevent undesirable 
changes throughout the reorganisation period. The trade unions in BSRG exercise 
their power to its upper limit, and in the limited space for decision-making, the 
performance of the company and its subsidiaries gets worse. In this scenario, the 
pressure from the trade unions is constant. The inertial scenario reflects the concept 
of the theory of structural inertia. The following paragraphs describe the mechanisms 
through which the collective labour agreements reduce BSRG’s adaptive capabilities.   
Trade unions’ restrictions on employment dismissal. By signing a CLA, an 
employer's ability to terminate employment relationships in case of a reduction in the 
number of posts or reduction of the workload is reduced. In addition, the involvement 
of trade unions in the process of staff selection and dismissal creates factual difficulties. 
In practice, the executives do not have the full freedom to take independent decisions 
and to implement all the necessary reorganisation-oriented measures in line with the 
environmental shifts. There is not enough flexibility in restructuring a troubled 
enterprise in order to keep it as a going concern.  
The opportunities for rapid and timely management response to the reduction in the 
workload during carriage of passengers and cargo specified in 2014 and 2016 CLA 
are severely limited and dependent on trade unions’ will and reaction. There is no 
flexibility in taking management decisions in connection with the changing business 
climate. Despite any decline in transported cargo and passengers, the companies 
cannot respond promptly, and any possible staff optimisation is dependent on the 
discretion and will of the trade unions. Thus, all business processes become 
prerogative of the trade unions, which could lead to deviations from a typical business 
management model and to generation of additional losses from maintaining human 
resources more than those currently needed. 
Article 11, para. 3 of 2014 and 2016 CLA of BSRP and BSRF stipulates: "The employer 
may dismiss a worker or an employee, a member of a trade union, or party to the CA, 
due to a reduction in the number of posts or reduction of the workload only subject to 
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a preliminary written consent in the sense of Art. 333(4) of the Labour Code (LC) of the 
relevant collective trade union body in the division". 
Trade unions’ interference in the selection processes. The interference of the trade 
unions with the staff selection processes creates factual difficulties for the managers 
to implement their policy. In practice, the companies are deprived of the opportunity to 
independently develop and implement their policy and objectives regarding human 
resources management. This, in turn, leads to an inability to plan the results. 
Article 11(1) of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA stipulates that "workers and employees to be 
made redundant shall be nominated by the Employer through selection by Art. 329 of 
LC (Labour Code), and based on specific criteria and indicators adopted by the 
parties." According to para.4, the employer undertakes to contribute to the social 
adaptation of the persons to be made redundant, directing them to vacant positions in 
the same or other divisions of the Companies and organising retraining at its own 
expense, and according to para.5, the trade unions are entitled to make proposals 
under para. 4.  
According to Art.12 (1) of 2014 CA and 2016 CA, in case of staff reduction the 
Employer undertakes not to dismiss: 
1. simultaneously members of one family; 
2. workers and employees in working age, in the presence of posts occupied by 
pensioners or persons who have acquired a right to retirement pension in the 
same or similar position; 
3. Workers and employees in the presence of posts that could be occupied by 
persons to be made redundant who meet the requirements for taking up the 
post. 
According to (2), "in case of equal qualification and equal performance of work, workers 
and employees with more serious family or in strained circumstances or health status 
take precedence over the others to remain in employment". Also, according to para. 3, 
"in case of equal qualifications workers and employees who provide the maintenance 
of their families alone or who are single parents cannot be dismissed."  
Trade unions’ interference in human resource management. Largely, trade unions 
have been given the opportunity to both monitor the course of these processes and to 
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participate directly in decision-making. Such privileges lead to loss of the employers' 
opportunity to make direct discretion in the human resources management and to 
inability to develop an independent human resources policy. 
Article 8(2) of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA, states, "the employer shall notify the Unions 
of the announced competitions for vacant posts and shall include in the committees 
their authorised representative." Paragraph 5 of the same article stipulates that „other 
things being equal, workers and employees made redundant by the company take 
precedence over the others in accepting employment.“  
Similar priorities are provided for in the wording of Art.12 of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA. 
Paragraph 2 of Art. 12 stipulates that "in case of equal qualifications and equal 
performance of the job, workers and employees with more serious family, material 
situation or health status take precedence over the other to remain in employment." 
Paragraph 3 of Art.12 stipulates that "in case of equal qualifications, workers and 
employees who provide the maintenance of their families alone or who are single 
parents cannot be dismissed", and paragraph 4 of the same Article requires from the 
employer to "maintain a database of the redundant persons and information about 
them in each division". 
At the same time, Art. 19(1), cl. 4 of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA contains an agreement 
that by 31 December 2014 (according to 2016 CLA - by 31 October 2016) „the system 
for evaluation of the posts and jobs" in the Companies shall be reviewed. 
Article 40(2) of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA stipulates that post for which inconvenient 
working hours are determined shall be proposed by the parties to the CLA in the 
divisions and that the Company Manager shall approve the list after consultation with 
the Central Board of the Parties (CBP). 
A new Section II - Training, Formal Qualification, and Re-Qualification - is created in 
2014 CLA and 2016 CLA. It stipulates that trade unions may directly participate in the 
human resources management process in the enterprise: 
According to Art.15(1), Section II of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA, the employer shall 
develop in cooperation with the Trade Unions the Ordinance on Vocational Training of 
Staff in Holding BSR Ltd. Paragraph (2) of the same Article stipulates that the employer 
shall develop a program for the professional development of the staff in cooperation 
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with the Trade Unions. It shall validate the organisation and conduct of training for the 
staff in order to create conditions for its professional development. 
Article 16 (of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA) stipulates, "on a proposal from a Trade Union 
and after examination by the Parties, the Employer shall decide on training in the sense 
of Art.169 of the Labour Code ". 
The trade unions’ obligations to the employer. The volume of information is 
significantly reduced in the inertial labour agreements in 2014 and 2016. The trade 
unions provide data only for the actual number of their members, but not data on the 
structure, and management bodies at central and local level - Art. 18(2) of 2014 CLA 
and 2016 CLA 
Employers’ ability to be informed of these circumstances is related to the exercise of 
their workers and employees' rights - for example, with a view to assessing the 
existence of protection under Art.333, para. 3 of LC concerning the members of the 
trade union management in the enterprise. In this sense, to ensure that such protection 
is in place, the employer needs more information from the trade union but not only data 
on its members who fall within the scope of that protection. In BSRF, although the trade 
union has designated an employee as a beneficiary of this protection on the basis of 
the analysis of structure and organisation of the trade union, Supreme Court of 
Cassation has held that, as regards this person there are no grounds for protection 
under Art.333, para. 3 of LC. 
In this sense, Art. 18(2) of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA provide for that the trade unions 
shall provide information on the actual number of their members at the request of the 
Employer.  
The Transformational Scenario 
The transformational scenario presents the attempts of the management to reduce the 
power of the trade unions and to eliminate the negative impact of the collective labour 
agreements on the financial performance of BSRG.  The maximum effect that could 
have been achieved was to eliminate the collective labour agreements for the period 
of reorganisation and regulate the labour arrangements through the Labour Code 
adopted in Bulgaria. The midway was to amend the collective labour agreements and 
produce a more reorganisation-friendly setup. Both sub-scenarios were available at 
the beginning of the reorganisation. However, because of trade unions’ power and the 
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inertial political environment, only the second one took place just for a short period in 
the years 2012 and 2013. The transformational scenario reflects the concepts of 
adaptation theories that the executives can adapt the organisations to the changing 
environments. The following paragraphs describe the amendments through which the 
CLAs produced a friendlier reorganisation-oriented environment and improved the 
adaptive capabilities of BSRG.   
Fewer restrictions on employment dismissal. 2011 CLA contains a progressive 
provision that the protection should not cover the dismissals resulting from the 
reduction in the number of posts and all cases of reduction of the workload (Art.11(1) 
of 2011 Collective Agreement (CA) of BSRF and Art. 10(1) of 2011 CLA of BSRP. 
Thus, companies had the opportunity to stop the trains with an average profitability of 
less than 15% (for passenger transport) and to take steps, in case of reducing the 
workload in certain structural units or the volume of transport by 10% or more of the 
total volume (for cargo transport), to optimise the staff without requesting prior 
agreement from the trade unions. These amendments made it possible to take into 
account the environment in which the companies operate, allowing for flexibility and 
faster response in case of a decline in the number of transported passengers and 
availability of low profitability trains.  
Article 11(1) of 2011 CLA of BSR Freight Ltd states that in case of dismissal due to the 
reduction of the workload, the preliminary protection provided for in Art.333(4) of LC 
shall be used, except for the cases of: 
 a sharp decline in the volume of transported cargo by 10% or more of the total 
volume; 
 reduction of the number of repaired wagons and locomotives by 10% or more 
of the total volume; 
 increase in the production capacity of one repair unit by 5% at the expense of 
other units or increase in the worked out person-hours in one repair unit by 10% 
to the detriment of other units. 
Article 10(1) of 2011 CLA of BSR Passengers Ltd. states that: "In case of dismissal 
due to the reduction of the workload, the preliminary protection provided for in 
Art.333(4) of LC shall be used, except for the cases of: 
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 stopping trains with an average profitability of less than 15%; 
 increase by 5% in the production capacity of a repair unit at the expense of other 
repair units; 
 increase by 10 % in the worked out person-hours in a repair unit at the expense 
of other repair units; 
The said texts also provide that the employer shall make a written request for a specific 
dismissal to the trade union body whose member is the worker or employee. The trade 
union body shall answer within ten days upon receipt of the employer's request. Worker 
or employee shall be dismissed after the employer has received the written consent of 
the trade union body. If the employer does not receive a written answer within the 
specified time limit, the consent shall be deemed to have been given. In the case of 
written refusal, the latter shall be motivated giving the specific reasons therefor. 
Less interference in the selection processes. 2011 CLA does not contain an 
agreement that trade unions can participate in the process of adopting the selection 
criteria and indicators, which ensured a more operational character and opportunity for 
management judgment as appropriate in defining the staff selection criteria and 
indicators. 
2011 CLA (Art.11 (1) of 2011 CLA of BSRF and Art. 10(1) of 2011 CLA of the BSRP), 
for example, also provide for an obligation for employers to contribute to the social 
adaptation of the persons to be made redundant, directing them to vacant positions in 
the same or other divisions of the Companies and organising retraining for its own 
account. However, unlike 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA, 2011 CA does not allow the trade 
unions to make proposals for implementation of social adaptation measures. 
2011 CLA (Art.12 of 2011 CLA of BSRF and Art.11 of 2011 CLA of BSRP) stipulates 
that "in case of staff reduction, the Employer agrees not to dismiss workers and 
employees in working age if there are posts occupied by pensioners or persons who 
have acquired a right to retirement pension, and not to dismiss members of one family 
simultaneously ", but there is no protection similar to that referred to in Art.12 (1), cl.3 
and para. 2 and para.3 of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA. 
Lower interference in human resource management. The above restrictions are 
significantly reduced in 2011 CLA, whereby the Trade Unions are not entitled to 
participate in the commissions involved in conducting competitions for occupation of 
107 
 
posts (Article 8(2) of 2011 CLA of BSRF and Article 7(2) of 2011 CLA of BSRP state 
that "the employer shall notify the Trade Unions and shall make appropriate 
announcements at the headquarters of the respective division and specific unit of the 
job vacancies that are to be occupied and of the announced competitions for 
occupation of posts and shall invite their representatives to participate in the 
Commissions as observers"). Some of the social advantages stipulated in Art. 8, para.5 
and in Art. 12(2)(3) and (4) of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA do not exist in selecting and 
employing staff. There are no arrangements similar to those specified in Section II - 
Training, Formal Qualification, and Re-Qualification - of 2014 CLA and 2016 CLA. 
More trade unions’ obligations to the employer. 2011 CLA (Art. 17a of 2011 CLA 
of BSRF and Art. 17 of 2011 CLA of the BSRP) contains an arrangement for provision 
of more comprehensive information by the trade unions on both their membership base 
and their structure (the provision states that "trade unions shall provide the employer 
with information on their structure and their membership base upon request"). 
 
5.4. CLA COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: INERTIAL VS. TRANSFORMATIONAL 
SCENARIOS 
 
BSR Freight Transportation Ltd 
Environmental signals. In the period 2010-2017, the company operates in an 
environment of growing competition of the private railway undertakings, a reduced 
share of the freight railway transport and substantial internal inefficiencies accumulated 
in the past. As a result of that the transported goods drop from 10,778 tons in 2010 to 
6 230 tons in 2017 (Audited financial reports 2010-2017). 
In the context of this unfavourable business situation, the company faced the 
exceptional challenge of optimising its structure and processes in order to adapt to the 
environmental shifts and avoid bankruptcy. The company's management faced the 
challenge to keep the workers motivated on the one hand and to restructure the 
company on the other. During the period under review, four Collective Labour 
Agreements (CLA) were in force.  Each of them had a duration of two years, with the 
term of the most recent collective agreement (2016 CLA) being extended by an annex 
for another year.  
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 2009 CLA was effective during 2009 and 2010. 
 2011 CLA covered the years 2011 and 2012. 
 2013 CLA covered the years 2013 and 2014. 
 2015 CLA covered the years 2015, 2016 and 2017.  
 
The cost of collective labour agreements. The difficulties created by the Collective 
Labour Agreements mentioned above relate to both the necessity to optimise the staff 
in line with the volume of freight. To determine the financial burden on BSRF, an 
analysis was made of each CLA signed with the social partners compared to the 
Labour Code (LC) for the respective years. 
The Collective Labour Agreement provides for some higher types of remuneration, 
both basic and additional, which do not guarantee an increase in the results from the 
workers and employees' work but only lead to an increase in the employer's financial 
commitments. 
Basic remuneration. The comparison between the basic remuneration of the workers 
and employees of BSRF laid down in LC and that stipulated in 2009-2016 CLA shows 
that there is a difference in the company's burden. 
The increase in the salary and social security contributions is due to the calculation of 
the funds under the agreed higher basic salary laid down in the CLA. In addition to the 
differences in the basic salaries, the calculation of the length of service and 
professional experience is also affected by the higher percentage set in the CLA - 1%, 
while that provided for in the Labour Code is 0.6% for each length-of-service year. 
The overall burden amounts to EUR 17 mln. 
 More than EUR 7 mln paid for employees' remuneration during the period under 
review; 
 The additional cost of EUR 2 mln paid for social security contributions; 
 The additional costs for the length of service and professional experience are 
EUR 9 mln. 
Additional remunerations. The analysis of additional remuneration specified in the 
Labour Code and that contained in the CLA for the period 2010-2017 shows that the 
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costs incurred for additional remuneration under the CLA burden the company by EUR 
10 mln. 
The costs for night work in the period 2009-2017 specified in the Labour Code were 
EUR 0.125. However, in the CLA, these funds are increased by different percentages 
as shown in the table 10 below:  
 
Table 10.  Night work costs LC vs CLA 
 
Sources: LC, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA 
 
Correspondingly, the costs calculated in accordance with the CLA exceed by EUR 5 
mln the estimated cost that would have been paid by the BSRF in accordance with the 
LC. 
The rate of increase for the worked overtime stipulated in the Labour Code is also 
increased in the Collective Labour Agreement. The table 11 below indicates the 
difference between the costs of LC and the costs of CLA.  
 
Table 11. Overtime costs LC vs CLA 
 
Sources: LC, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA 
 
The overtime cost incurred under the CLA in excess to the costs that would have been 
incurred under the LC for the period 2010-2017 is EUR 1 mln. The remuneration for 
kilometres driven by the loco-drivers increases from EUR 0.00175 in LC to EUR 0.0218 
in the CLA. The kilometres reward costs incurred under the CLA in excess to the costs 
that would have been incurred under the LC for the period 2010-2017 are EUR 3 mln. 
Night work LC CLA
 - for the position of driver and assistant driver of locomotive EUR 0.125 53%
 - for the positions referred to in Appendix 3 EUR 0.125 42%
 - for all other positions EUR 0.125 37%
 - for alternate duty according to a schedule EUR 0.125 25%
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The benefits paid in compliance with the CLA are higher in comparison with what would 
have been paid under the Labour Code due to: (1) the difference in the minimum salary 
under the Labour Code and that agreed in the CLA and (2) the different number of 
months defined in the Labour Code and CLA for the calculation of the benefits. The 
table 12 below shows the cost difference between the LC and the CLAs.  
 
Table 12.  Benefits costs LC vs CLA 
 
Sources: LC, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA 
 
The benefits paid in the period 2010-2017 under the four effective CLA have caused 
extra costs for the employer of EUR 4 mln. 
The table 13 below shows the total amount paid to the workers and employees of 
BSRF for basic and additional remuneration and social security contributions in the 
period 2010-2017 under Collective Labour Agreements in force during this period. 
The basis remuneration includes paid salary, social security contributions and accrued 
amounts for the length of service and professional experience. The additional 
remuneration includes amounts paid for night work, overtime and kilometres driven. 
Benefits LC CA
Benefits upon termination of employment relationship due to illness 
under the terms and conditions of Art. 325, cl.9 and Art. 327, cl.1 / 
Art. 34 of CA / 2 months 3 months
Benefit for acquired right to retirement pension under Art. 222,
para. 3 of LC 6 months 9 months
In case of dismissal under Art. 328, para 1 of LC and at the time of 
termination of their employment relationship the persons have no 
more than one year until the acquisition of the right to retirement 
pension and they are entitled to receive the benefit referred to in 
Art. 222, para. 1 of LC 1 month 6 months
In case of dismissal under Art. 328, para. 1, cl. 1, cl.2, cl. 3 and cl. 4 of
the Labour Code, the persons are entitled to receive the benefit
referred to in Art. 222, para. 1 of LC, for the time they were
unemployed but for no more than:  220 kt 1 month  6 months
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Table 13.  CLA costs in BSRF 2009 - 2017
 
Sources: Accounting reports, Annual Labour Reports, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA, 
2011-2017 BSRF Business Plans, Labour Code, Ordinance on the Structure and 
Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133 of 1993  
 
During the entire period, 2009-2017, salaries and benefits amounted to EUR 129 mln 
are paid to workers and employees of BSRF. Under the Labour Code, these costs 
would amount to EUR 98 mln. 
 
Table 14.  LC costs in BSRF 2010 - 2017 
 
Sources: Accounting reports, Annual Labour Reports, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA, 
2011-2017 BSRF Business Plans, Labour Code, Ordinance on the Structure and 
Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133 of 1993  
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The table 15 below shows that for the entire duration of the four Collective Agreements 
(2009-2017), the financial burden on the employer is EUR 31 mln. 
 
Table 15.  LC vs CLA costs in BSRF 2010-2017 
 
Sources: Accounting reports, Annual Labour Reports, 2011 CA, 2014 CA, 2016 CA, 
2011-2017 BSRF Business Plans, Labour Code, Ordinance on the Structure and 
Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133 of 1993 
  
The analysis of the four Collective Agreements which were in force during the period 
2010-2017 shows that 2014 CLA creates the most substantial financial burden on the 
employer amounting to EUR 9 mln. 
The cost of staff overcapacity. Zero Based Budgeting as a financial instrument is 
used to determine the spare capacity in the company. The budgeting process begins 
with revenue forecasts for the relevant year based on the volumes requested by 
forwarders and shippers of the company. Activities that are directly related to the 
generation of the planned revenue are examined in detail, each activity or process 
being assessed whether it is necessary for the current format, and what volume and 
what quality levels should be achieved. 
The objective is to highlight the excess assets and resources that have led to the cost 
base increase. The table below summarises the data from the detailed calculations 
made for each year of the period under review see Appendix 5 
The excess staff has been identified for each year, after examining the activities and 
processes, and depending on the volumes to be released. This excess staff is laid 
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down in the company's business plans as staff to be dismissed. However, due to the 
restriction of the employer's ability to terminate employment relationships in case of a 
reduction in the number of posts or reduction of the workload imposed by the collective 
agreements, these employees have not been dismissed.  
In 2011, although the trade unions went on strike for 28 days, the management 
neglected the postulates of the collective labour agreement and dismissed the current 
overcapacity of employees. For this reason, the company does not bear costs from 
overcapacity. 
Despite the decrease in the volumes of transported goods during the rest of the period 
under review, the company cannot react promptly, and the discretion of the trade 
unions determined the optimisation of the staff. Table 19 below shows that after 
examining the activities and the processes in the BSRF could be determined that the 
overcapacity of 2,787 people for the period 2010-2017 has led to excess costs of EUR 
10 mln.  
 
Table 16.  Costs of employees’ overcapacity in BSRF 2010 - 2017 
 
Sources: Accounting reports, Annual Labour Reports, Business plans of the BSR 
2010-2017 
* The cost of overcapacity is net one and includes the cost of salaries and social 
security contributions of the active staff during the period less the benefit due under 
the CLA. 
 
What is the effect of this financial burden on the financial position of the company? The 
table 17 below shows the main financial indicators of the company for the period 2010-
2017. The overall loss for the period is EUR 43 mln. The indebtedness at the end of 
the period is EUR 54 mln.   
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Table 17.  Inertial Scenario – CLA financial burden in BSRF 2010 - 2017 
 
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017 
 
Table 18 below shows the outcome of the transformational scenario. If the effect of 
CLAs for the period 2010-2017 had been disregarded, in other words, remuneration 
costs of EUR 31 mln above the Labour Code and costs of overcapacity of staff of EUR 
10 mln had been eliminated the financial result of the company would have increased 
by EUR 41 mln for the period and would decrease to a loss of EUR 1 mln as shown in 
table 9 below. The financial result of the company for the last three years (from 2015 
to 2017) would have been a profit. The indebtedness would have decreased from EUR 
54 mln to EUR 13 mln.  
 
Table 18.  Transformational scenario - no CLA financial burden in BSRF 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
BSR Passengers Transportation Ltd.  
Environmental signals. The operation of the BSRP from 2010 to 2017 is 
characterised by the exceptional dynamics of the business environment, which 
presents the company with many challenges. During this period, the competition from 
the road transport increased, the trains of the company were 40 years old and could 
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not provide quality services to the client, and the modernisation of some parts of the 
rail infrastructure interrupted the smooth transportation of passengers. Above all, the 
BSRG of companies was on the verge of bankruptcy. As a result of that, the number 
of transported passengers dropped from 30 mln in 2010 to 21 mln in 2017 (Audited 
financial reports 2010-2017). 
The management of BSRG undertook a large-scale reorganisation in order to rescue 
the going concern status of the enterprise. However, the collective labour agreements 
between the employer and the trade unions imposed restrictions on the implementation 
of the necessary reforms of the company. 
The negotiations on the 2011 Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) marked the 
beginning of the market-driven management by the BSRG’s transformational 
leadership. The agreements reached with the social partners on some key issues were 
based on the balance between protecting the interests of the employees and taking 
into account the real market situation facing the company. The new ideas and models 
for restructuring in 2011 were even more difficult to enforce because of the extremely 
social orientation of the arrangements that had already expired with the CLA 2009 – 
arrangements not in line with the dynamics of the market conditions in which the 
company operates. 
Four Collective Labour Agreements were in force through the observed period. Each 
of them had a two-year period of action, with the last Collective Labour Agreement, 
namely CLA 2016, extended by an annex for another year.  
 CLA 2009 was in force in 2009 and 2010;  
 CLA 2011 was in force in 2011 and 2012;  
 CLA 2013 was in force in 2013 and 2014, 
 CLA 2015 covers the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 
The cost of collective labour agreements. The difficulties created by the Collective 
Labour Agreements relate not only to the ability to optimise staff. In order to determine 
the burden that the BSRP carries, an analysis was made for each CLA signed with the 
social partners compared to the Labour Code for the respective years. The total cost 
of workers and employees of the BSRP includes basic and additional remuneration 
and social security contributions. The basis remuneration includes paid salary, social 
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security contributions and accrued amounts for the length of service and professional 
experience. The additional remuneration includes amounts paid for night work, 
overtime and kilometres driven. 
Basic remuneration. The comparison between the basic remuneration of the workers 
and employees of the BSRP as laid down in LC and that stipulated in 2009—2016 CLA 
shows that there is a difference in the company's burden. The increase in the salary 
and social security contributions is due to the calculation of the funds under the agreed 
higher basic salary laid down in the CLA. In addition to the differences in the basic 
salaries, the calculation of the length of service and professional experience is also 
affected by the higher percentage set in the CLA - 1%, while that provided for in the 
Labour Code is 0.6% for each length-of-service year. 
The overall burden amounts to EUR 26 mln. 
 More than EUR 10 mln paid for employees' remuneration during the 
period under review; 
 An additional EUR 3 mln paid for social security contributions; 
 The additional costs for the length of service and professional experience 
are EUR 13 mln. 
Additional Remunerations. The analysis of the additional remuneration specified in 
the Labour Code and that contained in the CLA for the period 2010-2017 shows that 
the funds paid for additional remuneration under the CLA burden the company by an 
amount of EUR 9 mln. 
The funds paid for night work in the period 2009-2017 exceed by EUR 1 mln the 
amount estimated by the employer; if they were calculated according to the coefficients 
specified in the Labour Code, they could have been EUR 0.125 per hour. In the CLA, 
these funds, however, are increased by different percentages: 
Table 19.  Night work costs LC vs CLA
Sources: LC, 2011 CLA, 2014 CLA, and 2016 CLA 
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The overtime funds paid under the CLA for the period 2010-2017 also have a negative 
effect on the employer, amounting to EUR 7 mln since, apart from the higher basic 
salary used as a basis for their calculation, the rate of increase stipulated in the Labour 
Code is also increased: 
Table 20. Overtime costs LC vs CLA
Sources: LC, 2011 CLA, 2014 CLA, and 2016 CLA 
 
Similarly, when calculating the remuneration for kilometres driven by the loco-drivers, 
the increase in LC of EUR 0.00175 increases to BGN 0.0218 in the CLA and results in 
an amount of EUR 1 mln that should be paid by the employer. 
The benefits paid in the period 2010-2017 under the four effective CLA have caused 
damage to the employer amounting to EUR 1 mln. The reason is again cumulative, 
results from the difference in the minimum salary under the Labour Code, and that 
agreed in the CLA, and the different number of months defined in the Labour Code and 
CLA for the calculation of the benefits. 
 
Table 21.  Benefits costs LC vs CLA 
Sources: LC, 2011 CLA, 2014 CLA, 2016 CLA 
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The table 22 below shows the total amount paid to the workers and employees of 
BSRP for basic and additional remuneration and social security contributions in the 
period 2010-2017 under the Collective Agreements in force during this period. 
 
Table 22.  CLA costs in BSRP 2009 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports, Annual Labour Reports, CLA 2011, CLA 2014, 
CLA 2016, 2011-2017 BSRP Business Plans, Labour Code. Ordinance on the 
Structure and Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133/1993 
 
During the entire period, 2010-2017, salaries and benefits amounted to EUR 213 mln 
are paid to workers and employees of the BSRP. If these costs were calculated under 
the Labour Code, as table 23 shows, they would amount to EUR 177 mln. 
 
Table 23.  LC costs in BSRP 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017, Annual Labour Reports, CLA 2011, CLA 
2014, CLA 2016, 2011-2017 BSRP Business Plans, Labour Code. Ordinance on the 
Structure and Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133 of 1993 
119 
 
The table 24 below shows that for the entire duration of the four Collective Labour 
Agreements (2009-2017), the financial burden on the employer is EUR 36 mln. 
 
Table 24.  LC vs CLA costs in BSRP 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017, Annual Labour Reports, CLA 2011, CLA 
2014, CLA 2016, 2011-2017 BDZ Business Plans, Labour Code. Ordinance on the 
Structure and Organisation of Salaries, Council of Ministers Decree No. 133 of 1993 
 
The analysis of the four Collective Labour Agreements which were in force during the 
period 2010-2017 shows that 2011 CLA creates the largest financial burden on the 
employer amounting to EUR 12 mln. 
The cost of staff overcapacity. Alike in BSRF, the Zero-Based Budget is used to 
determine the spare capacity in the company. The budgeting process begins with 
planning the number of passengers transported, the volume of passenger-kilometres 
work by individual segments and the revenue for the respective year. Activities that are 
directly related to the generation of the planned revenue are examined in detail, each 
activity or process being assessed whether it is necessary for the current format, and 
what volume and what quality levels should be achieved. The objective is to highlight 
the excess assets and resources that drive the increase in the cost. The excess staff 
has been identified for each year, after examining the activities and processes, and 
depending on the volumes to be released. This excess staff is laid down in the 
company's business plans as staff to be dismissed. However, due to the restriction of 
the employer's ability to terminate employment relationships in case of a reduction in 
the number of posts or reduction of the workload imposed by the collective 
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agreements, these employees have not been dismissed. After examining the activities 
and processes in the BSRP, an overcapacity of 3,222 employees was identified for the 
period 2010-2017.  
Table 25.  Costs of employees’ overcapacity in BSRP 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Audited financial reports, Annual Labour Reports, Business plans of BDZ for 
the period 2010-2017*. The cost of overcapacity is net one and includes: the cost of 
salaries and social security contributions of the active staff during the period less the 
benefit due under the CLA. 
 
In 2011, the management ignored the postulates of the collective labour agreement, 
and although the trade unions went on strike for 28 days, the management dismissed 
the overcapacity of employees. For this reason, the company does not bear costs from 
overcapacity. However, despite the decrease in the volumes of transported 
passengers during the rest of the period under review, the company did not react 
promptly, and the optimisation of the staff was determined by the discretion and the 
will of the trade unions in much the same way that it happened in BSRF. 
Correspondingly, the overcapacity of 3,222 people for the period 2010-2017 has led to 
excess costs of EUR 10 mln. What is the effect of these costs on the financial position 
of the company? The table 26 below shows the KPIs of the company for the period 
2010-2017. The overall loss for the period is EUR 29 mln. The debt at the end of 2017 
is EUR 43 mln.  
(The income for 2015 and 2016 in tables 26 and 27 is different because of the 
elimination of income from related parties. The decline is mainly because of the 
reduction of the cards for reduced cost travel, given to the employees of BSRF).  
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Table 26.  Inertial scenario CLA financial burden in BSRF 2010 - 2017
 
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Table 27 below shows the outcome of the transformational scenario. If the financial 
reports were adjusted with the potential savings from (1) the cost Collective Labour 
Agreements above the Labour Code: EUR 36 mln; (2) the unrealised overcapacity of 
staff with a cost of EUR 10 mln, and; (3) the reflected decrease in compensation under 
the PSO contract: EUR 7 mln, the financial result of the company could have been 
improved by EUR 39 mln. Correspondingly, the loss could have decreased from EUR 
29 mln to EUR 9 mln profit; the debts would have decreased from EUR 43 mln to EUR 
4 mln; EBITDA would have increased from EUR 172 mln to EUR 211 mln for the entire 
period.  
Table 27.  Transformational scenario: no CLA financial burden in BSRP 2010 - 2017
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Holding Bulgarian State Railways Group 
Environmental signals. Despite the decrease in the volumes of transported 
passengers and goods during the period of reorganisation 2010-2017, the 
management of BSRG, BSRF and BSRP were not able to react promptly and the will 
of the trade unions determined the optimisation of staff. Correspondingly, the 
overcapacity of 6,009 employees (2,787 in BSRF, and 3,222 in BSRP) for the period 
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has led to excess costs of EUR 20 mln (EUR 10 mln in BSRF and EUR 10 mln in 
BSRP). 
For the entire duration of the four Collective Labour Agreements (2009-2017), the 
financial burden for the employer above the costs that would have been incurred under 
the regulations of the Labour Code is EUR 67 mln (EUR 36 mln in the BSRP and EUR 
31 mln in the BSRF). Thus, the total extra cost of the four Collective Labour 
Agreements (2009-2017) was EUR 87 mln.  
What is the effect of these costs on company’s financial position? The table 28 below 
shows the KPIs in company’s audited financial statements for the period 2010-2017. 
The overall loss for the period is EUR 134 mln. The debt at the end of 2017 is EUR 
206 mln.   
 
Table 28.  Inertial scenario CLA financial burden in BSRG 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
However, table 29 below shows the outcome of the transformational scenario. If the 
financial reports were adjusted annually with the potential savings from the unrealised 
overcapacity of staff with a total cost of EUR 20 mln the loss would have decreased 
from EUR 134 mln to EUR 115 mln; the debts would have decreased from EUR 206 
mln to EUR 187 mln; EBITDA would have increased from EUR 182 mln to EUR 201 
mln for the entire period.  
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Table 29.  Transformational scenario: no overcapacity in BSRG 2010 - 2017
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
In a more optimistic scenario when adjusted financial reports include both: (1) the 
potential savings from the unrealised overcapacity of staff with a total cost of EUR 20 
mln and (2) the financial burden of EUR 67 mln for the costs under the regulations of 
the Labour Code, the financial position would improve significantly. 
 
Table 30. Transformational scenario: no CLA and overcapacity in BSRG 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
The loss would have decreased from EUR 134 mln to EUR 70 mln; the debts would 
have decreased from EUR 206 mln to EUR 126 mln; EBITDA would have increased 
from EUR 182 mln to EUR 262 mln for the entire period.  
 
5.5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REORGANISATION SPEED 
A Z score calculation could provide information about the effect of the CLAs on the 
adaptive capability of BSRG when the adaptive capability measures through the effect 
on the speed of transformation.  
124 
 
BSR – Freight Transportation Ltd.  
Table 31 below shows the effect of CLAs on the fitness of BSRF expressed by Z-Score.   
Table 31.  Z – Score of opacity and resistance in BSRF 2010 - 2017
 
As the transformational scenario proposes, in the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score of 
BSRF would have been better for the entire period of the transformation from 2010 to 
2017. In 2017, the real Z-Score is 0.69 compared to 3.69 Z-Score in the hypothetical 
absence of CLAs or 3.0 points difference that is 5.34 times higher than the real Z-Score 
of BSRF. What is more important, is that if CLAs had not existed in BSRF, the 
company’s Z-Score for the entire period except in 2011 and 2012 would have been 
above the 1.23 hurdle that indicates that the likelihood of bankruptcy is high. For 2016 
and 2017, Z-Score (3.35 and 3.69 respectively) would have been above the 2.9 hurdle, 
which shows that the enterprise is financially sound. In other words, the transformation 
of the enterprise would have been completed in 2013, and the company would have 
been financially sound in 2016. 
 
BSR – Passengers Transportation Ltd.  
Table 32 below shows the effect of the CLAs on BSRP’s fitness expressed by Z-Score.   
 
Table 32.  Z – Score of opacity and resistance in BSRP 2010 - 2017 
 
As the transformational scenario proposes, in the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score of 
BSRP would have been better for the entire period of the transformation from 2010 to 
2017. In 2017, the real Z-Score is 1.38 compared to 3.68 Z-Score in the hypothetical 
absence of CLAs or 2.3 points difference that is 2.66 times higher than the real Z-Score 
of BSRP. What is more important, is that if the CLAs had not existed in the BSRP, the 
company’s Z-Score for 2010, 2011, 2016 and 2017 would have been above the 1.23 
hurdle, which indicates that the likelihood of bankruptcy is high. For 2017, the Z-Score 
of 3.69 would have been above the hurdle of 2.9, which shows that the enterprise is 
BSRF 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Real Z-Score 0,84 0,72 0,37 0,95 0,40 0,67 0,69 0,69
CLAs Z -Score 1,32 1,06 0,76 1,32 1,38 2,21 3,35 3,69
BSRP 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Real Z-Score 2,03 4,38 1,02 0,74 0,51 0,77 0,99 1,38
CLAs Z -Score 2,34 6,78 1,16 0,86 0,78 1,10 1,42 3,68
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financially sound. In other words, the transformation of the enterprise would have been 
completed in 2016, and the company would have been financially sound in 2017. 
Holding BSR Group Inc. 
Table 33 below shows the effect of CLAs on the fitness of BSRG expressed by Z-
Score.  
Table 33.  Z – Score of opacity and resistance in BSRG 2010 - 2017 
 
As the transformational scenario proposes, in the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score of 
BSRG would have been better for the entire period of the transformation from 2010 to 
2017 except in 2013. In 2017, the real Z-Score is 0.40 compared to 0.79 Z-Score in 
the hypothetical absence of CLAs. In other words, in the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score 
would have been 98% higher for the Group of companies as a whole. Otherwise 
speaking, the absence of CLAs would have allowed faster improvement of company’s 
fitness and its faster reorganisation. Correspondingly, the adaptive capability declines 
in the presence of CLA.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the environmental shifts and the signals from the market that BSRG 
should undertake significant reorganisation to recover its going concern status the 
CLAs act as a pro-inertial force increasing the mortality hazard. Thereby, the CLAs 
have a significant effect on the adaptive capabilities of the company. The inertial CLAs 
block and slowdown the transformation of BSRG in the following ways: 
1. CLA imposes restrictions on the ability of the managers to reduce overcapacity 
of employees even when the workload drops sharply.  
2. Even when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy, the leadership of the 
companies could not implement the measures that lead to staff dismissal. There 
is not enough flexibility in restructuring the troubled enterprise in order to keep it 
as a going concern.   
3. The involvement of trade unions in the process of staff selection and dismissal 
creates factual difficulties. In effect, the managing companies do not have the 
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,40
CLAs Z-Score 0,38 0,34 0,39 0,51 0,41 0,57 0,51 0,79
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freedom to take independent decisions fully and to implement all the necessary 
reorganisation-oriented measures in line with the environmental shifts.  
4. CLA allows the trade unions’ leaders to intervene in human resources 
management and do not allow the managers to develop an independent human 
resources policy. These limits have a significant impact on leadership’s ability to 
employ people outside of the company especially in times of reorganisations 
when one of the ways to reduce inertia is by hiring managers and employees with 
more open business culture, and higher professional diversity and competences. 
5. CLA imposes a significant financial burden on every company in BSRG. The 
overall financial burden in the case of BSRG was up to EUR 87 mln. A significant 
part of this extra cost could be eliminated in times of transformations.  
6. CLA imposes factual and financial restrictions on the managers’ plans to 
reorganise the company. As a result, the timing of transformation is prolonged, 
and the cost of change increases additionally. For example, if the extra costs 
imposed by the CLA had been saved the BSRG would have repaid the debts 
quicker and would have saved millions of extra interest costs and penalties. That 
would have speeded up the reorganisations and shortened the timing of changes.  
7. Transformational management running the company at the outset of 
reorganisations adopted CLA that was an attempt to relate human resource policy 
and regulations to the environmental shifts. This CLA was giving (1) more 
freedom in designing the human resource strategy and plans, (2) greater flexibility 
in adapting to market changes and (3) greater flexibility in eliminating internal 
inefficiency. However, when the transformational management was out of the 
office for a year and a half, the adopted at that time (in 2014) collective labour 
agreement reverted to the old practices. Inertia was strong enough to restore all 
the blockages of the reforms.   
The above data confirms the hypothesis that: “the adaptive capacity of the troubled 
BSRG to adjust to the environmental shifts declines with the strength of the limits 
imposed on the company performance by the institutionalised Collective Labour 
Agreements.” 
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Chapter Six 
Change process, opacity, asperity, and performance  
Once environmental drift and internal organisational inertia have compromised the 
corporate architecture, and the company fitness has been demolished, the 
reorganisation appears to be the last option for every troubled enterprise. However, 
the uncertain reorganisation-related outcomes across different industries around the 
globe raise the issue of how far possible it is to plan a change. Chapter 6 analyses the 
effects of opacity and resistance on the fitness of the troubled BSRG and reflects the 
influence on company’s adaptive capability and on the reorganisation speed.   
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Opacity and Planning 
Opacity is a cultural phenomenon measuring decision makers’ lack of understanding 
of units’ daily operations. Opacity affects the process of business planning and 
budgeting. We know that not everything works according to a plan. However, 
managers try to hide the imperfections of planning. Almost every management has 
only partial information about what is going on in the organisation that is supposed to 
be effectively directed by the top. Not surprisingly, the lack of sufficient information has 
significant influences over planning and decision-making. The organisational intricacy 
i.e., interconnections between organisational units adds extra complicity to the whole 
process of designing and implementing reorganisation plans. The deeper the 
hierarchy, the more intricate is an organisation. Both intricacy and opacity 
(independent variables) tend to grow with inertia as organisations age. They are higher 
when they have a substantial adverse effect on the fitness of troubled organisations 
(the dependent variable) in hectic periods of reorganisations. Opacity and resistance 
delay the reorganisation and could block the transformation of troubled companies 
(operationalisation). Opacity and resistance deteriorated the fitness of the troubled 
BSRG and reduced its adaptive capability as well as the speed of transformation 
(causal mechanism).  
The influence of opacity in the reorganisation process lays down some critical 
questions: Did the management change the plan? Why did the management modify 
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the plan? What was easier and what was harder than the management had expected? 
What was foreseen and what was not foreseen? Were the decision makers aware of 
the opportunities and were they able to identify them?  
In 2010 the top management of BSRG undertook extensive reorganisation originating 
from a plan for restructuring and stabilisation. Initially, the transformational 
management had limited understanding of the company, and the organisational 
learning took place in the process of change. The information that the executives 
needed was not a secret; the managers did not have it. BSRG at that time was an old, 
inertial and very opaque organisation. The opacity is pointed out by the fact that: (1) 
the initial plan was amended several times, (2) new reorganisation measures were built 
into the plan every year, and (3) a more comprehensive plan was adopted in 2015.  
The plans developed by the transformational management allow for studying 
company’s opacity by grouping the restructuring measures by units. The number of 
ideas at the commencement of the restructuring compared to the number of measures 
emerging in the process of planning indicates a high level of opacity. The analyses 
performed present the effects of the opacity on (1) BSRG’s financial performance and 
(2) correlations between planning and timing of change and enterprise’s adaptive 
capability.  
Asperity and Resistance 
Some of the reorganisation measures undertaken by the top management inevitably 
violate part of the established organisational codes that specify corporate identities in 
the three companies that are parts of BSRG. The implementation of these measures 
unavoidably encounters severe cultural opposition. The reactions to the activities 
undertaken by the transformational managers stemmed from a variety of sources 
including railman tradition, trade unions power, and historically established 
professional norms and routines. The critical fact is that asperity that generated 
resistance to the implementation of the planned reorganisation-oriented measures 
violated the financial prospects of the troubled BSRG and prolonged the reorganisation 
period. The strength of this cultural opposition is difficult to depict. However, its effects 
can be studied through the effects of the non-implemented and the delayed 
reorganisation-oriented measures.  
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Study Hypothesis 3. The adaptive capacity of the troubled BSRG and its subsidiaries, 
to adapt promptly to the environmental drifts, declines with the strength of its 
organisational opacity and asperity. 
6.2. METHODOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION BASIS  
For the analysis of opacity effects, the database was created based on information 
provided by the three companies on their activities in the period 2010-2017. The data 
source includes the two strategic plans adopted in 2010 and 2015, company’s annual 
plans, company’s financial reports and company’s business reports in the period 2010-
2017.  
The information on the leading indicators gathered is summarised for each calendar 
year during the period for each company and BSRG as a whole. The total number of 
planned measures for each of the companies and the expected effect of their 
implementation for the respective year were identified and analysed. The relative share 
of the implemented and non-implemented measures was calculated, assessing the 
effect of their discovery, delayed implementation or non-implementation. Significant 
groups of reasons for non-implementation of planned measures were summarised. In 
addition, the available information on the measures taken by the three companies was 
grouped into several main routes which facilitates the interpretation and comparability 
of the output data and allows identification of sectors where the predictability, planning, 
and implementation of the measures are hampered.  
Different descriptive statistical techniques were used for the processing and 
presentation of the data in the study. Part of the collected information in the database 
was systematised and presented in two-dimensional statistical distributions (cross 
tables), another with graphical images. A statistical grouping of data was performed on 
several different parameters characterising the units of the population. A comparative 
quantitative analysis presents the difference between the actual financial performance 
of the company and the potential performance in the possible absence of opacity and 
asperity. Altman Z-Score test, calculated over a number of years, presents the impact 
of the opacity and the resistance on the fitness of BSRG, allowing conclusions about 
the speed of transformation and the adaptive capability of the company.  
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6.3. ANALYSIS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN 2010 - 2017 
During the reviewed period 2010-2017, the three companies took a total of 305 
measures in the different areas of their activities, 143 of them being introduced by 
BSRP, 101 by BSRF and 61 by BSR Holding (Fig.40). The measures concern activities 
such as restructuring, optimisation of processes and activities, optimisation of assets 
and liabilities, a large part of them relate to the implementation of the companies' 
investment programme.  
 
Fig. 40 Distribution of the measures taken broken down by companies and years (in 
absolute figures)  
Figure 40 shows that two three-year sub-periods – 2010-2012 and 2015-2017 – can 
be determined. The distribution of measures in each of them is relatively equal: 163 
measures were adopted during the first sub-period, and 142 were adopted in the 
second sub-period. In the early years of these sub-periods, large packages of 
measures were put in place. They were used as a basis for the adoption of two 
strategic documents.  
In 2010, which was practically the first year of reforms in BSRG, the management 
undertook a broad reorganisation of the activity. The basis for the decisive reforms in 
the Group during the period 2010 - 2012 was the adopted Plan for Restructuring and 
Financial Stabilisation of Holding BSR Inc. The objectives set in this plan were focused 
on the financial stabilisation of companies: generation of more revenues, efficient use 
of funds and strict control of the costs, staff reduction leading to productivity gains, and 
payment of arrears.  
A large part of the measures taken are organisational ones and are aimed at optimising 
the organisational and management structure, restructuring of activities and 
processes, improving the coordination between the companies in the group, divisions, 
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directorates and departments, and at increasing the management capacity. A total of 
116 measures was taken in 2010, which makes 71% of the measures provided for the 
sub-period and approximately 38% of all measures throughout the period under 
review. Despite the existence of an overall strategy for the period, over the next two 
years, new measures need to be taken by all three companies. This means that the 
management team lacked adequate visibility to incorporate those measures into the 
2010 core package. The suspension of reforms and postponing of the difficult and 
unpopular measures in BSRG at the end of 2013 and 2014 are part of the reasons for 
the deterioration of all main operational and financial indicators of the companies. This, 
in turn, requires that the company's management should take rapid action and the need 
to develop and consistently implement a new long-term sustainable strategy for 
BSRG’s stabilisation, financial recovery, modernisation and development. 
A new Plan for Restructuring and Development of Holding BSR INC. Group for 
the period 2015-2022 has been adopted. The implementation of the comprehensive 
package of measures laid down therein is expected to provide the activity of railway 
undertaking with a sound financial basis, to ensure its modernisation, and to increase 
the efficiency and quality of medium and long-term transport services offered. The 
measures set in this plan mainly focus on optimisation of processes and activities, 
optimisation of assets and liabilities and an increase of investments. In 2015, BSRG 
adopted a total of 69 measures, which is 49% of the measures taken for the sub-period 
and almost 23% of all measures throughout the period under review. The opacity of 
the organisation is evident from the fact that all three companies introduced additional 
measures in the next two years. BSRF took, in each of the three years of the sub-
period, a relatively equal number of measures (see Fig. 40) indicating increased 
uncertainty, lower transparency and, hence, hindered predictability of expected effects 
of introduced measures. The parallel changes set in 2015 Plan of BSRF also require 
further adjustments and additions, albeit at fading intensity, since the number of added 
measures is half reduced in each subsequent calendar year. Based on the "number of 
measures" indicator, it can be argued with greater optimism that the basis for reforms 
in BSRG plan is adequately set since the new measures introduced in 2016 and 2017 
affect current activities related to the reduction of debts and sale of non-operating 
assets. 
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The highest relative share of the total number of measures taken during the period 
2010-2017 is attributed to BSRP – 47%, followed by BSRF with 33% and BSRH with 
20%.  The intensity used to adopt the measures during the period under review varies 
across the different companies (Fig. 41). BSRH took 77% of all measures during the 
first three-year period, while the proportion of the other two companies was by 50% 
lower, i.e., more than half of the measures were introduced during the second three-
year period.   
 
Fig. 41 Distribution of the measures taken during the period 2010-2017 broken down 
by companies (In absolute figures and %)  
The proper planning of measures and their practicability determine whether a plan is 
successful and predictable, and the extent to which it achieves the expected effects. 
The higher degree of transparency in an organisation is a prerequisite for the proper 
identification of problematic areas and taking accurate decisions for their removal. To 
achieve the expected effect it is necessary to implement on time the entire package of 
measures. The implementation of 54 of the 305 measures or almost 18% of all 
measures taken by the three companies during the period 2010-2017 never happened. 
The proportion of the measures implemented in 2010, on average for the three 
companies, is the highest: 91% (see Fig. 42). During the period under review, the 
average proportion of measures implemented by each of the companies is as follows: 
84% – BSRH; 83% – BSRP; 81% – BSRF. In the second three-year sub-period 2015—
2017, the companies BSRP and BSRF, except BSRH, show a high proportion of non-
implemented measures: almost every fourth measure has not been implemented. 
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Fig. 42 The relative share of implemented and non-implemented measures in total and 
for each company in the period 2010-2017 (in absolute figures and %) 
The main groups of reasons for non-implementation of almost every fifth measure are 
trade union protection and limitation on the application of Labour Code, lack of will of 
the middle management and, finally yet importantly, lack of financial investment. As 
the financial investments depend on the will of the government, it could be concluded 
that the non-implementation of most of the measures was due to some internal or 
external resistance. Some of these measures have not been implemented due to the 
lack of predictability and sufficiently clear justification of the expected effect.  
    
6.4 ANALYSIS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN 2010 - 2017 BY AREAS OF IMPACT  
Each of the 305 measures taken by the three companies during the period 2010-2017 
affects the activity of a particular sector, with the implementation of individual measures 
134 
 
having an impact on the activity of more than one department in the structure of the 
particular company. Therefore, the distribution of measures by area of impact leads to 
a fictitious increase in the actual number of measures. To determine the sectors with 
the lowest predictability, the dynamics of the measure implementation should be 
examined, broken down by areas of impact and the level of implementation. The 
examination will allow defining the areas in which the implemented measures do not 
have the expected impact. To this end, the available information on the measures 
taken by the three companies is grouped by main areas depending on the area which 
the particular measure effects1. 
The aggregated data on the three companies during the period under review shows 
that, according to the area, which they affect, the measures introduced are distributed 
as follows: the relative share of the measures introduced in Finance, Marketing, RS, 
Human Resources, Operation and Information Technologies Department is the highest 
(see Fig. 43). The total number of measures introduced to these areas account for 68% 
of all measures taken by the three companies in the post-2010 period. 
 
Fig. 43 Relative share of the measures taken by the three companies in the period 
2010 -2017 broken down by areas of impact (in %)  
 
Figure 43 shows that several groups are formed depending on the number and area 
of impact of the planned measures. The first group includes sectors, such as 
Marketing, RS, and Finance, where the number of measures taken during the period 
                                                          
1 The main groups of measures broken down by areas of impact include activities in the following departments: 
Operation Department - measures concerning activities related to Engine Drivers, Conductors, Cleaning, Transport 
and Control Activity, and Schedule are included; Marketing Department - Ticketing, Communication, Marketing, 
Products and Prices; Finance;  RS -  Locomotives, Wagons; Administration and Control - Control of Contracts 
and MTSp, General Administration, Control, ISCM, QMS; 
 
135 
 
is around 70, which is the average of ten measures per year for each area during the 
period under review. The second group includes Human Resources and Operations 
sectors with just over 40 measures implemented in each of them. 20 to 30 measures 
are implemented in the sectors of Strategic Management, Public Contracts and MTS, 
Real Estate and Information Technologies. As regards most of the other sectors, the 
measures taken are less than 10.  
 
Fig. 44 Distribution of the measures taken by the three companies broken down by 
areas of impact in the period 2010 - 2017 (in absolute figures) 
Depending on the nature of their activity, the distribution of measures among the 
companies varies as a relative share of the total number of measures in a given area 
(Figure 45). 
 
 
Fig. 45 Distribution of the measures introduced by the three companies in the period 
2010 - 2017 broken down by areas (in %)  
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Specific activities concerning the operation of the companies BSRF and BSRP require 
some measures to be implemented in sectors such as Operation, Marketing, RS, ICC, 
Public Contracts and MTS, Safety, and Real Estate.  The company BSRP takes a 
relatively more significant number of measures in most of the examined areas, their 
proportion being over 80% in the sectors Marketing, RS, Administration and Control, 
Safety and about 70% in the sectors Information Technologies and Public Contracts 
and MTS. Exceptions are made for the sectors Operation, Legal and Real Estate, 
where the relative share of the measures taken by BSRF is higher. On a comparative 
basis, balance in the distribution of measures between the three companies is 
observed to a certain extent in the Finance and Legal sectors. At the same time, BSRH 
has taken both measures related to activities specific to the company, such as activities 
in the area of QMS, SPM, RF and VTC, and measures affecting the strategic 
management of the company – almost 60% of all measures in this area. It is also 
noteworthy that in Audit sector measures have only been taken by BSRH during the 
period under review.  
The intensity of the introduction of measures over the time distributed by area of impact 
is shown in Fig. 46.  
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Fig. 46 Intensity of measures over the time distributed by area of impact (in %) 
 
In a period of reorganisation and progressive reforms, some areas where significant 
changes are made are of particular importance. Expected greater dynamics over time 
in the introduction of measures are observed in some central areas, with significant 
differences in the volume and activity between the three companies (Fig. 47).  
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Fig. 47 Distribution of the introduced measures broken down by area of impact for 
each of the companies in the period 2010-2017 (in absolute figures) 
 
The previous results show that in BSRP, there is a significant increase in the activity 
of introducing new measures for each calendar year. The process of introducing 
measures by BSRP in the sectors Marketing, RS and Finance are most intensive in 
time. For BSRF, these are the sectors Finance, ICC, and Human Resources. In BSRH, 
the sectors Finance and SPM are the most affected. In the first three years, there is 
greater dynamics in the Strategic Management and Human Resources sectors, while 
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in the last three years of the period under review dynamics is reported in the Audit 
sector.  
The accumulation of measures in specific sectors over the years can also be seen in 
the following graphics (Fig. 48). In some areas, measures are adopted each year of 
the period under review. As regards BSRF, these are Finance, and Human Resources 
sectors and new measures have been added to sectors Operation, Marketing, RS, 
Public Contracts and MTS during five of the six years of the period under review.  
The company BSRP adds measures affecting the operation of sectors Operation, 
Marketing, RS and Human Resources each calendar year, while the sectors where 
changes are planned on an annual basis during five of the six years of the period are 
Finance, Public Contracts, and MTS and Information Technologies. BSR Holding 
implemented measures every year only in the Finance sector. They cover the entire 
period and are mainly concentrated in its first half, while the measures implemented in 
SPM sector cover five of the six years in the period 2010 - 2017. Due to the 
accumulation of additional measures throughout the period, the sectors mentioned 
above could be defined as more opaque (labour-intensive, featuring lower visibility and 
transparency), with difficulties affecting to varying degrees each of the companies. 
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Fig. 48 Distribution of the introduced measures broken down by areas of impact and 
years (in absolute figures)  
 
In BSRP, the non-implemented measures affecting the activities in sectors Marketing, 
RS, Finance, IT and HR have the largest share. In BSRF the sectors with a high share 
of non-implemented measures are Finance, Human Resources, Public Contracts, and 
MTS and RS. In BSRH the non-implemented measures in the areas of impact are 
distributed as follows: 3-Finance; 3-Audit; 2-SPM; 1-RF; 1-Strategic Management.  
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6.5. FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN 2010 - 2017 
The Transformational Scenario vs. the Inertial Scenario  
The practical applications of two alternative scenarios are presented in the following 
paragraphs. The transformational (managerial) scenario illustrates the beliefs of the 
adaptation theory that the executives in the company can adapt the organisation to the 
environmental shifts. Adaptation theory proposes that organisational variability reflects 
designed changes in the strategy and structure of individual organisations in response 
to environmental changes, threats, and opportunities. A top executive must be able to 
anticipate future events and know how to plan for them. (Katz & Kahn, 1978).  
The Inertial (ecological) scenario illustrates the theory of opacity and asperity. Opacity 
reduces the foresight of the executives and planning and implementing process is 
hindered and prolonged. Asperity, on the other hand, limits the ability of the managers 
to implement the reorganisation-oriented plans. The mixed effects of the two possible 
scenarios are illustrated in the rest of the chapter.  
The quantitative analysis of the measures taken gives a general idea of the scale of 
the objectives set, the level of difficulty in determining proper decisions and level of 
feasibility of the tasks assigned. The level of the measures' success rate can be used 
to determine whether the measures taken are timely and adequately set and whether 
their introduction and implementation lead to the expected, planned effect. Some of 
the measures have an indirect effect that can be assessed in the long term. For this 
analysis, the measures whose impact can be quantified in financial terms are 
summarised and analysed. The following groups of indicators have been introduced: 
overall planned effect of the measures taken, omitted effect of the non-implemented 
measures, omitted effect of the delay in detection of measures and omitted effect of 
late implementation. The proper planning can lead to timely detection and 
implementation of a given measure which results in the desired effect.  The measures 
taken in each calendar year are qualified depending on whether they are timely 
detected and implemented. If a measure is adopted in a given calendar year, but its 
identification has been delayed, the lost profits are calculated depending on the length 
of the delay in the measure identification, the accrued omitted effect being calculated 
in the year when the measure is identified. The loss accumulated due to delayed 
implementation of a measure is also accrued to the lost profit for a given calendar year 
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depending on the period of delay of its implementation. The results obtained are 
summarised for each calendar year for each of the three companies and are presented 
as a total for BSRG (see Tables in Appendix 3).  
According to the distributions broken down by calendar years, as can be seen in Fig. 
49, there is no direct proportion between the number of introduced measures and the 
magnitude of the expected effect. Due to the different nature of the planned measures, 
the expected effect of their implementation cannot be subjected to quality assessment 
and to the assessment of the omitted effects of their non-implementation or late 
implementation over the time.   
 
Fig. 49 Planned measures (number) and achieved effects (mln Euro) broken down by 
years, the total for Holding BSR Ltd. Group 
 
Despite the significantly smaller number of non-implemented measures compared to 
the number of implemented ones, it is clear that the omitted effects are commensurate 
with the expected effect from the implementation of all planned measures in a given 
calendar year. The untimely identification and late implementation of some measures 
lead to a dangerous accumulation of omitted effects over time. The summary tables in 
Appendix 3 show that the omitted effects of late implementation and non-
implementation of specific measures may be several times higher than the overall 
planned effect of the implementation of all measures in a given calendar year.  
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The overall effect for the three companies in the period 2010-2017 amounts to nearly 
EUR 186 mln. According to the data, this amount is mainly due to the successful 
implementation of the planned measures in BSRH: nearly 78% of the achieved effect 
is owed to that company, 15% thereof is owed to BSRF, and 8% of the effect is owed 
to BSRP (see Fig. 50). Most of the effects achieved by the BSRH are owed to the 
reduction of the company's debts during the three-year period (2015-2017) - by almost 
EUR 82 mln, and to the implementation of measures related to the sale of non-
operating assets - nearly 16 mln in the last three years. 
 
Fig. 50 Effect of the measures taken broken down by companies for the period 2010-
2017 (mln EUR) 
At the same time, the relation between the achieved and omitted effects is the most 
favourable for BSRH during the period under review - below 1%.  Figure 51 shows that 
BSRH has minimised the delayed measures, and therefore the lost profits for the 
company during the period are almost zero. As regards BSRP, the effect of the delayed 
and non-implemented measures is 33% higher than the overall planned effect of the 
measures taken. The ratio between these indicators is most problematic in BSRF 
where the effect of the late identification and implementation of measures exceeds 
more than three times the result of the effect achieved by the company during the 
period under review. 
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Fig. 51 Omitted effects of non-implemented measures, late detection of measures and 
late implementation of measures broken down by companies for the period 2010-2017 
(mln EUR) 
The most severe problem for the company is the late identification of measures, which 
is the reason for the severe accumulation of omitted effects of the delay, especially 
during the last three years of the period under review. The length of time from the 
moment of introduction of a specific measure, or from the optimum moment when the 
measure was to be identified, until its implementation, is directly related to the 
achievement of maximum effect of the implementation of the specific measure. The 
greater delay results in increased lost profits and multiplication of those losses over 
time.   
The Cost of Opacity and Resistance 
The costs of opacity are measured by assessing the cost of the delay in the discovery 
of the measures. In other words, the cost is equal to the foregone opportunities to 
improve the financial position of BSRG, because the appropriate measures were not 
discovered on time and therefore not implemented on time. These lost opportunities 
would come from: (1) what additional income would the company have earned and (2) 
what expenses would the company have saved if the measures had been discovered 
and implemented on time. In other words, how would the financial position of each 
company within BSRG have been financially improved if the organisation had been 
transparent and the management had been able to plan the reorganisation in an 
optimal way?   
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The cost of resistance is measured through (1) the costs of the delay of the 
implementation of the discovered measures and (2) non-implementation of the 
discovered measures.   
The costs of opacity and resistance are analysed in the three companies and on a 
group level, i.e., BSRH, BSRF, BSRP and the whole of BSRG. The effects of opacity 
and resistance are described by incorporating their cost, effects into the financial 
statements of the respective companies to demonstrate how would the financial 
position of each company, and the group of companies have improved. The 
comparative analysis would present insight into the difference between the actual 
financial position of the three companies and the BSRG, and the potential financial 
position in case of absence of opacity and resistance. Based on the information derived 
conclusions are made about the impact of the opacity and the resistance on the 
adaptive capabilities of the subsidiaries and the group of companies as a whole.  
 
Holding BSR Inc., Individual  
The database that was created to analyse the measures undertaken by the 
management to reorganise the company provides the following information about the 
effects of the measures in BSRH for the period 2010-2017.  
 
Table 33. Summary Indicators - BSRH  
 
Cost of Resistance (delayed implementation). The delay in measures 
implementation has an impact on the leading financial indicators of the BSRH for the 
period. The table below shows that the effect of the implementation delay for the 
income part amounts to 0.5 mln Euro for 2010-2017. The improvement of the financial 
result for the Holding would have been 0.5 mln Euros for the period, and the total 
decrease in indebtedness would have been 0.5 mln Euro, as well. Table 34 below 
shows the omitted effects of the delayed implementation on the KPIs of BSRH. 
 
 
№ Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total 
1 Total number of measures 27 9 11 10 2 2 61
2 Implemented measures 25 8 7 7 2 2 51
3 Non - implemented measures 2 1 4 3 0 0 10
4 Planned effect of the measures 11 3 13 42 28 48 146
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Table 34. Cost of resistance BSRH: omitted effects of delayed implementation  
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRH 
 *TPS Lokomotiv Ltd. still exists in 2010 and data for an individual report of BSR Inc. 
is not available. 
**In 2011 the income cannot be compared with the following reporting years as BSR 
Inc. had income from “transportation organisation and management.” The Holding 
structure is in force as of 2012. 
 
Cost of Resistance (non-implementation). The benefits omitted due to non-
implemented measures amount to 0.5 mln Euro. The income of the Holding for the 
period under review would have been 0.5 mln Euro more if these measures had been 
implemented. The equity capital would have been higher with the increase equal to the 
improvement of the financial result, namely with 0.5 mln Euro. The company 
indebtedness would have decreased by 0.5 mln Euro. Provided that the planned 
measures were implemented, the company indebtedness would have been 136.5 mln 
Euro in comparison to the reported indebtedness of 137 mln Euro at the end of 2017. 
Table 35 below shows the omitted effects of non-implementation on the KPIs of BSRH. 
 
Table 35. Cost of resistance BSRH – omitted effects of non-implementation 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRH  
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2010* 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 63        14        9           8           11        8           8           121      
Lost income delayed implementation -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
Total expenses 81        15        10        15        13        24        12        170      
Cost of delayed implementation -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
EBITDA 7           5           1           (4)         -       (16)       (5)         (12)       
EBIT (10)       4           (1)         (4)         (1)         (17)       (5)         (33)       
Net profit (17)       (1)         -       (7)         (3)         (16)       (4)         (48)       
Equity capital 43        42        40        34        27        12        13        13        
Total assets 383      353      307      258      218      179      150      150      
Total liabilities 339      311      264      224      191      167      137      137      
Total reduction of  liab ilities -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2010* 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 63        13        9           8           11        8           8           121      
Lost income non-implementation -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 81        14        10        15        13        24        12        169      
Costs of non-implementation -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
EBITDA 7           5           1           (4)         -       (16)       (5)         (12)       
EBIT (10)       4           (1)         (4)         (1)         (17)       (5)         (33)       
Net profit (17)       (1)         -       (7)         (3)         (16)       (4)         (48)       
Equity capital 43        42        40        34        27        12        13        13        
Total assets 383      353      307      258      218      179      150      150      
Total liabilities 339      311      264      224      191      167      137      137      
Total reduction of  liab ilities -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
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*TPS Lokomotiv EOOD still exists in 2010 and data for an individual report of BSR INC. 
is not available. 
**In 2011 the income cannot be compared with the following reporting years as BSR 
INC. had income from “transportation organisation and management.” The Holding 
structure is in force as of 2012. 
 
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. Table 36 below shows that the total omitted 
effect of the delay in measures discovery, non-implementation and delayed 
implementation during the period 2010-2017 amounts to 1 mln Euro. 
 
Table 36. Total cost of opacity and resistance BSRH – total omitted effects  
  
 
If the measures had been timely discovered and implemented the income of BSRH 
would have been 1 mln Euro higher for the period under review. With these 
assumptions, the financial result would have been improved by 1 mln Euro, and the 
debts would have been reduced by 1 mln Euro, as well. Table 37 below shows the total 
financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in the BSRH. 
 
Table 37. Total financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in BSRH 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRH  
*TPS Lokomotiv EOOD still exists in 2010 and data for an individual report of BSR INC. 
is not available. 
**In 2011 the income cannot be compared with the following reporting years as BSR 
Inc. had income from “transportation organisation and management.” The Holding 
structure is in force as of 2012. 
Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total %
Cost of delayed discovery -    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -
Cost of  delayed implementation -    -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       50%
Cost of non-implementation -    -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       50%
Total: -    -       1           -       -       -       -       -       1           100%
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2010* 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 63        14        9           8           11        8           8           121      
Total  income lost opacity / resistance -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
Total expenses 81        14        10        15        13        24        12        169      
Total cost of opacity /resistance -       0,5       -       -       -       -       -       0,5       
EBITDA 7           6           1           (4)         -       (16)       (5)         (12)       
EBIT (10)       4           (1)         (4)         (1)         (17)       (5)         (33)       
Net profit (17)       -       -       (7)         (3)         (16)       (4)         (48)       
Equity capital 43        43        41        34        27        12        13        13        
Total assets 383      353      307      258      218      179      150      150      
Total liabilities 339      310      264      224      190      166      136      136      
Total reduction of  liab ilities -       1           -       -       -       -       -       1           
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BSR - Freight Transportation Ltd. 
The database that was created to analyse the measures undertaken by the 
management to reorganise the company provides the following information about the 
effects of the measures on the BSRF for the period 2010 - 2017.  
 
Table 38. Summary Indicators – BSRF 
 
 
Cost of Opacity (delay in measures discovery). The cost of opacity has a significant 
impact on the company financial result and indebtedness. Table 39 below shows that 
the omitted effect of the delay in discovering the measures on the income of the 
company for the period under review amounts to EUR 3 mln. This means that if the 
measures had been discovered and implemented on time, the company income would 
have been EUR 3 mln higher, and at the same time, the costs would have been EUR 
43 mln less, i.e., the improvement of the financial results for the period 2010-2017 
would have been at the amount of EUR 46 mln. The total decrease of indebtedness 
would have been EUR 5 mln (41 is attributed to the decrease in the depreciation costs). 
 
Table 39. Cost of opacity BSRF – omitted effects of delayed discovery
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRF  
 
Cost of Resistance (delayed implementation). The omitted effect due to delay in 
measures implementation also affects the main financial indicators of BSRF for the 
period 2010-2017. Table 40 below shows that the effect on the expenses amounts to 
EUR 14 mln. The improvement of the company financial result for this period would 
№ Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total 
1 Total number of measures 31 6 0 9 0 16 62
2 Implemented measures 30 4 8 12 16 5 75
3 Non - implemented measures 1 2 1 4 7 11 26
4 Planned effect of the measures 3 0 7 7 10 1 28
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 79        97        77        78        69        64        53        56        573      
Lost income delayed discovery -       3           -       -       -       -       -       -       3           
Total expenses 84        101      82        67        70        59        54        59        576      
Cost of delayed discovery 1           5           9           9           9           8           -       -       43        
EBITDA (5)         (2)         (3)         6           -       7           2           1           6           
EBIT (5)         (3)         (4)         4           (2)         4           (1)         (3)         (10)       
Net profit (5)         (4)         (4)         11        (1)         4           (1)         (3)         (3)         
Equity capital (4)         58        60        68        64        65        100      97        97        
Total assets 46        116      124      123      119      112      148      145      145      
Total liabilities 51        57        64        56        55        47        47        48        48        
Total reduction of liab ilities 1           2           -       -       -       1           -       -       5           
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have been EUR 14 mln, and the total decrease of indebtedness would have been EUR 
14 mln. The indebtedness at the end of 2017 amounts to EUR 53 mln, and if the 
measures had been successfully implemented, it would have been EUR 39 mln. 
 
Table 40. Cost of resistance BSRF – omitted effects of delayed implementation
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRF  
 
Cost of Resistance (non-implementation). The omitted benefits of non-
implementation of the measures amount to EUR 39 mln. The company income for the 
period under review would have been EUR 16 mln (including EUR 15 mln from the 
sale of assets) higher if the measures had been implemented, and the expenses would 
have been EUR 23 mln less. The equity capital would have been increased with the 
amount equal to the improved financial result, namely with EUR 39 mln, and the 
company indebtedness would have decreased by EUR 37 mln. Under the assumption 
that the planned measures had been implemented, the company indebtedness would 
have been EUR 16 mln, compared to EUR 53 mln indebtedness reported at the end 
of 2017. Table 41 below shows the omitted effects of non-implementation on the KPIs 
of BSRF.   
 
Table 41. Cost of resistance BSRF – omitted effects of non-implementation 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRF  
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 79        95        77        78        69        64        53        56        571      
Lost income delayed implementation -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 84        107      88        74        78        65        53        57        605      
Cost of delayed implementation 2           -       2           2           2           3           2           2           14        
EBITDA (5)         (4)         -       8           1           9           3           3           15        
EBIT (5)         (11)       (11)       (3)         (10)       (2)         1           -       (42)       
Net profit (5)         (11)       (11)       4           (9)         (2)         -       (1)         (34)       
Equity capital (3)         51        46        46        35        30        66        65        65        
Total assets 46        110      110      99        86        71        107      104      104      
Total liabilities 50        59        63        54        51        42        41        39        39        
Total reduction of  liab ilities 2           -       2           2           2           3           2           2           14        
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 79        95        77        78        69        68        64        57        587      
Lost income non-implementation -       -       -       -       -       4           11        1           16        
Total expenses 85        107      88        73        77        62        49        56        596      
Costs of non-implementation -       -       3           3           3           6           6           3           23        
EBITDA (7)         (4)         -       9           2           12        9           4           25        
EBIT (7)         (11)       (10)       (2)         (9)         1           6           -       (32)       
Net profit (7)         (11)       (11)       5           (8)         5           16        1           (9)         
Equity capital (5)         49        44        46        36        38        90        90        90        
Total assets 46        110      110      99        86        70        106      104      104      
Total liabilities 52        61        65        54        50        34        17        16        16        
Total reduction of  liab ilities -       -       3           3           3           10        17        2           37        
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Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. Table 42 below shows that the total effect of 
delay in measures discovery, delayed implementation and non-implementation during 
the period 2010-2017 amounts to EUR 99 mln.  
 
Table 42. Total cost of opacity and resistance BSRF 
 
 
If these measures had been discovered and implemented on time the company income 
would have been EUR 18 mln (including EUR 15 mln sales of assets) higher, and the 
total costs EUR 81 mln less (including EUR 40 mln depreciation). Under these 
assumptions, the financial result would have been improved by EUR 99 mln, and the 
liabilities would have decreased by EUR 37 mln. Table 43 below shows the total 
financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in BSRF. 
 
Table 43. Total financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in BSRF 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010-2017 BSRF  
 
BSR – Passengers Ltd. 
The database that was established to analyse the measures undertaken by the 
management to reorganise the company provides the following information about the 
effects of the measures on the BSRP for the period 2010-2017.  
 
 
 
Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Cost of delayed discovery 1           7           9           9           10        8           -       -       46        
Cost of  delayed implementation 2           -       2           2           2           3           2           2           14        
Cost of non-implementation -       -       3           3           3           10        17        4           39        
Total: 3           7           14        14        14        20        19        6           99        
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 79        97        77        78        69        68        64        57        589      
Total  income lost opacity / resistance -       2           -       -       -       4           11        1           18        
Total expenses 82        101      76        62        65        51        47        54        539      
Total cost of opacity /resistance 3           5           14        14        14        16        9           6           81        
EBITDA (3)         (2)         3           11        5           15        11        6           45        
EBIT (4)         (3)         1           9           2           12        8           3           28        
Net profit (4)         (4)         1           16        4           16        18        4           50        
Equity capital (2)         60        67        79        80        93        147      150      150      
Total assets 46        116      124      123      119      111      162      164      164      
Total liabilities 49        55        57        44        38        19        16        16        16        
Total reduction of  liab ilities 3           2           5           5           5           13        3           1           37        
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Table 44. Summary Indicators - BSRP 
 
 
Cost of Opacity (delay in measures discovery). Opacity has a negative impact on 
company’s financial result and indebtedness. The table 45 below shows that there is 
no omitted effect of the delay in discovering the measures on company’s income for 
the period under review. At the same time, the costs would have been EUR 4 mln less, 
i.e., the improvement of the financial results for the period 2010-2017 would have been 
EUR 4 mln. The total decrease of indebtedness would also have been EUR 4 mln.  
 
Table 45. Cost of opacity BSRP: omitted effects of delayed discovery 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010-2017 BSRP  
 
Cost of Resistance (delayed implementation). The delay in implementation of the 
measures also affects the main financial indicators of the BSRP for the period 2010-
2017. The table 46 below shows that there is no effect on income due to delay in 
measures implementation for the period under review. At the same time, the costs 
would have been EUR 17 mln lower. Under the assumption that the planned measures 
had been implemented, the improvement of company financial result for the period 
under review would have been EUR 17 mln, and the total decrease of indebtedness 
would have been EUR 17 mln, as well. 
 
 
 
№ Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total 
1 Total number of measures 58 7 5 43 19 11 143
2 Implemented measures 57 7 5 33 14 8 124
3 Non - implemented measures 1 0 0 10 5 3 19
4 Planned effect of the measures 1 4 1 0 0 2 9
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 132      145      140      136      136      137      135      137      1 098   
Lost income delayed discovery -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 136      144      139      141      142      143      137      141      1 123   
Cost of delayed discovery 4           -       -       -       -       -       -       -       4           
EBITDA (3)         16        40        37        29        28        17        12        176      
EBIT (4)         -       3           (1)         (4)         (1)         (6)         (4)         (17)       
Net profit (4)         1           1           (5)         (6)         (5)         (2)         (4)         (25)       
Equity capital 6           233      129      63        38        69        81        76        76        
Total assets 48        278      276      241      241      220      209      178      178      
Total liabilities 31        20        114      135      119      98        69        38        38        
Total reduction of liab ilities 4           -       -       -       -       -       -       -       4           
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Table 46. Cost of resistance BSRP – omitted effects of delayed implementation 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010-2017 BSRP 
 
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. The table below shows that the total effect of 
delay in measures discovery, non-implementation or delayed implementation of the 
measures during the period amounts to EUR 21 mln.  
 
Table 47. Total cost of opacity and resistance BSRP 
 
 
If those measures had been discovered and implemented on time, the company 
operating costs would have been EUR 21 mln less. Under these assumptions, the 
financial result would have been improved by EUR 21 mln, and the liabilities would 
have decreased by EUR 21 mln.  
 
Table 48. Total financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in BSRP 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010-2017 BSRP  
 
 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 132      145      140      136      136      137      135      137      1 098   
Lost income delayed implementation -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 139      140      136      137      142      141      135      140      1 110   
Cost of delayed implementation 1           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           17        
EBITDA (7)         20        43        41        30        30        19        13        189      
EBIT (7)         5           5           3           (3)         -       (4)         (3)         (4)         
Net profit (7)         5           4           (1)         (6)         (4)         -       (3)         (12)       
Equity capital 3           234      132      71        46        78        92        89        89        
Total assets 48        278      276      241      241      220      209      178      178      
Total liabilities 34        20        110      128      111      88        58        26        26        
Total reduction of  liab ilities 1           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           17        
Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total %
Cost of delayed discovery 4           -       -       -       -       -       -       -       4           20%
Cost of  delayed implementation 1           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           17        80%
Cost of non-implementation -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total: 5           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           21        100%
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 132      145      140      136      136      137      135      137      1 098   
Total  income lost opacity / resistance -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 135      140      136      137      142      141      135      140      1 106   
Total cost of opacity /resistance 4           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           21        
EBITDA (3)         21        43        41        30        30        19        13        193      
EBIT (3)         5           5           3           (3)         -       (4)         (3)         -       
Net profit (3)         5           4           (1)         (6)         (4)         -       (3)         (8)         
Equity capital 7           238      136      75        50        83        96        94        94        
Total assets 48        278      276      241      241      220      209      178      178      
Total liabilities 30        15        106      123      107      84        53        21        21        
Total reduction of  liab ilities 5           4           3           4           1           2           2           1           21        
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Holding BSRG 
The database depicting the measures undertaken by the management to reorganise 
the company provides the following information about the effects of the measures in 
BSRG for the period 2010-2017.  
 
Table 49. Summary Indicators – BSRG 
 
 
Cost of Opacity (delay in measures discovery). The delay in measures discovery 
has an impact on the BSRG financial result and indebtedness. The table below shows 
that there is no effect of the delay in discovering the measures on the BSRG income 
for the period under review. At the same time, the expenses would have been EUR 48 
mln (including EUR 41 mln reductions of depreciation) less, i.e., the improvement of 
the financial results for the period 2010-2017 would have been at the amount of EUR 
48 mln. The total decrease in debts would have been EUR 7 mln. 
 
Table 50. Cost of opacity BSRG – omitted effects of delayed discovery 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRG  
 
Cost of Resistance (delayed implementation). The lost effect due to delay in 
measures implementation also affects the main financial indicators of BSRG for the 
period 2010-2017. The table below shows that the effect on income due to the delay 
in measures implementation amounts to EUR 1 mln less for the period under review, 
and the expenses amount to EUR 31 mln. The improvement of company financial 
result for this period would have been EUR 32 mln, and the total decrease of 
indebtedness would have been EUR 32 mln. The indebtedness at the end of 2017 
№ Indikators ('000 EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total
1 Total number of measures 116 22 25 69 43 29 304
2 Implemented measures 112 19 20 52 32 15 250
3 Non-implemented measures 4 3 5 17 11 14 54
4 Planned effect of the measures 15 7 21 49 38 51 181
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total revenues 216      225      214      217      205      202      189      193      1 662   
Lost income delayed discovery -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       -       
Total expenses 234      245      221      213      221      211      201      202      1 748   
Cost of delayed discovery 5           5           9           9           9           9           -       -       48        
EBITDA 32        21        35        38        24        28        5           6           189      
EBIT (9)         (13)       (6)         (3)         (13)       (5)         (18)       (10)       (77)       
Net profit (18)       (20)       (7)         4           (16)       (9)         (11)       (8)         (86)       
Equity capital 96        60        51        54        33        59        89        81        81        
Total assets 529      482      459      418      365      366      376      344      344      
Total liabilities 416      392      370      319      281      251      225      198      198      
Total reduction of liab ilities 6           -       -       -       -       1           -       -       7           
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amounts to EUR 206 mln, and if the measures had been successfully implemented, it 
could have been EUR 174 mln.  
 
Table 51. Cost of resistance BSRG – omitted effects of delayed implementation  
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRG  
 
Cost of Resistance (non-implementation). The omitted benefits of non-implemented 
measures amount to EUR 31 mln. If the measures had been implemented the income 
for the period under review would have been EUR 8 mln (including EUR 7 mln sales 
of assets) higher, and the expenses would have been EUR 23 mln less. The equity 
capital would have increased by an amount equal to the improved financial result, 
namely by EUR 31 mln, and the company indebtedness would have decreased by 
EUR 31 mln. Under the assumption that the planned measures had been implemented, 
the company indebtedness would have been EUR 174 mln, compared to EUR 206 mln 
indebtedness reported at the end of 2017.  
 
Table 52. Cost of resistance BSRG – omitted effects of non-implementation 
 
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRG  
 
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. The table below shows that the total effect of 
the delay in measures discovery, delayed implementation and non-implementation of 
the measures during the period amounts to EUR 111 mln.  
 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017 Total
Total revenues 216      225      215      217      205      202      189      193      1 663   
Lost income delayed implementation -       -       1           -       -       -       -       -       1           
Total expenses 237      247      225      217      228      215      197      198      1 765   
Cost of delayed implementation 2           4           5           5           3           4           4           4           31        
EBITDA 29        25        41        44        26        31        9           10        214      
EBIT (12)       (14)       (9)         (7)         (20)       (9)         (15)       (7)         (93)       
Net profit (21)       (22)       (10)       -       (23)       (13)       (8)         (5)         (102)     
Equity capital 92        55        43        42        14        36        70        65        65        
Total assets 529      477      444      394      332      325      335      304      304      
Total liabilities 420      392      364      307      267      233      204      174      174      
Total reduction of  liab ilities 2           4           6           5           3           4           4           4           32        
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017 Total
Total revenues 216      225      214      217      205      206      192      195      1 669   
Lost income non-implementation -       -       -       -       -       4           2           1           8           
Total expenses 239      250      228      220      227      214      195      199      1 772   
Costs of non-implementation -       1           3           3           3           6           6           3           23        
EBITDA 26        21        37        41        27        33        12        9           207      
EBIT (14)       (18)       (12)       (10)       (20)       (8)         (11)       (7)         (100)     
Net profit (24)       (25)       (13)       (3)         (23)       (8)         (3)         (4)         (103)     
Equity capital 90        49        34        31        3           30        69        64        64        
Total assets 529      477      444      394      332      324      334      302      302      
Total liabilities 422      397      373      318      278      239      205      174      174      
Total reduction of  liab ilities -       1           3           3           3           10        8           4           31        
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Table 53. Total cost of opacity and resistance BSRG 
 
If those measures had been discovered and implemented on time, the income of BSRG 
would have been by EUR 9 mln higher, and total costs would have been by EUR 102 
mln lower (including depreciation worth 40 mln). Under these assumptions, the 
financial result would have been improved with EUR 111 mln, and the liabilities would 
have decreased by EUR 71 mln. 
 
Table 54. Total financial effects in the absence of opacity and resistance in BSRF  
Source: Adjusted audited financial statements 2010 - 2017 BSRG  
 
6.6. OPACITY, RESISTANCE, AND THE SPEED OF REORGANISATION 
A Z score calculation could provide information about the effect of the opacity and the 
resistance on the adaptive capability of BSRG and its subsidiaries when the adaptive 
capability is measured through the effect on the speed of transformation.  
 
BSR – Freight Transportation Ltd.  
The table 55 below shows the effect of opacity, resistance and the combined effect of 
both on the fitness of BSRF expressed by Z-Score.   
 
Table 55. Effects of opacity and resistance on the Z-Score of BSRF 
 
Indicators (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Cost of delayed discovery 6           5           9           9           10        8           -       -       48        
Cost of  delayed implementation 2           4           6           5           3           4           4           4           32        
Cost of non-implementation -       -       3           3           3           10        8           4           31        
Total: 8           10        18        17        15        22        12        8           111      
BSRF 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Real Z-Score 0,84 0,72 0,37 0,95 0,40 0,67 0,69 0,69
Z-Score Opacity 1,00 1,05 0,73 1,29 0,93 1,16 1,09 1,08
Z-Score Resistance 1,01 0,76 0,63 1,33 0,96 2,24 3,81 3,49
Z-Score Opacity and Resistance 1,47 1,25 1,20 1,88 1,64 3,20 4,71 4,49
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In the absence of opacity, the Z-Score of BSRF would have been better for the entire 
period of the transformation from 2010 to 2017. In 2017, the real Z-Score is 0.69 
compared to 1.08 Z-Score in the hypothetical absence of opacity or 0.39 points 
difference that is 57% from the real Z-Score of BSRF. Similarly, in the absence of 
resistance, the Z-Score of BSRF would have been better for the entire transformation 
period. What is more important is that if the resistance had not existed in the BSRF, 
the company’s Z-Score 2015, 2016 and 2017 would have been 2.24, 3.81, and 3.49, 
or well above the 1.23 hurdle that indicates that the likelihood of bankruptcy is high. 
For 2016 and 2017, the Z-Score would have been above the hurdle of 2.9, which shows 
that the enterprise is financially sound. In other words, the transformation of the 
enterprise would have been completed in 2016. Considering the combined effect of 
the absence of opacity and resistance, the Z-score in 2015 would have been 3.20 or 
above 2.9 hurdles showing that the company is sound. Moreover, the transformation 
would have been completed in the same year. In 2016 and 2017, the Z-score would 
have been 4.71 and 4.49 that is above the hurdle of 4.14 as an average for non-
bankrupt companies.      
 
BSR – Passengers Transportation Ltd.  
Table 56 below shows the effect of the opacity, resistance and the combined effect of 
both on the fitness of BSRP expressed by Z-Score.   
 
Table 56. Effects of opacity and resistance on the Z-Score of BSRP 
 
 
In the absence of opacity, BSRP’s Z-Score would have been better for the entire period 
of the transformation from 2010 to 2017. In 2017, the original Z-Score is 1.38 compared 
to 1.53 Z-Score in the hypothetical absence of opacity. Similarly, in the absence of 
resistance, the Z-Score of BSRP would have been better for the entire transformation 
period. What is more important, is that if the resistance had not existed in BSRP, the 
company’s Z-Score in 2016 and 2017 would have been 1.30, and 2.20 or well above 
the 1.23 hurdle, which indicates that the likelihood of bankruptcy is high, while the 
original Z-Score in 2016 is 0.99. In 2017, the Z-Score would have been 2.20 or much 
closer to the hurdle of 2.9 showing that the enterprise is financially sound compared to 
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the original Z-Score of 1.38. Considering the combined effect of the absence of opacity 
and resistance the Z-score in 2017 would have been 2.66 or much closer to 2.9 hurdle 
showing that the company is sound. Moreover, the transformation would have been 
almost completed in the same year.  
 
BSR – Holding Inc. Group  
The table below shows the effect of opacity, resistance and the combined effect of both 
on the fitness of BSRG expressed by Z-Score.   
 
Table 57. Effects of opacity and resistance on the Z-Score of BSRG 
 
 
In the absence of opacity, the Z-Score of BSRG would have been better for the entire 
period of the transformation from 2010 to 2017. In 2017, the real Z-Score is 0.40 
compared to 0.50 Z-Score in the hypothetical absence of opacity. 
Similarly, in the absence of resistance, the Z-Score of BSRG would have been better 
for the entire transformation period. In 2017, the original Z-Score is 0.40 compared to 
0.88 Z-Score in the hypothetical absence of resistance. In other words, in the absence 
of resistance, the Z-Score would have been 120% higher for the Group of companies 
as a whole. Considering the combined effect of the absence of opacity and resistance 
the Z-score in 2017 would have been 1.01 or 153% higher than the original score of 
the group of companies. In other words, the absence of opacity and resistance would 
have allowed faster improvement in the fitness of the company or faster reorganisation 
thereof. Correspondingly, the adaptive capability declines in the presence of opacity 
and resistance.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. By the reviewed indicators, although the comparison between the three companies 
is not entirely correct due to the different functions they perform, a conclusion may 
be drawn that the measures were taken and the development plan has been most 
effectively implemented in BSRH. 
2. For each of the three companies, the intensity of adopting the measures during the 
period under review is different, but every year new reorganisation measures are 
introduced in the original plan. This is a clear indication of the opacity of the 
organisation.  
3. The adopted 2010 Restructuring Plan of Holding BSR Inc. Group was amended 
several times, and in 2015, a new, more comprehensive development plan was 
adopted. This is another confirmation of that company’s opacity.  
4. The lack of transparency is also evidenced by the data on the number of delayed 
measures. The financial estimates show that the late identification of measures and 
the delay in implementation of specific measures are the main reasons for the delay 
of the reforms and the lack of satisfactory results from some of the changes.  
5. The identification of the areas where the cascade of adopting follow-up measures 
as a result of difficulties in the full and timely definition of the problem areas shows 
that, as regards the three companies, sector Finance and a few other company-
specific sectors are the main ones which also defines them as sectors with higher 
level of transparency and traceability.  
6. The total cost of opacity in the companies making part of Holding BSRG is EUR 
62,125,000. The omitted effects of timely discovery and implementation of the 
restructuring measures have a significant influence on the financial position of each 
company and the whole group.  
7. The total cost of resistance in the companies that are part of BSRG is EUR 
69,051,000. The delay of the implementation or non-implementation of 
restructuring measures also has a significant effect on the financial position of each 
company and the whole group.  
8. The opacity and resistance have a significant effect on the speed of reorganisation 
in BSRG and its daughter companies. If BSRF were free of opacity and resistance 
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the transformation of the company from a troubled one (Z-Score 0.84) to a having 
not high likelihood of bankruptcy (Z-Score above 1.23) would have taken four years 
(from 2010 to 2013 when the Z-Score is 1.88) and from a troubled one to sound 
financially (Z-Score above 2.9) would have taken six years (from 2010 to 2015 
when the Z-Score is 3.2). Even more, the company would achieve the average for 
non-bankrupt companies (Z-Score 4.14) in seven years (from 2010 to 2016 when 
the Z-Score is 4.71). In the existence of opacity and resistance, the company did 
not reached the status of the relatively low likelihood of bankruptcy in 2017 when 
the original Z-Score was 0.69.  
9. The transformation of BSRP would have taken one year less to recover from a 
troubled company to a company not having a high likelihood of bankruptcy. The 
original Z-Score in the existence of opacity and resistance goes above 1.23 in 2017 
when it is 1.38. In the absence of opacity, it would have happened in 2016 when 
the Z-Score was 1.41. What is more, in the absence of opacity and resistance the 
Z-Score being 2.66 in 2017 would have been very close to the status of the 
financially sound company: 2.9.   
10. The transformation of BSRG would also have been quicker in the absence of 
opacity and resistance as the Z-Score would have been 1.01 compared to the 
original Z-Score of only 0.40 in 2017 in the presence of opacity and resistance. 
The above data confirms the hypothesis that the adaptive capacity of the troubled 
BSRG and its subsidiaries, to adapt in a timely manner to the environmental drifts, 
declines with the strength of its organisational opacity and asperity. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conflicting stakeholders’ demands and BSRG adaptive 
capabilities 
The conflicting demands of the internal and the external audience influence the 
reorganisation of BSRG. Chapter 7 illustrates the adverse effects of stakeholders’ 
conflicting demands on the financial performance of BSRG in the crisis generation and 
in the reorganisation period. Two possible scenarios are analysed and compared 
quantitatively: (1) the inertial scenario illustrates the effects of the conflicting demands 
and (2) the transformation scenario illustrates the alternative option proposed by the 
management at the launch of the reorganisation but implemented only partly because 
of the resistance of the internal and the external audiences.   
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the institutionalisation theory prescribes, the Bulgarian State Railways Inc. Group 
operates within multiple institutional spheres and is subject to multiple conflicting 
institutional demands. By the end of 2009, the enterprise had the status of a troubled 
company, and its financial fitness made compliance impossible: satisfying the 
demands of some of the members of the internal and the external audiences required 
defying the demands of the others. 
Institutional demands penetrate the organisational boundaries of the BSR Holding 
Group and its subsidiaries through the two known mechanisms:  
1. The external actors located outside of the organisation (Government, European 
institutions, creditors, suppliers and clients) exercised external compliance 
pressures on the organisation using resource dependence relationships; 
2. The internal actors (trade unions, managers and staff) conveyed the internal 
institutional demands by promoting practices, standards and values that they 
have been trained to follow or have been socialised into inside or outside the 
BSRG. The actions of those organisations’ members reflected their 
understanding of what the appropriate goals of BSRG were, as well as the 
appropriate means to achieve these goals. 
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The intensity of the conflicting institutional demands in BSRG is higher when they have 
significant control over decision-making and a substantial negative impact on the 
fitness of the organisation. The strength of the conflicting stakeholders’ demands 
(independent variable) in a situation when the troubled enterprise demanded 
reorganisation (control variable) influence the fitness of the company (dependent 
variable) as conflicting institutional demands limited decision-making and execution 
options of managers (operationalisation). When conflicting institutional demands were 
solid, the company’s fitness deteriorated (causal mechanism). 
The stakeholders of BSRG influenced the organisation throughout the whole period 
2002-2017 that is taken into account in the research. The effect of the stakeholders’ 
behaviour on the company is separated into two phases: (1) the period between 2002 
and 2009 when the crises aroused and (2) the period of the reorganisations between 
2010 and 2018.  
Hypothesis 4. The adaptive capacity of the troubled Bulgarian States Railways and 
the speed of transformation declined with the intensity of conflicting institutional 
demands presented by the key members of the external and the internal audience.   
 
7.2. METHODOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION BASIS  
For the analysis of the effects of the conflict stakeholders’ demands on the adaptive 
capabilities of BSRG, the data is collected based on the information provided by the 
three companies for the period 2002-2017. The data source includes the audited 
annual financial statements, the strategic plans adopted in 2010 and 2015, the 
collective labour agreements and the business reports by the company in the period 
2002—2017, the annual reports for PSO contract for the period 2002—2010, and the 
borrowing contracts with financial institutions and other operating reports.   
The information on the leading performance indicators is summarised for each 
calendar year during the period, for every company and BSRG. The role of each 
stakeholder in driving the crisis of BSRG and its subsidiaries is analysed, and 
information about the financial magnitude of the influence is presented. Comparative 
analyses describe the financial position of the company as it was before the outset of 
the transformation and as it would be without the adverse effect produced by the 
stakeholders.   
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Autoethnographic approach and content analysis of documents such as plans, 
budgets, and reports present the conflicting goals and concerns of the stakeholders at 
the launch of the reorganisation. Content analysis of documents describes the 
activities of the stakeholders and the communication with them during the entire 
reorganisation process.  
The comparative quantitative analysis would depict the difference between the actual 
financial performance of the company and the potential performance if the scenario 
proposed by the transformational management had taken place (in the absence of 
conflicting stakeholders’ demands). The comparative analysis provides data about 
stakeholders’ impact on the adaptive capability and the speed of reorganisation of 
BSRG.  
 
7.3 ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS FOR THE CRISIS OF BSRG 
The Role of the Employees 
The employees did not undertake any action that was influencing the BSRG directly. 
However, the fact that the company was massively overstaffed was by itself a heavy 
burden. At the beginning of reorganisations, in 2010, overcapacity was approximately 
6,600 out of a total 15,439 employees. 6,000 employees represent almost 43% of all 
the employees in the organisation. The total excess cost accumulated for the entire 
period 2002-2010 because of the excess labour capacity is € 171 mln (BSRG, 
Financial Statements 2002-2010). 
The Role of the Trade Unions 
Before the beginning of the reorganisations, the trade unions had overwhelming power 
in BSRG. They were enjoying full control over the recruitment process from bottom to 
top, including the last CEOs; almost every management’s decision was agreed with 
them, and the union leaders occupied offices next to those of the top management; the 
membership fee of € 240,000 per annum was directly deducted from the salaries of 
the workers and transferred to the trade unions’ accounts; the cost of the collective 
labour agreement was a heavy financial burden for the company. The trade unions 
guaranty that employees would not be fired and by doing so, they protected the 
redundant staff of the company (BSRG Collective Labour Agreements 2007 and 2009).  
163 
 
The trade unions expected that the company would continue providing the services to 
the public (BSRP) and the business (BSRF) regardless of the accumulated internal 
inefficiencies and regardless of the imposed restrictions on management’s actions. 
 
The Role of the Government 
The Government as an owner of BSR and the primary source of finance for the 
passengers’ side of the business had a significant role in driving the crisis of the 
enterprise.  
1. The BSR Passengers Transportation Ltd. incurred direct losses due to reported 
under-financing by the Government for the execution of the contract for the 
provision of public transport services in the period 2002-2010. The loss, calculated 
as the difference between the compensation received for the period (subsidies) and 
expenses made on public transport services for the period amounts to EUR 150 
mln (Annual reports PSO contract 2002-2010). 
The Table 58 below shows the amount of underfinancing by year from 2002 to 2009.  
Table 58. BSRP underfinancing 
 
Sources: (Annual reports PSO contract 2002-2010). 
 
2. In 2005 and 2007 new rolling stock were purchased via a bank loan for EUR 186 
mln (BSR loan contracts 2002-2008). This borrowing was very risky since the very 
beginning, as the subsidised part of any business could not generate enough cash 
proceeds for repayment of debts. Usually, the money for investments in new rolling 
stocks come from the state budget. In other words, the government was meant to 
provide the funds for the investment in the newly purchased rolling stock instead of 
burdening the company with the borrowing from banks. The debt intended for the 
purchase of new rolling stock represented 63% of the borrowings, and the overall 
banking debts grew up from EUR 31 mln to EUR 296 mln (BSRH, Annual Financial 
Statements 2002-2010). Table 59 below shows the amounts borrowings from 2002 
to 2009. 
 
 
million euro 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Общо
underfinancing 26 13 9 23 25 10 23 20 150
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Table 59. BSRG borrowings  
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2005-2009) 
The above data clearly illustrates that the government did not provide the necessary 
funds for the operations of the state-owned enterprise BSRG as they had another 
priority and the development of the railways was not among them. At the same time, 
government’s expectations were that the company would continue providing the 
services to the public (BSRP) and the business (BSRF).    
Comparison between the KPIs of BSRG for the period 2002-2009 and the alternative 
KPIs of BSRG had the government finance the company adequately and provided the 
funds for the purchase of the new rolling stock (practice in the railway companies) 
demonstrates the effect of the governmental policy on the crisis of BSRG. Table 60 
below shows the key performance indicator of BSRG for the period 2002-2009.  
 
Table 60. BSRG key performance indicators 2002-2009 underfinancing  
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2002-2009) 
 
The table shows that the BSRG generates losses almost every year during the period 
under consideration. The total loss is EUR 81 mln; the total EBITDA is EUR 109 mln 
and the total debts amount to EUR 434 mln.  
If the company had received the financing that was relevant for the provided 
transportation services and the purchase of the new rolling stock was financed with an 
investment form the government, the KPI would have been considerably different. 
Table 61 below shows the KPIs based on this scenario. 
 
 
 
million euro 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Loans 16 0 1 156 14 186
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Table 61. BSRG key performance indicators 2002-2009 without underfinancing  
 
Source: (Adjusted audited financial statements of BSRG 2002-2009) 
 
Instead of a total loss of EUR 81 mln, the company would have generated a profit of 
EUR 102 mln; the total EBITDA would have gone up to EUR 295 mln, and the total 
debts would have gone down to EUR 89 mln.  
 
The Role of the Banks 
Major international banks loaned EUR 270 mln to the enterprise for the period 2002-
2009. The first repayment was due by the end of 2009. However, the development of 
the crises of BSRG proves that the banks did not do careful risk analysis because the 
overdue amount in 2009 was EUR 11 mln, and EUR 37 mln in 2010. Even the payment 
of interest was under question in 2010. (BSRH Annual Financial Statements 2002-
2009).   
The above data clearly illustrates that the banks did underestimate the risks that the 
enterprise could face at that time. They expected to earn good interest on the funds 
provided, believing that a state enterprise would not have troubles paying the interest 
and the principal as it was scheduled. The lending financial institutions were so 
confident and eager to profit that they even did not consider it as a problem that a state 
guaranty was not included in the contracts with BSRH (Loan contracts 2002-2008).      
 
The role of the Management 
The inertial management played a crucial role in generating the crises in the BSR.  
1) The management of the BSR did not anticipate the need for change. The market 
conditions in the country were changing. The competition from road transport 
significantly reduced the number of passengers traveling by train. Table 66 below 
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presents the number of transported passengers from 2002 to 2009. In 2009, BSRP 
transported 6 mln passengers less compared to 2004. (BSRH, KPI 2002-2018) 
 
Table 62. BSRP transported passengers  
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRP 2002-2009) 
 
New private competitors entered in the freight rail transportation market. A significant 
part of the rail freight transport moved to road transportation. The industry structure 
was changing and one of the biggest clients of BSRF, the largest metallurgical 
company in Bulgaria, Kremikovtsi, went bankrupt in the middle of 2008. Kremikovtsi’s 
share was about 20-25% of BSRF’s total transported freight. As a result of its 
bankruptcy, the company suffered losses representing the value of pending recoveries 
for completed rail transport services amounting to a total of EUR 7 mln (BSRF 
operational statistics 2005). 
2) The inertial management did not undertake any reorganisation in order to adapt the 
company to the changing environmental conditions. In the company archives, there 
is no business plan considering any reorganisation of the company designed within 
the period 2002-2009.  
3) The inertial management did not undertake any actions to reduce operating cost, 
decrease the overcapacity of employees and avoid generating loses year after year 
in BSRG and its subsidiaries. The total loses of BSRG generated from 2002 to 2009 
was EUR 85 mln (BSRG Financial Statements 2002-2009).   
4) The inertial management was not able to communicate the financial needs of the 
enterprise with the governmental institutions. Instead, the management took 
several loans in order to purchase new rolling stock, fill in the existing cash deficits, 
repay part of the overdue loans, and maintenance part of the existing rolling stock. 
The overall debt grew up 3.27 times from € 100 mln in 2002 to € 434 mln in 2009 
(BSRH Financial Statements 2002-2009).  
5) As a result of management’s inactivity in 2005, the price of 25 EMUs increased by 
EUR 14 mln, an extra cost paid by the company (BSRH Financial Statements 
2005).  
in million 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Transported passangers 33 719 35 206 38 283 33 748 34 113 33 283 33 758 31 360
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6) The management provided services to counterparties in Serbia, Macedonia, and 
Greece that resulted in EUR 16 mln uncollectable account receivables (BSRH 
Financial Statements 2002-2009).    
 
7.4. THE STAKEHOLDERS’ GOALS AND THE REORGANISATION OF BSRG   
At the end of 2009, BSRG was on the verge of bankruptcy. The overall debts of EUR 
434 mln (while the net assets were EUR 380 mln) constituted 77% of the assets and 
the loss for the year was EUR 34 mln (BSRH, KPI 2002-2018). In that context, the 
process of the transformation of BSRG was framed by the conflicting demands of the 
most powerful agents of the internal and the external audience.  
 
The Intentions of the Management 
At the end of 2009 began the process of recruitment of the new management. The new 
(transformational) management was supposed to reorganise the company and save 
its status of a going concern. The team developed two detailed business plans: the 
first one for the period 2010-2014 and the second one for the period 2015-2022 (Plan 
for Restructuring and Financial Stabilisation of BSRG, 2010; Revitalisation and 
Development Plan of BSRG for 2015-2022 March 2015, Sofia). 
The plan for the restructuring and financial stabilisation of BSRG initiated wide-ranging 
reorganisation to turn the company around.  
The Intended effects of the reorganisation. The first reform was the restructuring of the 
Group by concentrating all commercial and operational activity in two companies 
utterly separate from each other: BSRF Transportation Ltd. and BSR Passengers 
Transportation Ltd. The second reform targeted the optimisation of all operational, 
manufacturing and commercial activities and processes in both companies and the 
holding "umbrella." The aim was to increase efficiency by significantly reducing 
expenses and maximising revenue. The third reform was to solve the problem of the 
company’s over indebtedness. The fourth reform was the realisation of the investment 
programme for the development of BSRG. (Plan for the restructuring and financial 
stabilisation of BSR Inc., 2010).  
The reorganisation of BSRG required many unpopular measures: (1) lay off of 
employees, (2) change of the organisational structure and process, (3) delay of 
repayment of the debts, (4) rescheduling payments to the suppliers, (5) negotiations 
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on the financial state aid with the government, the state institutions and the EU 
institutions, (6) cut off unprofitable trains and services (parcel services for example).  
Respectively, the reorganisations had many conflicting terrains and jeopardised the 
interests and the expectations of the major stakeholders of the company –government, 
trade unions, creditors, suppliers and clients (Plan for the restructuring and financial 
stabilisation of BSR Inc., 2010).  
 
The Goals of the Employees 
The employees suffered from the deteriorating working conditions and stagnating 
salaries (often not paid on time) in a massively overstaffed company with very low 
working morale. They wanted to keep their employment, have better working 
conditions and higher salaries. The management’s intent to keep the company as a 
going concern was in full compliance with the goals of most of the working force to 
save their employment in the long-term. However, the reorganisation proposed by the 
management and aimed at reducing the number of employees and at changing the 
working process conflicted with the short-term goals of many of the employees, 
especially with those employees who were satisfied with having some salary and 
relaxed working hours as a bonus.  
 
The Goals of the Trade Unions 
The trade unions wanted to keep all the benefits received in the free of change and 
reorganisations period. These benefits include control over the recruitment process 
from the bottom to the top, participation in decision-making, representative offices, the 
membership fee of EUR 240,000 deducted from workers’ salaries and transferred 
directly to the trade unions’ accounts, as well as favourable collective labour 
agreements. However, the reorganisation proposed by the management and aimed to 
reduce the number of employees, and the influence of the trade unions conflicted with 
the goals of the trade union leaders. 
 
The Goals of the EU – Commission 
In 2007 Bulgaria became a member of the EU. As a member of the Union, the country 
was obligated to follow all European Treaties and Directives. In that sense, the EU-
Commission became a new critical stakeholder of BSRG as it was the institution 
governing the allocation of state-aid-permissions for troubled companies. In other 
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words, the Bulgarian State needed permission from the European Commission to 
support the reforms by providing financing for partial repayment of the overdue debts. 
These were the debts that could meet the requirements for state-aid-permission and 
that BSRG was not able to repay by itself (EU Directives).  To see the green light, the 
company needed to provide arguments for at least one of the possible types of state-
aid-permissions complied with a detailed restructuring plan. The plan is supposed to 
confirm that the entity could be a going concern after the reorganisation. The goal of 
the European Commission clerks was to have the required information well supported 
so that they could reassure themselves that the decision they would take could not be 
compromised. The timing of the procedure was of little value. However, the 
transformational management of BSRG was in a hurry to obtain a state-aid-permission 
as soon as possible to shorten the timing of reorganisation.   
 
The Goals of the Banks 
Major international banks had loaned EUR 270 mln to the enterprise. The first 
repayment was due by the end of 2009. However, even the interest was under question 
(BSRG, Audited financial statements 2002-2010). What did the banks want? The goal 
of the banks was to receive regular payments both on the principal and on the interest. 
Alternatively, they wanted higher interest rates as compensation for the overdue loans. 
However, the financial poison of the company did not allow the management to meet 
the repayment schedules and the expectations of the banks (BSRG, Annual Financial 
Statements 2009). Therefore, the transformational management’s goal was to save 
the company by restructuring and optimising it. Debt repayment was a high priority for 
the leadership, but it was not doable in short-term. The conflicting interests of the 
management and the banks were unsolvable in short and even in mid-term. The banks 
insisted for governmental intervention, but the government was reluctant and restricted 
by the EU directives.     
 
The Goals of the Suppliers 
The suppliers, who had earned millions of euros for decades, were feeling the pinch of 
cash shortage, as the BSRG’s overdue accounts payable were EUR 150 mln (BSRG, 
Financial statements 2009). However, the management was not able to meet the 
payment obligations because of the financial status of the company. The conflict was 
extreme. The suppliers’ goal was to obtain timely payment in accordance with the 
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terms fixed in the contracts with BSRG. However, the management was not able to 
meet these expectations in the short-term because of the weak financial position of the 
company. Nevertheless, the long-term goals of the management and the suppliers 
were similar as it was both sides’ interest to have a smooth supply process and a going 
concern.   
The Goals of the Government 
The government experienced intense pressure as the company was on the verge of 
bankruptcy due to imbalanced national transportation scheme, powerful lobbying for 
road transport and lack of sufficient investments in railways. The authority was at the 
same time not very happy to face hostile actions like for example strikes launched by 
the trade unions and restrictions to company funds imposed by both banks and 
suppliers. Correspondingly, support for reforms initiated by the managers was 
contingent, heavily depending on the political situation.  
The Conflicting Goals of Stakeholders 
The goals of suppliers of BSRG, banks that credited the company, company’s 
employees and trade unions, differed significantly from one another in the short run. 
All of these stakeholders wanted timely payments of due amounts: salaries, loans, 
payables. The company’s financial position did not allow the management to comply 
with all these goals because of the cash shortage. Therefore, the demands of all these 
members of the external and the internal audience were in unsolvable short-term 
conflict.     
The goals of employees, suppliers, banks, trade unions and government were not in 
direct conflict with the goals of the European Commission. However, all of these 
stakeholders depended to a certain extent on the decisions of the European 
Commission as it was clear that state-aid would be necessary to complete the entire 
reorganisation of the enterprise. The government did not want to spend extra cash. 
The European Commission was not interested in the current payments, but in the 
ability of the company to keep on being a going concern after the reorganisations.   
Broadly speaking the suppliers had short-term conflicting goals with banks, employees, 
trade unions and management.  
The conflicting claims in the limited surge space predetermined the timing of the 
change. The correlation between the institutionalised conflicting stakeholder’s 
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demands and the outcomes of the slowed down transformation is a subject matter of 
the quantitative analysis in the following parts. 
 
7.5. THE STAKEHOLDERS PROCESS AND ASPERITY   
 
The BSRG and the Trade Unions 
 
The inertial vs. transformational scenario. The inertial scenario of the relations 
between the management and the trade unions as discussed in Chapter 5 presents 
the traditional setup that has been historically institutionalised by the collective labour 
agreement. This arrangement was declared to be unchangeable and the institutional 
constraints, the institutionalised aspects of the labour agreement, prevented the 
particular changes in the reorganisation period. The transformational scenario, on the 
other hand, presents management’s attempts to reduce the trade unions’ power and 
to eliminate the negative impact of the collective labour agreements on the financial 
performance of BSRG. The maximum effect that could have been achieved was to 
eliminate the collective labour agreements for the period of reorganisation and regulate 
the labour arrangements through the Labour Code adopted in Bulgaria. The midway 
was to amend the collective labour agreements and produce a more reorganisation-
friendly setup. Both sub-scenarios were available at the beginning of the 
reorganisation. However, because the power of the trade unions and the inertial 
political environment, only the second one took place just for a short period in the years 
2012 and 2013.  
The conflicts in the process. The strike in the autumn of 2011 was the ultimate 
demonstration of the cultural opposition against the reorganisation of BSRG. It lasted 
24 days from 24 November to 17 December 2011 (https://fakti.bg.; 
https://www.investor.bg.). At that time, many passenger trains did not operate. What 
was the reason for such an outburst of asperity? BSRG’s management was willing to 
speed up the reorganisation and initiated some unpopular reforms 
(https://www.capital.bg.). The most controversial elements were: 
1. The dismissal of 2000 employees. The motive for such a dramatic discharge 
was the low labour productivity as the company was massively overstaffed.    
2. The privatisation of the freight subsidiary.  
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3. The implementation of a pro-business collective labour agreement. The goal 
was to reduce various restrictions blocking the reforms. Examples of such 
constraints were: (1) the management’s obligation to obtain trade unions’ 
approval, ahead of any amendment of the organisational architecture and (2) 
ahead of any reduction of the number of employees regardless of the business 
cycle.  
4. The cancelation of the most loss-generating 120 passenger trains. The goal was 
to alter the schedule, exclusive of the complete closure of any of the passenger 
routes. 
5. The real bone of content was that the management refused to collect the 
membership fees from the members of the trade unions.    
The only possible strategy for the management in facing the requirements of the trade 
unions, at that time, was defiance. Keeping the enterprise running was possible only 
by reducing operating cost, increasing available cash and eliminating all the limitations 
that could block the reorganisation of the enterprise. The transformational leadership 
was aware of all the negative consequences of that strategy.  
The strike did not succeed: 2000 employees left the company, BSRF and BSRP 
adopted new pro-business collective labour agreements allowing for the reduction of 
excess employees in connection with the increase or decrease of the business 
activities; the management of BSRP stopped 120 loss-generating trains from 
operations.  
However, in 2013 the inertial management substituted the transformational 
management because another government took power after the general elections. The 
inertial management signed a collective labour agreement that restored all the 
limitations existent before the adoption of the pro-business collective labour 
agreements adopted by the transformational leadership.    
By the end of 2014, the transformational management returned to the company (the 
previous government returned to power) and adopted manipulation strategy in the 
relations with the trade unions. The strategy was a combination of active lobbying to 
convince the leaders of the trade unions in the feasibility of the reorganisation-oriented 
plans, controlling them through the allocation of resources and people and the 
inclusion of trade unions’ representatives into some parts of the decision-making. At 
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that time that was the only possible strategy to strike a balance between the 
reorganisation needs and the complicated political situation that did not allow 
confrontation with the trade unions. The strategy, however, brought some positive 
results: some people were set free in BSRG and thus reduced the overcapacity 
without any additional tension. Here some “aha” moment could be observed as the 
trade unions and the management generated a new understanding of the situation in 
BSRG allowing them to find a partial solution to the existing problem of overcapacity 
and alleviate the issue without confrontation.  
Quantitative analysis of the conflict. The overall financial burden, imposed on the 
BSRG by the trade unions dominated CLA, (as described in Chapter 4) was up to EUR 
87 mln. As a result of the imposed factual and financial restrictions on the managers’ 
plans to reorganise the company, the conflicting demands of the trade unions 
prolonged the timing of the transformation and increased the cost of change.   
Table 63 below shows the KPIs in the audited financial statements of the company for 
the period 2010-2017. The overall loss for the period is EUR 134 mln. The debt at the 
end of 2017 is EUR 206 mln.   
 
Table 63. BSRG inertial scenario KPIs 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Table 64 below, shows that in the transformational scenario (when financial reports 
adjust to eliminate the conflicts with the trade unions), the financial position improves 
significantly: (1) the loss decreases from EUR 134 mln to EUR 70 mln; (2) the debts 
decrease from EUR 206 mln to EUR 186 mln; and (3) EBITDA increases from EUR 
182 mln to EUR 262 mln for the entire period.  
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Table 64. BSRG transformational scenario KPIs 2010-2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Table 65 below shows the effect of the trade unions’ resistance on the fitness of BSRG 
expressed by Z-Score.  
 
Table 65. BSRG Z-Score 2010 - 2017   
 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
In the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score of BSRG would have been better for the entire 
period of transformation from 2010 to 2017, except in 2013. In 2017, the real Z-Score 
is 0.40 compared to 0.79 Z-Score in the hypothetical absence of CLAs. In other words, 
in the absence of CLAs, the Z-Score would have been 98% higher for the BSRG, as a 
whole. Otherwise speaking, the absence of CLAs allows for a faster improvement in 
company’s fitness and its faster reorganisation. Consequently, the adaptive capability 
declines because of the asperity of the trade unions.  
The BSRG and the European Commission  
In 2010, the management of BSRG designed the “Plan for the Restructuring and 
Financial Stabilisation of BSRG for 2010 and a plan for the activities for the 2010-2014 
period”. It was evident that the company needed state-aid in order to restore its going 
concern status. However, the state-aid required a permit by the European 
Commission.  
The inertial vs. transformational scenario. The inertial scenario of the relations 
between the management and the European Commission presents the picture when 
the clerks of the Commission follow their agenda to have the required information well 
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,40
CLAs Z-Score 0,38 0,34 0,39 0,51 0,41 0,57 0,51 0,79
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supported so that they could reassure themselves that the decision they would take 
could not be compromised. As discussed earlier, the timing of the procedure was of 
little value. Exactly, this approach inflicted inertial acting as the clerks did not care 
about the urgency of the situation. However, BSRG’s transformational management 
had the restructuring plan, and the appropriate state-aid-permission was a crucial part 
of it. The transformational scenario was to obtain a state-aid-permission as soon as 
possible in order to reduce the cost and shorten the timing of the reorganisation. Both 
scenarios were available at the beginning of the reorganisation. However, because of 
the bureaucratic nature of the EC structures, the inertial approach of the clerks delayed 
the state-aid-permit until 2017.  
The conflict in the process. On 17 September 2010, the Bulgarian government 
informs the European Commission on the need of temporary measure – rescue aid of 
EUR 127 mln. The rescue-aid is allowed by the European Commission, but the 
government never put it into practice.  
On 18 May 2011, the Bulgarian government informs EC about the need for 
restructuring aid for BSRG. On 9 November 2011, EC informs the government of 
Bulgaria that decision is taken to open up a procedure for investigation of the case and 
additional information is required. On 11 January 2012, the government presents an 
updated plan accompanied by the answers to all the questions.  
Permission is not given in the following 18 months. On 20 June 2013, the government 
of Bulgaria cancels the privatisation of BSRF. One of the requirements for the 
restructuring aid is that the company proofs its contribution of 50% to the whole 
restructuring of the company. The cancelation of the BSRF privatisation procedure 
makes it impossible for BSRG to meet this requirement.  
On 8 September 2014, the EC Directorate-General (DG) for Competition informs the 
Bulgarian government that debt cancellation state-aid might be permissible in the case 
of BSRG. EC stated many requirements as a prerequisite to giving state-aid-
permission to BSRG. The only possible strategy that the management could employ 
was acquiescence or the adoption of arrangements required by the European 
Commission. The strategy resulted from taken-for-granted norms, and regulations 
applied by the European Commission and voluntary compliance with institutional 
requirements. 
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After many meetings and technical discussions of the government and management 
with Directorate’s representatives, the state aid permission is issued on 16 June 2017 
(Commission Decision on the State Aid SA.31250-2011/C (ex 2011/N). However, the 
whole process lagged for almost three years and reduced the speed of the 
transformation process by postponing required payments on the overdue amounts of 
debt.  
Quantitative analysis of the conflict. As a result of the delay, BSRG paid interest 
penalties. Had the whole process of the notification lasted a year (a period that could 
be considered a normal one for a company in a financial distress), the total financial 
burden would have been EUR 14 mln less, as the company would have not paid 
interest penalties for the rest of the period because of the earlier notification and 
repayment of the debts in 2016. The capital structure would have improved by EUR 61 
mln additionally to the increase of equity that took place in 2018. The effect of the total 
increase of equity of EUR 162 mln would have come two years earlier.  
Table 66 below shows the effect of the delayed notification on the fitness of BSRG as 
expressed by Z-Score.   
 
Table 66. BSRG delayed notification Z-Score 2010 - 2017   
 
Source: (Adjusted Audited financial statements of BSRG 2010-2018) 
 
If the notification from the European Commission had come on time, the Z-Score of 
BSRG would have been better for the entire period from 2016 to 2018. In 2018 the real 
Z-Score is 1.21 compared to 1.55 Z-Score in the absence of the delay of the 
notification. In the absence of the delay, the Z-score in 2018 would have been 28% 
higher than the original score of BSRG. In other words, if the notification had come on 
time that would have allowed for faster reorganisation and faster improvement of 
company’s fitness. Consequently, BSRG’s adaptive capability declined because of the 
delay of the European Commission to provide state-aid-permission on time.   
 
The BSRG and the creditors 2009 - 2018.  
The indebtedness of BSRG increased from EUR 101 mln in 2002 to EUR 434 mln in 
2009 or by 492%. The significant portion of BSRG debts represents borrowed funds 
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,4 1,21
Z-Score Notification ontime 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 1,22 1,47 1,55
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(loans) provided by financial institutions. The loans funded the supply of new tractive 
and rolling stock, recycling, and modernisation of the existing railroad fleet and for 
refinancing of arrears to NEK EAD, NRIC, and Ipex Bank. In 2009, BSRG liabilities 
rocket to EUR 435 mln (BSRH, KPI 2002-2018). 
The reasons thereof are related to the lack of reforms and to the global financial and 
economic crisis which at that time affected Bulgaria. Within a few years, the company 
lost more than a half of its freight and about 15% of its passengers (BSRG, KPI 2002 
- 2018). The Table 67 below shows the data for the period 2002-2009.  
 
Table 67. BSRF transported tones 2002 - 2009 
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRF 2002-2009) 
 
Inertial vs. transformational scenario. The inertial scenario of the relations between 
the management and the creditors presented the picture when the clerks of the banks 
followed their agenda to either collect the overdue amounts as soon as possible or to 
benefit financially from the situation. The reorganisation-oriented plans of the 
management of BSRG were of little value. Exactly, this approach inflicted inertial acting 
as the clerks did not care about the feasibility of the plans. However, BSRG’s 
transformational management had the restructuring plan where the debt repayments 
mechanisms were set out. The transformational scenario was to restructure the debts 
and repay them with the cash proceeds generated from the implementation of the 
measures as laid down in the reorganisation plans.  The idea was to repay as soon as 
possible in order to reduce the cost and shorten the timing of the reorganisation. Both 
scenarios were available at the beginning of the reorganisation. However, because of 
banks’ disagreement the inertial scenario dominated the reorganisation period. The 
cost of reorganisation increased and the timing of the reorganisation was significantly 
prolonged.  
The conflict in the process. BSRG management was forced to reduce the payments 
to the lending banks and NRIC in order to preserve the company and to start the long-
delayed railway reforms.  
The first overdue payments were reported in November and December 2009 under the 
First Debenture Loan and payable to KFW and amounted approximately to a total of 
in thousends 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Transported tones 18 500 20 070 20 387 20 298 21 183 20 175 17 590 10 633
Net tonne- kilometers 4 628 5 274 5 212 5 163 5 225 4 711 4 031 2 266
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EUR 10.9 mln. In 2010, due to the severe deficit, the overdue liabilities of BSRG to 
KFW, First Debenture Loan and Second Debenture Loan increased to approximately 
EUR 27 mln. The company's free cash was insufficient to repay the debts as scheduled 
(Audited financial statements of BSRG 2010). The management had no choice but to 
repay the arrears to significant trade suppliers related to supply of materials and spare 
parts, fuel, lubricants, rolling stock repairs, and supply of traction power supply in order 
to ensure the smooth operation of the system.  
The only possible strategy of the management in facing creditors’ requirements at that 
time was defiance.  Keeping the enterprise running was possible only by paying the 
suppliers first and ignoring the expectations of the banks for, later on, suffering all the 
negative consequences of that strategy. Fig 52 below illustrates precisely the defiance 
strategy employed by the management of BSRG.  
 
Fig 52. Total indebtedness, including financial institutions for the period 2002 - 2018 
Source: Audited financial statements of BSRG 2002 - 2018 
 
The graph shows that between 2010 and 2012 BSRG repaid EUR 39 mln debt to the 
suppliers that amounts to 43% of the total amounts overdue to them. For the same 
period, BSRG repaid EUR 9 mln to the banks that represent 3% of the amounts 
overdue (BSRG, Audited financial statements 2002 - 2018). The total overdue amounts 
are presented in table 68 below.   
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Table 68. Indebtedness of BSRG 2010 - 2018 
 
Source: Audited financial statements BSRG 2010 – 2018 
 
In the period 2010 - 2012, meetings were held, and correspondence with the lending 
banks was exchanged in order to restructure the arrears due by BSRG partially. The 
management of BSRG tried to convince the lending banks in the fusibility of the plan 
adopted in 2010 and demonstrated that the rescheduling of the debts could be 
beneficial to both sides. The creditors did not accept the proposals. 
On the contrary, they placed unacceptable and impossible to meet requirements for 
the leadership of BSRG. At the end of 2012, the bondholders under the Second 
Debenture Loan initiated three legal proceedings at the High Court of Justice in London 
against BSR for arrears amounting to approximately EUR 32 mln (principal and 
interest). By decisions of 1 March 2013, the court adjudicated that BSRG was to pay 
the arrears and awarded a default interest of 8% in favour of the lending banks. In 
2012, Depfa Bank brought proceedings against BSRG at Sofia City Court for arrears 
under the First Debenture Loan amounting to approximately EUR 3 mln. In 2013, some 
meetings and discussions were held with representatives of the bank, and as a result, 
an agreement to reschedule the debts of BSRG, including cancellation of 75% of the 
interest due, was reached. 
In the period 2013 and 2015, with the advancement of the reforms the Ministry of 
Transport, Information Technology and Communications (MTITC) and BSRH made 
numerous proposals and organised meetings for the restructuring of the debts to KFW 
and the Second Debenture Loan. In the meantime, the defiance strategy gives way to 
a strategy of compromise when the enterprise partially satisfies all demands by 
balancing competing expectations while actively bargaining alterations of the 
demands. Between 2010 and 2013, BSRG repaid EUR 50 mln and by 2015, the total 
amount of repaid debts to the lending banks amounted to EUR 106 mln or 38% of the 
total debt. However, the creditors did not accept the proposals, and instead, they again 
set requirements that were impossible to be fulfilled by either the government or the 
BSRG, concerning specifically the initial payment of the entire overdue portion of the 
debts and provision of a state guarantee. Only EUROFIMA made an exception 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Overdue amounts in million 27 59,5 81,7 78,4 116 105,4 79,6 79,7 0
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agreeing that the debt of EUR 5.1 mln maturing in March 2015 should be deferred until 
September of the same year. 
While the lending bank institutions not only did not accept any rescheduling proposals 
they also undertook an aggressive strategy against BSRG. In the period February 2013 
through October 2015, KFW initiated nine enforcement proceedings against the 
subsidiary BSRP and withdrew from its accounts an amount worth approximately EUR 
12.1 mln. In January 2014, the bondholders under the Second Debenture Loan 
blocked BSRH accounts and in March of that year took the first coercive actions aimed 
at the part of the non-operating real estate of BSRH. In November 2014, the 
bondholders decided to request for acceleration of the Second Debenture Loan and to 
proceed with the sale of part of the established special pledge, namely 3,542 cargo 
carriages owned by BSRH. It should be noted that the bondholders limited their 
coercive measures only to assets that were not related to the operating activities of 
BSRG, which was due, among other things, to the established and maintained good 
relations with them on the part of the transformational management. That was the only 
partial outcome of the strategy of compromise.  
In early 2015, the bondholders initiated three new legal proceedings at the High Court 
of Justice in London against BSRH for new arrears amounting to approximately EUR 
66.7 mln. By decisions of July 2015, the court condemned BSRH to pay the arrears 
and awarded a default interest of 8% in favour of the lending banks. In 2015, the 
Minister of Transport proposed the bondholders under the Second Debenture Loan, 
the amounts due to be paid out of the expected receipts from the concession initiated 
at that time at Sofia Airport and upon receipt of the EC approval for state-aid for BSRG. 
In June 2016, after several years of continuous efforts by BSRH, an agreement with 
KFW on restructuring and rescheduling of BSRG debts to the bank by the end of 
February 2018 was reached. The Bank withdrew its initial requests for repayment of 
all currently outstanding debts of BSRG and form some form of state guarantee. No 
additional collateral was provided to the bank. BSRG fulfilled the agreement with KFW 
promptly, and the funding did not exceed the state funding of the company provided at 
that time. 
However, in 2016, the bondholders brought at Sofia City Court a partial claim for EUR 
511,000 against the subsidiary BSRP in virtue of its joint responsibility for the debts of 
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BSRH resulting from the reorganisation made in 2011. In March 2017, an agreement 
was reached with EUROFIMA to extend by three months the term of a portion of BSRH 
debts maturing in April and amounting to EUR 20 mln with an option of signing a 
refinancing agreement for the amount of EUR 9.8 mln by the end of March 2018. BSRH 
managed to fully repay its debts to EUROFIMA by June 2017 (Audited financial 
statements of BSRG 2017).  
In the period September–October 2017, after (the EC's notification of state aid came 
on 16 June 2017) intense negotiations with the bondholders were held to agree on a 
comprehensive agreement for payment of BSRH arrears. General agreement on the 
parameters of the agreement in question, including on the payment of four instalments 
of the debt was reached, with a discount of EUR 3 mln being negotiated. The 
agreement was not signed because the Ministry of Finance did not commit to providing 
the required amounts from the state budget. 
Quantitative analysis of the conflict. In the period 2009-2018, the debts repaid by 
BSRH amounted to approximately EUR 323.1 mln (Audited financial statements of 
BSRG 2009-2018), and no additional funds were provided for this purpose in addition 
to standard state funding of the company. The debt repayment was made possible 
thanks to the free internal financial resources as a result of the successful reforms 
implemented by the company management to improve the financial stability, structure, 
and processes, and to reduce the spare capacity. To this end, the BSRG paid the price 
representing the amount of accrued compensation for late payments (default interest) 
for the debts during the period 2010 – 31 May 2018 amounting to approximately EUR 
43.4 mln (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2018). 
If the lending banks had accepted the management’s reorganisation plan 
(transformational scenario) and agreed to renegotiate and restructure the debts the 
financial performance the company could have improved by saving the penalty costs. 
At the time of the potential negotiations and afterwards, for the entire period under 
consideration from 2013 to 2018, the market interest rates were below the interest cost 
of the 3.5 % + 6m EURIBOR of the Second Debenture Loan and 0.5 % + 6 m EURIBOR 
of the KFW BANKENGRUPPE 15% ЕМВ Loan. So, it could be hypothesised that it 
would have been beneficial for the banks to reschedule the loans at the same interest 
rate conditions. In this case, as Table 69 below shows, the company would have saved 
EUR 18 mln worth of penalties.  
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Table 69. Reported interest expense on arrears for the period 2010 - 2018 
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2013-2018) 
 
Table 70 below shows the effect of the penalties imposed by the lending banks on the 
Z – Score of BSRG  
 
Table 70. Z – Score without penalties vs. real Z-Score 2010 - 2018 
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2010-2018) 
 
Had the loans been rescheduled according to the transformational scenario the Z-
Score of BSRG would have been better for the entire period from 2016 to 2018. In 
2018 the real Z-Score is 1.21 compared to 1.57 Z-Score in the possible rescheduling 
of the loans. The Z-score in 2018 would have been 30% higher than the original score 
of BSRG. In other words, if the loans had been rescheduled in 2013 that would have 
allowed for faster reorganisation and faster improvement of company’s fitness. 
Respectively, the adaptive capability declines because the landing banks did not 
accept the transformational scenario and deny rescheduling the outstanding loans.    
 
The BSRG and the Government 2009 - 2018 
The inertial vs. transformational scenario. The inertial scenario of the relations 
between the management and the government presented the picture when the state 
bodies and clerks followed their agenda to support the reorganisation of BSRG only 
when it was politically beneficial and unavoidable. BSRG management’s 
reorganisation plans were essential for the government to the extent they did not 
generate unacceptable political tension or allocation of resources. This approach 
inflicted inertial acting because neither politicians nor clerks cared about the 
consistency of the reorganisation plans. However, the reorganisation-oriented 
measures in the restructuring plans are interconnected, and success is heavily 
dependent on the sum of actions. The transformational scenario relied on the reliability 
of the governmental support promptly. Both scenarios were available at the beginning 
of the reorganisation. However, because of the inconsistency in the institutional 
millions 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total
Penalties interest cost 2 1 3 5 5 2 18
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,4 1,21
Z-Score Notification without penalties 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,46 0,1 0,29 0,3 0,42 1,57
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support, the inertial scenario dominated the reorganisation period. The cost of 
reorganisation increased and the reorganisation timing was significantly prolonged.  
The conflict in the process. The government is the primary source of funding for 
BSRP. Every year the government provides state subsidy to cover the costs that the 
company cannot cover from its market incomes. Additionally, the government covers 
50% of the costs for students and pensioners. Finally, the government is the only 
source of funding for purchasing of new rolling stock (Contract for provision of public 
transport services, 2010) as the Ministry of transport controls the state-owned 
enterprise BSRG and its subsidiaries, and all funding depends on the Ministry of 
Finance and the National Assembly. Therefore, the only possible strategy of the 
management dealing with the government and the other state institutions was 
acquiescence.  
As already discussed, earlier in 2010 the management of BSRG designed the “Plan 
for the Restructuring and Financial Stabilisation of BSR for 2010 and a plan for the 
activities for the 2010-2014 period”. Financial forecast prescribed that the government 
should provide funds to keep the company as a going concern. However, the needed 
state-aid was only possible subject to permission from the European Commission. The 
rescue aid of EUR 127 mln was allowed by the European Commission (Notification 
402/2010 of 16 December 2010), but the government never provided the funds to the 
company.  
On 18 May 2011, the Bulgarian government informs the European Commission about 
the need for restructuring aid for BSRG. On 9 November 2011, the European 
Commission informs the government of Bulgaria that decision is taken to open up an 
investigation procedure on the case and additional information is required. On 11 
January 2012, the government presents an updated plan accompanied by the answers 
to all the questions.  
Permission is not given in the following eighteen months. On 20 June 2013, the 
government of Bulgaria cancels the privatisation of BSRF. However, one of the 
essential requirements for obtaining restructuring-aid permission is that the company 
provides proves that its contribution is at least 50% of the whole restructuring cost of 
the company. The cancelation of the BSRF privatisation procedure made it impossible 
for the BSRG to meet this requirement. Had the privatisation taken place the company 
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would have received a minimum of EUR 60 mln that would have allowed the 
management to repay EUR 60 mln worth of debts in the same year. In this case, the 
financial position of the company would have been significantly better.   
On 16 June 2017 BSRH receives a state-aid permit under subsequent EU Notification 
No S.A.31250 for cancellation of previous debts existing as of 31 December 2006 and 
loans refinanced with borrowed funds after 1 January 2007. However, the provision of 
part of the funds is delayed until 30 June 2018. Due to the late provision of the funds, 
BSRG suffers additional losses as a result of accrued financial and default interest 
accrued on debts subject to cancellation for the period 1 July 2017 – 30 June 2018 for 
EUR 4 mln (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2018). 
According to the contract concluded with the state for the provision of public transport 
services, the Government had to finance the purchase of new rolling stock by the end 
of 2013, providing capital transfers amounting to EUR 575 mln. The government did 
not provide the necessary investment for the renovation of the rolling stock meant to 
guarantee the competitive position of the passengers’ transportation part of BSRG’s 
business (PSO contract for passengers’ transportation services). Over the period 
2009—2017, funds worth EUR 109 mln are provided, and the actual under-financing 
from the Government under the contractual engagements amounts to EUR 506 mln 
(Audited financial statements of BSRG 2009 - 2017). 
 
Quantitative Analysis of the Combined Conflicting Stakeholders Demands 
The story of the reorganisation of BSRG and its subsidiaries up to now demonstrates 
that the conflict demands of the internal and the external audiences limit the speed of 
the reorganisation and worsen the fitness of the company. The demands of each of 
the stakeholders reduce the adaptive capabilities of the enterprise and increase the 
mortality hazard. The exciting part is the combined effect of the conflict demands on 
the timing of the reorganisation and the performance of the company.  
The effects of the different stakeholders are as follows: 
1. Trade unions: the total cost of CLAs and delayed the release of staff in EUR 87 
mln. 
2. Lending banks: total penalty costs worth EUR 18 mln. 
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3. European Commission: the total cost of delayed state-aid-permit EUR 14 mln 
and a total of EUR 61 mln equity less.   
4. Government: delayed allocation of funds in compliance with the state-aid permit 
EUR 4 mln.  
5. European Commission, and the Government: total delayed EUR 101 mln 
increase in equity in 2016 (increased in 2018). 
Table 71 below shows that had the above adverse effects not taken place the fitness 
of the company would have been significantly better.    
 
Table 71. BSRG KPI Transformational Scenario 2010 - 2018 
 
Source: (Adjusted audited financial statements of BSRG 2010-2018) 
 
The overall improvement of BSRG financial performance in the transformational 
scenario is:  
1. The outstanding debts would have been repaid in 2016, the indebtedness would 
have gone down to the normal levels of EUR 38 mln, and the debt crisis would 
have ended up.  
2. Improvement of the capital structure due to the increase of equity by EUR 148 
mln as a result of the improved financial results EUR 101 mln, and an increase 
of EUR 47 mln of equity by the government.   
3. Increase of assets by EUR 161 mln as a result of the savings of costs  
Table 72 below shows what would be the effect on the Z-Score of BSRG if there had 
been no conflicting stakeholders’ demands (transformational scenario).  
 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total revenues 216     225      214     217       205       202     189      193       198       
Lost income 
Total expenses 230     242      216     207       215       207     190      189       198       
Cost of delayed 9         9          14       16         15         12       11        13         2           
EBITDA 35       30        48       54         39         39       16        19         10         
EBIT (5)        (9)        (1)        4           (8)         (2)        (7)         3           (2)         
Net profit (15)      (17)      (2)        11         (10)       (5)        (1)         5           -       
Equity capital 99       67        62       72         57         86       276      280       285       
Current assets 113     101      111     101       84         80       100      158       205       
Total assets 529     477      444     394       332       325     382      412       450       
Current liabilities 181     199      195     153       169       133     21        21         21         
Total liabilities 413     380      344     277       224       183     38        38         38         
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Table 72. Z – Score no conflict stakeholders demands vs. real Z-Score 2010 - 2018 
 
Source: (Audited financial statements of BSRG 2010 - 2018) 
 
If the transformational scenario had taken place (had conflicting demands of the critical 
stakeholders of BSRG not existed), the Z-Score of BSRG would have been 
significantly better for the entire period from 2010 to 2018. In 2018 the real Z-Score is 
1.21 compared to 3.87 Z-Score in the absence of conflicting demands of the 
stakeholders. The Z-score in 2018 would have been 3.2 times higher than the original 
score of the group of companies. If the principal representatives of the internal and the 
external audiences had approved the transformational management’s reorganisation 
plans and had supported the implementation of the changes the transformation of the 
company would have been completed in 2016. In 2016 the Z-Score of the company 
would have been 3.68 or far above the 1.23 hurdle indicating a high likelihood of 
bankruptcy (if below) and well above 2.9 indicators for financially sound (if higher) 
enterprises. In 2017 and 2018 the Z-Score of BSRG would have been even higher with 
3.48 and 3.87, respectively. All in all, the reorganisation of BSRG would have lasted 
six years from 2010 to 2016 and would have been completed in 2016.  
 
CONCLUSION 
1. The analysis of the role of the critical stakeholders for the crisis of BSRG shows 
undoubtedly that the government and the trade unions were the driving force.  The 
excess cost of the labour for the period 2002-2009 amounts to EUR 171 mln. The 
government underfinanced the company by EUR 150 mln and did not provide EUR 
186 mln for the purchase of the new rolling stock. If the government had 
appropriately financed the public transport services provided by BSRP and invested 
in new rolling stock, BSRG would not have been on the verge of bankruptcy. On 
the contrary, the enterprise would have been financially sound.    
1. The key members of the internal and the external audience of BSRG – the trade 
unions, the government, the landing bank institutions, and the European 
Commission – did not accept the agenda of the transformational management 
included in the management’s reorganisation plans and actions since the outset of 
the reorganisation. They had conflict demands, and the support for the 
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,4 1,21
Z-Score no demands 0,39 0,33 0,46 0,73 0,47 0,7 3,68 3,84 3,87
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management’s intentions varied significantly. The trade unions organised the most 
vigorous opposition to the reorganisation in the first two years. Later on, some “aha” 
effects alleviated the problem to a certain extent, but the effects are close to 
marginal. The lending banks ignored the management’s proposals and followed 
their strategy of collecting overdue debts. The European Commission did not 
oppose the intentions of the management but was not cooperative in meeting the 
essential deadlines of the management. The government was supportive in some 
of the aspects of the reorganisation, but not very consistent in understanding and 
backing up the plans of the transformational management. More or less each of the 
stakeholders followed its agenda in the process of the change of BSRG.    
2. The individual strategies of the transformational management in coping with the 
conflicting demands of the critical stakeholders had mixed effects. The strategy of 
defiance applied to the trade union demands in the first years of the transformation 
was very successful as it accelerated the changes. The strategy of manipulation 
employed later on had marginal effects coming mainly from the “Aha” effects. The 
strategy of defiance used against the lending banks did not bring any positive 
effects with them, but it allowed the company to survive in the short term. The 
strategy of acquiescence applied to the EU-Commission and the government had 
many short-term problems. However, it was successful at the end as the European 
Commission gave the state-aid-permit and the government provided the necessary 
funds.    
3. The conflicting demands of the critical members of the external and the internal 
audience had devastating effects on the fitness of the company. The total direct 
cost incurred by the BSRG because of the conflicting demands amounts to EUR 
123 mln. The total indirectly postponed improvement amounts to EUR 163 mln. 
Moreover, the conflicting stakeholders demand reduced the speed of the 
transformation. The transformation lasted two years more before the company was 
able to approach the exit of the status “high likelihood of bankruptcy.” The status of 
financially sound enterprise has not yet been achieved by the end of 2018.  
The above data confirm the hypothesis that the adaptive capacity and the speed of 
reorganisation of the troubled BSRG declines with the intensity of the conflicting 
institutional demands presented by the principal representatives of the internal and the 
external audience.  
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Chapter Eight 
Combined Effects of Opacity, Resistance and Stakeholders’ 
Conflicting Demands 
Chapter 8 discusses the combined effects of opacity, resistance and conflicting 
stakeholders’ demands on the adaptive capability of BSRG. They deteriorate the 
fitness of BSRF, BSRP and BSRG and slowdown the speed of reorganisation of the 
companies. Z-scores present the aggregate data about the fitness and the speed of 
transformation of BSRG.   
 
8.1. BSRF 
Collective Labour Agreements. Table 73 below shows that in the inertial scenario 
the overall loss of BSRF for the period 2010-2017 is EUR 43 mln and the indebtedness 
at the end of the period is EUR 54 mln. 
 
Table 73.  Inertial Scenario - CLA financial burden in BSRF 2010-2017 
 
Sources: Audited financial reports BSRF 2010-2017 
 
The effect of the CLA on the financial performance of BSRF is significant (see Chapter 
5). However, Table 74 below shows that if disregarding the effect of the CLAs for the 
period 2010-2017 (transformational scenario), the financial result of the company 
would have increased by EUR 41 mln for the period and would have decreased to a 
loss of EUR 1 mln. The financial result of the company for the last three years (from 
2015 to 2017) would have been positive, and the indebtedness would have decreased 
from EUR 54 mln to EUR 13 mln (see Chapter 5).  
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Table 74.  Transformational scenario - no CLA financial burden in the BSRF 2010 - 
2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. Table 75 below shows that the total effect of 
delay in measures’ discovery, delayed implementation or non-implementation in BSRF 
during the period 2010-2017 is also significant (see Chapter 6). If these measures had 
been discovered and implemented on time the company income would have been EUR 
18 mln (including 15 mln sales of assets) higher, and the total costs would have been 
by EUR 81 mln less (including EUR 40 mln worth of depreciation). If disregarding the 
effects of the resistance and opacity for the period 2010-2017, the financial result of 
the company would have increased by EUR 99 mln for the period and would have 
increased to a profit of EUR 6 mln as shown in table 75 below. Company’s financial 
result for the last three years (from 2015 to 2017) would have been positive, and the 
indebtedness would have decreased from EUR 54 mln to EUR 16 mln (see Chapter 
6).  
Table 75.  The total cost of opacity and resistance in the BSRF 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRF. 
 
Total effects. Table 76 below shows that if disregarding the effects of the CLAs, 
resistance, and opacity for the period 2010-2017, the financial result of the company 
would have increased by EUR 113 mln from EUR 42 mln loss in the inertial scenario 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Revenue 79           95           77          78           69           68            64          57          
Expenses 84           107         86          71           75           60            47          54          
EBITDA (5)           (4)            3            11           4             15            11          6            
EBIT (5)           (11)          (8)           (1)            (7)            4              8            3            
Net profit (5)           (11)          (8)           7             (6)            8              17          4            
Equity (3)           51           49          52           43           48            101        105        
Assets 46           110         110        99           86           70            116        119        
Debts 50           59           61          48           42           24            16          16          
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(Table 73) to EUR 71 mln worth of profit. Company’s financial result for the whole 
period except in 2010 would have been positive; the indebtedness would have 
decreased from EUR 54 mln in the inertial scenario (Table 73) to EUR 16 mln, and the 
equity would have increased from EUR 51 mln in the inertial scenario (Table 73) to 
EUR 171 mln.  
 
Table 76.  Total effects of CLAs, opacity, and resistance in the BSRF 2010 - 2017 
 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRF. 
 
8.2 . BSRP  
Table 77 below shows the KPIs of the company for the period 2010-2017. The overall 
loss for the period is EUR 29 mln. The debt at the end of 2017 is EUR 43 mln.  
 
Table 77. Inertial Scenario: CLA financial burden in BSRP 2010 - 2017
 
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Collective Labour Agreements. However, if the financial reports adjust in the 
transformational scenario with the potential savings from (1) the cost of the Collective 
labour agreements that are above the Labour Code in force during that period of EUR 
36 mln; (2) the unrealised overcapacity of staff with a cost of EUR 10 mln, and; (3) the 
reflected decrease in compensation under the PSO contract - EUR 7 mln, the financial 
result of the company would have improved by EUR 39 mln. Consequently, the loss 
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could have decreased from EUR 29 mln to EUR 9 mln profit; the debts would have 
decreased from EUR 43 mln to EUR 4 mln; EBITDA would have increased from EUR 
172 mln to EUR 211 mln for the entire period, and equity would have increased from 
EUR 72 mln to EUR 111 mln (Table 78 below).  
 
Table 78.  Transformational scenario - no CLA financial burden in the BSRP 2010 - 
2017
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
 
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. The total effect of delay in measures’ 
discovery, delayed implementation or non-implementation in BSRF during the period 
2010-2017 is also significant (see Chapter 6). However, if the measures had been 
discovered and implemented on time, the company operating costs would have been 
lower by EUR 21 mln. Table 79 below shows that if disregarding the effects of the 
resistance and the opacity for the period 2010-2017, the financial result of the company 
would have increased by EUR 21 mln for the period and the loss would have gone 
from EUR 29 mln down to EUR 8 mln. The indebtedness would have decreased from 
EUR 43 mln to EUR 21 mln, and equity would have increased from EUR 72 mln to 
EUR 94 mln (see also Chapter 6).  
 
Table 79.  The total cost of opacity and resistance in the BSRP 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017. 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Revenues 132       145       140       136       136       137       135       137       
Expenses 135       140       136       137       142       141       135       140       
EBITDA (3)          21         43         41         30         30         19         13         
EBIT (3)          5           5           3           (3)          -        (4)          (3)          
Net profit (3)          5           4           (1)          (6)          (4)          -        (3)          
Equity 7           238       136       75         50         83         96         94         
Assets 48         278       276       241       241       220       209       178       
Debts 30         15         106       123       107       84         53         21         
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Total effects. Table 80 below shows that if disregarding the effects of the CLAs, 
resistance, and opacity for the period 2010-2017, the financial result of the company 
would have increased by EUR 113 mln from EUR 28 mln loss in the inertial scenario 
(table 81) to EUR 22 mln profit. Company’s financial result would have been a small 
loss only for the last three years; the indebtedness would have decreased from EUR 
43 mln in the inertial scenario (Table 78) to EUR 21 mln, and the equity would have 
increased from EUR 72 mln in the inertial scenario (Table 78) to EUR 122 mln.  
 
Table 80.  Total effects of CLAs, opacity, and resistance in the BSRP 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRP. 
 
8.3. BSRG  
Collective Labour Agreements. Table 81 below shows the KPIs of BSRG for the 
period 2010-2017, as determined in the audited financial statements. The overall loss 
for the period is EUR 134 mln. The debt at the end of 2017 is EUR 206 mln.   
 
Table 81. Inertial Scenario - CLA financial burden in BSRP 2010 - 2017
Sources: Audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRG. 
 
However, when the financial reports adjust in the transformational scenario with both: 
(1) the potential savings from the unrealised overcapacity of staff with a total cost of 
EUR 20 mln and (2) the financial burden of EUR 67 mln for the costs under the 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Revenue 132           145           140           136           136           137           135           137           
Expenses 132           135           129           132           135           140           136           138           
EBITDA 1               25             50             46             36             31             18             15             
EBIT -            9               13             8               3               2               (5)              (1)              
Net profit -            10             11             4               1               (2)              (1)              (1)              
Equity 10             246           151           95             77             111           123           122           
Assets 48             291           276           241           241           220           209           206           
Debts 27             21             91             103           80             56             26             21             
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regulations of the Labour Code, the financial position would have improved significantly 
(Table 82, see also Chapter 5). 
 
Table 82.  Transformational scenario - no CLA financial burden in BSRG 2010 -2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRG. 
  
The loss would have decreased from EUR 134 mln to EUR 70 mln; the debts would 
have decreased from EUR 206 mln to EUR 186 mln; EBITDA would have increased 
from EUR 182 mln to EUR 262 mln for the entire period; equity would have increased 
from EUR 32 mln to EUR 112 mln. The loss of the company in 2017 would have been 
only EUR 1 mln if compared with EUR 9 mln prior to any adjustments.  
Total Cost of Opacity and Resistance. The total effect of the delay in measures’ 
discovery, delayed implementation and non-implementation during the period amounts 
to EUR 111 mln. If those measures had been discovered and implemented on time, 
the income of Holding BSRG would have been by EUR 9 mln higher, and total costs 
would have been by EUR 102 mln lower (including EUR 40 mln depreciation). Under 
these assumptions, the financial result would have improved by EUR 111 mln from a 
EUR 134 mln loss to a EUR 23 mln loss; the liabilities would have decreased by EUR 
57 mln; equity would have increased from EUR 32 mln to EUR 144 mln.  
 
Table 83.  The total cost of opacity and resistance in BSRG 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRG. 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
Revenues 216       225       215       217       205       206       192       195       
Expenses 232       241       213       205       215       201       191       195       
EBITDA 34         25         44         47         30         37         16         13         
EBIT (6)          (8)          3           5           (8)          4           (7)          (4)          
Net profit (16)        (16)        2           12         (10)        5           1           (1)          
Equity 98         67         66         78         62         102       144       144       
Assets 529       482       459       418       365       365       382       355       
Debts 414       385       354       295       251       208       177       148       
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The effects of the conflicting stakeholders’ demands. The story of the 
reorganisation of BSRG and its subsidiaries demonstrates that the conflict demands 
of the internal and the external audiences have a slowing down effect on the speed of 
reorganisation and an adverse effect on company’s fitness. The demands of each of 
the stakeholders reduce the enterprise’s adaptive capabilities and increase the 
mortality hazard. Table 84 indicates that if adverse effects had not taken place the 
debts would have been repaid in 2016, the indebtedness would have gone down to the 
normal levels of EUR 38 mln, and the debt crisis would have ended up. The capital 
structure would have improved due to the increase of equity by EUR 148 mln (improved 
financial results of EUR 101 mln, and a EUR 47 mln worth increase of equity by the 
government). The assets would have been EUR 108 mln higher in 2017 because of 
costs savings.  
Table 84.  The effects of the conflicting stakeholders’ demands in BSRG 2010 - 2017 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2017 BSRG. 
 
Table 85 below shows the effect of opacity, resistance and the combined effect of 
conflicting stakeholders’ demands on BSRG’s fitness expressed by Z-Score.   
  
Table 85.  Comparative Z-Score: Inertial vs. Transformational 
Sources: Adjusted audited financial reports 2010-2018 BSRG. 
  
In the absence of opacity, resistance and conflicting stakeholders’ demands, the Z-
Score of BSRG would have been better for the entire period of the transformation from 
2010 to 2017. In 2018, the real (inertial) Z-Score is 1.21 compared to 4.73 Z-Score in 
the transformational scenario – absences of problems with the reorganisation of 
BSRG. In other words, if the transformation had happened in the best possible way, 
Financial indicators  (mln EUR) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Revenue 216     225      214     217       205       202     189      193       
Expenses 230     242      216     207       215       207     190      189       
EBITDA 35       30        48       54         39         39       16        19         
EBIT (5)        (9)        (1)        4           (8)         (2)        (7)         3           
Net profit (15)      (17)      (2)        11         (10)       (5)        (1)         5           
Equity 99       67        62       72         57         86       276      280       
Assets 529     477      444     394       332       325     382      412       
Debts 413     380      344     277       224       183     38        38         
BSRG 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Real Z-Score 0,32 0,22 0,25 0,56 0,09 0,26 0,26 0,40 1,21
Transformational Z-Score 0,43 0,44 0,71 1,09 0,85 1,37 4,66 4,75 4,73
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the Z-Score would have been 3.9 times higher for BSRG. Otherwise speaking, the 
absence of hinders for the transformation of the company would have allowed for faster 
improvement in company’s fitness and for faster reorganisation. Respectively, the 
adaptive capability declines in the presence of opacity, resistance, and conflicting 
stakeholders’ demands. If they had not existed the reorganisation would have been 
successful in 2015, when the Z-score goes above 1.23 (the likelihood of bankruptcy is 
high if below). Moreover, the company would have been financially sound thereafter 
because the transformational Z-Score 4.66 in 2016, 4.75 in 2017 and 4.73 in 2018 is 
above the level of 2.9 for financially sound companies and above the average for non-
bankrupt companies: 4.14. In other words, the transformation of BSRG from 
bankruptcy to a going concern would have lasted five years, from 2010 to 2015.     
 
CONCLUSION  
The institutionalised external and internal audience perceptions, the internal structural 
inertia and the opacity of BSRG have a tremendous effect on the adaptive capability 
of the company. Had the managers enjoyed the chance to implement the 
reorganisation plans in the absence of conflicting stakeholders’ demands, structural 
inertia, asperity and opacity, the leadership would have successfully turned around the 
BSRG much quicker. The recovery of the going concern status would have been a 
valid fact within five years after the beginning of the reorganisation or three years 
earlier than it actually happened. Moreover, one year after the initial recovery, the 
fitness of the business would have been at the level of a very sound and profitable 
enterprise.  On the contrary, the existence of institutionalisation, inertia, opacity, and 
resistance not only delayed the recovery back to a going concern status of BSRG till 
the end of 2018 but also made the enterprise’s status very fragile and thereby retaining 
the mortality hazard of the corporation at a very high level.     
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Chapter Nine 
The Reorganisation in Progression 
Chapter 9 presents a managerial self-reflective description of the transformational 
process within BSRG. The reorganisation started with my appointment as a chairman 
of the Board of Directors of BSRG on 7 October 2009. At that time, I had a very 
superficial understanding of what the status of the enterprise was. I did not have any 
experience and knowledge of the railways. However, I was educated to international 
business standards, I had respective professional experience, which was largely 
suitable to lead a turnaround project, and my motivation to succeed was powerful. The 
rest is the story depicted below.  
 
The initial diagnosis of the status of the company  
The only information readily available for the initial diagnosis was restricted to the 
financial statements, organisational charts, and operating reports prepared for the 
BSRG top managers. The situation was very far from rosy. The company had 
outstanding debts worth EUR 425 mln while the net assets stood at EUR 380 mln. The 
debts made 77% of the assets, and the capital structure was very unfavourable. The 
loss was EUR 34 mln (15% of revenues): EUR 12.5 mln of it was in BSRF, EUR 5.3 
mln in BSRP and a further EUR 16.2 mln in BSRH. The organisational structure was 
unnecessarily complicated. It consisted of four companies, 315 organisational units 
and 9 levels of hierarchy. The complexity of the organisation exceeded all expectations 
and was accompanied by a high level of opacity, i.e., reduced transparency of the 
operations.  
Another potential source of information, though not readily available, was the 
knowledge of the managers. I started participating in the daily meetings of directors 
and had discussions with some of them throughout the day. What impressed me most 
was that the top managers had no comprehension of how difficult the situation was. 
What they discussed predominantly was operating issues: schedules of passenger 
trains, loading of freight wagons, and number of locomotives needed for enterprise’s 
daily operations. Neither company’s market position nor its financial status were part 
of the regular discussions. I had the feeling that I was in a working environment where 
operations went as they usually had been going for decades. Nothing in the thinking 
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or the behaviour of the executives showed they were ready to face the financial reality. 
More worrying still, the only available blueprint for reorganisations was a two-page long 
list of suggestions on how to improve the situation. Considering the magnitude of the 
crisis in which the corporation was, this document was so general and concentrated 
almost exclusively on small scale operating issues that it appeared to be missing the 
point entirely. All the managers were living in a world that did not exist any longer. They 
were thinking in a way they had been thinking for decades. They were inert and did not 
anticipate that without prompt action the enterprise would have stopped operating 
within months.  
It got apparent to me that the inertial managers did not realise the new, unfavourable 
conditions for the BSRG. They did not recognise that without more professional 
management the reorganisation of the enterprise, the only life-saving radical surgery, 
was impossible.     
 
The appointment of the transformational management  
Since it was clear that new, transformational leadership was a critical prerequisite to 
initiate the successful reorganisation process of BSRG, we had to focus on the 
selection of suitable managerial candidates. At that time, the idea of relying on a 
structured, well thought through and implementable blueprint for the process of 
recruiting change managers was not on the agenda. However, more or less the 
desirable attributes of transformational candidates described in Chapter 4 were 
intuitively sought. The idea was to engage motivated, diversely educated managers, 
having a more professional understanding of corporate management, not being part of 
the inertial thinking of the rail man community and demonstrating higher level of 
adequacy to the positions they occupied. The task was both easy and a difficult one. 
The tricky part was coming from the fact that the increased mortality hazard of BSRG 
was not very motivating for the potential newcomers, and the remuneration package 
was very modest. However, even managers with somewhat lower professional profile 
were able to bring fruitful changes to company’s architecture. In general, the initial 
steps yielded a compromise between the desired profile of the transformational 
managers, and the managers available on the market and sought through personal 
and professional networks.  
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The process of hiring change managers started a month after my appointment on the 
Board of Directors. The procedure was relatively smooth as the new managers 
occupied positions that the inertial managers either did not consider as crucial 
(marketing, administration, corporate responsibility) or because they realised that in 
order to compromise with the owner (the minister of transport) they had to give up 
control of some competencies. The inertial managers, for example, had to accept the 
appointment of the new Finance Director of the holding as they did not have enough 
power and convincing arguments against such an appointment. All in all, eleven top 
managers joined the company within four months. However, to facilitate those first 
steps of reorganisation, it was essential to incorporate into the first transformation team 
some of the “inertial” employees of the company who did not match the expected profile 
of the change managers but possessed valuable knowledge about the systems and 
the existing inefficiencies. Such employees were, for example, finance managers and 
accountants who, because of the nature of their jobs, were more pragmatic and aware 
of the excessive costs structures of the corporation.  
The newly created (semi-) transformational team designed the first restructuring plan 
by March 2010, 5 months after my appointment. That initial plan was subsequently 
regularly amended, on an annual basis, as the team was identifying new restructuring 
needs, opportunities, and appropriate restructuring measures. However, the critical 
point here is that we initiated the first restructuring steps right after my appointment. 
We could not allow ourselves to wait until the completion of the restructuring plan. It 
was important to react promptly to avoid any further adverse developments.  
 
The launch of the reorganisation  
Turning around a troubled company turned out to be a complicated job. It required an 
understanding of the complexity of the business and the internal architecture of the 
company. During the reorganisation, it is strongly recommended to begin the reshuffle 
without any delay. The starting point is the visible problems. Professional managers, 
especially those with strong general managerial and corporate finance knowledge, 
should be capable of understanding the underlying problems and promptly initiate 
small changes that bring about considerable benefits at that stage. Examples of such 
reorganisations include enhanced cost control, improved cash flow management, and 
quick organisational amendments. This is how the reorganisation of BSRG began.  
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The implementation of small initiatives allowed for better utilisation of scarce 
resources. The cancellation of needless activities and costs that were part of the inertial 
management increased the amount of free cash. The free cash was used to pay to 
problematic suppliers. Secondly, the quick start of the reorganisation signalled to the 
internal audience that routines ought to change and the onset of the transformation 
was there with the new leadership. Thirdly, the kick-off of the quick changes conveyed 
an essential message to the external audience that the new management had 
identified the problems and started to address them. Finally, it was very motivating for 
the members of the newly designed transformation team that they got involved in 
something motivating, challenging and meaningful.  
The high speed of the transformation was crucial at that time; any prolonged 
incremental change would have undermined the significant reduction of costs and 
generation of free cash that alleviated the problem with the suppliers and kept the 
company in operation. 
The application of those quick changes would be useful for every troubled company in 
all industries when the suppliers are about to cancel the life-saving deliveries. Even 
when the company does not have an urgent liquidity issue (very unlikely for a troubled 
company), the timely initiation of some quick reorganisations would be recommendable 
as this would facilitate the learning process. The implementation of such rapid changes 
allows to improve visibility and improve planning as the managers get practically 
involved in the situation.  
An example illustrating the importance of carrying out a quick change simultaneously 
with the planning would be the first meetings between the World Bank and the 
Bulgarian government. The WB representatives came to negotiate a DPL loan 
supporting the reorganisation of BSRG. The vice president of the World Bank was not 
only pleased that the plan seemed to be feasible, but he also praised the leadership of 
the corporation for promptly implementing the first reorganisation-oriented measures. 
The reputation of the management raised, and the backing from the government 
solidified. Such support turned out to be useful as the reputation of the management 
was a sharp weapon in subsequent conflicts with the stakeholders.   
The collaboration with the World Bank was as a joint project of the two parties. The 
managers from the World Bank were getting to know the specific circumstances in 
BSRG and the management of the company were learning from World Bank’s railway 
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experience (some of the consultants of the World Bank were ex-managers in railway 
enterprises). The professional approach of both sides produced perfect alignment as 
a result of rational decision making. Such cooperation will be useful in all the 
circumstances when the managers of a troubled company work with external 
consultants and institutions.  
 
The battle with the inertial management 
The appointment of a small number of transformation managers was not too disturbing 
for the old cohort dominating the company. However, the ever-growing number of 
managers who insisted on challenging the status quo and the power distribution within 
the organisation changed their attitude. The adoption of the first reorganisation plan in 
2010 increased the tension because the plan set different priorities and intended to 
modify the control over the company resources and expenses. The reorganisation 
would simplify the operations, increase the process transparency and demand clear 
accountability. Accountability was crucial as it is usually the requirement of the 
environment and offers a selective advantage that increases the likelihood of survival. 
The old cohort could not maintain control over the critical operations and would be 
challenged by the newly introduced performance requirements that they did not 
understand and neither did they want to accept. The conflict became inevitable.  
There were two primary conflicting interests:  
(1) the power to manage and control the resources of the company and  
(2) the values and routines inside the organisation.  
The power over the company’s resources belonged not only to the inertial 
management but also to the trade unions. Values and routines were part of railwaymen 
community’s daily life. In other words, the challenge set by the new transformational 
management was severe.  
There was a clear demarcation line between the two groups: the inertial management 
and transformational management. The inertial managers were reluctant to offer 
information voluntarily and did everything possible to block or at least postpone the 
implementation of any restructuring measures. The daily confrontation became a norm. 
Both teams were trying to win the support of the owner (the minister) of the company. 
The inertial camp claimed that the transformational managers were not railwaymen 
and did not understand how a rail company should be managed. This contention was 
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correct from a narrow professional perspective. However, the very nature of the 
reorganisation at that point did not involve and could not disturb the operations of the 
company. The transformation team insisted that: (1) If nothing changed the company 
would go bankrupt, (2) the nature of the reorganisation was compatible with the 
railwaymen professional rules and logic, and that (3) the inertial management did not 
propose any feasible alternative to the changes they suggested.  
What was important was that regardless of all the collisions between the two opposing 
sides, the transformation team successively and persistently implemented the 
reorganisation. The execution of the reforms brought the first promising results by 
improving the interaction with the suppliers and reducing the operating loss from EUR 
34 mln in 2009 to EUR 23 mln in 2010.   
As a rear-guard action in March 2011, the inertial managers adopted amendments to 
the collective labour agreement. The trade unions insisted that the chairman of the 
Board of Directors and leader of the transformation should not take part in the 
negotiations. The owner (the minister of transport) of the company agreed. The 
outcome compromised the reforms by increasing operating costs. As a consequence 
of that, the prime minister fired the minister of transport in May 2011. Usually, ministers 
are rarely fired for one mistake; however, at that time the possible bankruptcy of BSRG 
was a hot political topic. Moreover, the finance minister played an essential role in the 
process of dismissal as he was not satisfied with the speed of reorganisation and did 
not want to invest money into “a black hole” as he described the jeopardised-by-
insolvency BSRG. Two months later, the owner (the new minister) substituted the 
inertial Board Members with transformation managers. This action changed the 
attitude of those railway managers who stayed in the company, and they became more 
content with the reorganisations.  
 
The battle with the trade unions 
The removal of the inertial top management and the reinforcement of the 
transformation team with new members allowed the turnaround management to speed 
up the reforms. Strengthening of the transformation management was a product of the 
professional network of transformational managers who had already initiated the 
reorganisation of BSRG. The mobilisation of the political support came from the clear 
plans forged by the transformational management, the success of the initial 
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restructuring and the rational arguments given to the politicians in favour of the future 
reforms. The goal was to reduce inefficiency and set free more cash for repaying the 
overdue debts. The measures were radical: (1) dismissal of 2000 employees, (2) 
cancelation of 120 most loss-making passenger trains, (3) privatisation of BSRF, and 
(4) resurrection of a pro-reforms collective labour agreement.  
After the removal of the inertial leadership, the plans of the reformers jeopardised the 
ancient regime, evolved during the last two decades. The uncompromising agenda of 
the transformational leadership endangered the power, the image and the status of the 
trade unions. The management of BSRG wanted to speed up the reorganisation. 
However, that was in dissonance with the prevailing state of affairs that were 
institutionalised within BSRG during previous decades. The management stopped the 
practice of directly collecting the trade union membership fees by the payroll, thereby 
depleting their resources and undermining their power. The response of the trade 
unions was a threat of industrial action (strike) on a national scale.   
The prime minister and the government got involved in the negotiations between the 
management and the trade unions. The process became a tactical game, with both 
sides trying to whip up enough support to prevail. It was crucial for the transformation 
leadership to build up a coalition in favour of the reorganisation plans. The aim was to 
generate support within a broader, external audience and to undermine the confidence 
of the potential participants in the strike. The tactic was the following: (1) the World 
Bank and other organisations supported the restructuring, (2) the initial success of the 
reforms, complement by detailed argumentation why the further improvements were 
unavoidable, was an excellent argument in front of the government, (3) the 
transformational leadership justified the reorganisations publicly via all media, (4) in 
response to the request from the executives of BSRG, several business organisations 
aired their support for the reorganisation plans.   
The whole campaign lasted three months, and the transformational leadership won. 
Less than 10% percent of the employees participated in the strike even at its peak. It 
continued for 24 days from 24 November through 17 December 2011 and was the 
ultimate demonstration of opposition to the reorganisation of BSRG. During that time 
many passenger trains did not operate. 
The strike did not succeed. Moreover, this was an event that increased the adaptive 
capability of BSRG. The trade unions lost the battle for the future of the company. The 
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defeat of the trade unions reset the clock of the internal institutionalisation and 
structural inertia. The attitudes and the motivation of both internal and external 
audience of the organisation quickly changed. Taken-for-granted features and beliefs 
did get delegitimised, and the employees forgot about the ancient regime to a certain 
extent. The internal audience members were no longer tied in a very dense network, 
and the cultural opposition they were able to generate was not as efficient as before. 
This momentum held for a while and allowed a sustainable change of organisational 
characteristics. The whole process reminds of Schumpeter's idea of creative 
destruction – the "process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionises the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one. (Schumpeter, 1942)" 
The decisions were complex, involving multiple parties as well as strategic and 
technological considerations. The efficiency of these decisions was dependent not only 
on the managerial talent but also on the institutions that provided the transactional 
framework.  
The transformational management speeded up the reorganisation. 2000 employees 
left the company, both BSRF and BSRP adopted new pro-business collective labour 
agreements allowing the reduction of excess employees contingent upon the increase 
or decrease of the business cycle; the management of BSRP stopped 120 loss-making 
trains from operations. The terrain was free to execute numerous reorganisation steps 
within the next years.   
 
The game with the banks and the suppliers 
In 2010 and 2011 the BSRG management reduced the overall debts of the corporation 
by EUR 36 mln. However, because BSRG had no resources to repay all the debts as 
it was contractually scheduled, all the funds were used to pay the suppliers. The 
strategic decision to use the free cash to pay the suppliers and to terminate the 
payments to the banks was the only possibility at that time, the only way to keep the 
enterprise operating by securing the supply of electricity, fuels, spare parts, and all the 
other consumables for the daily operations. In March 2010 a new cash flow 
management procedure was adopted. From then on, payments were tightly controlled 
by the board of directors. The strategy was: (1) solve the problem with the suppliers, 
(2) negotiate with the banks to earn time for the reorganisations, (3) speed up the 
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reforms to increase cash available for repayment of the debts, (4) secure state-aid 
permission from the European Commission, (5) convince the government to repay the 
last part of the outstanding debts, and (6) solve the indebtedness issue.  
The strategy faced many challenges: some of the suppliers blocked the company 
accounts, the banks imposed penalty costs, the state-aid permission was given after 
significant delay, and the government was reluctant to transfer the money to the BSRG 
on time. However, the critical element of the strategy was that regardless of all the 
hurdles faced on the way to the final goal, the management implemented it consistently 
and persistently. The execution of the reforms accumulated cash that was used for the 
settlement of a portion of the overdue amounts. Making the problem smaller and 
smaller was giving the transformation management arguments in communication with 
all the parties involved in the decision making. The banks were made hesitant whether 
to wait for the reorganisation outcomes patiently or to undertake severe actions against 
the company. Step by step, debt restructuring and rescheduling agreements were 
completed with some of the lending institutions. The European Commission had no 
other option but to issue the state-aid permission. In due course, the last unsolved 
issue was the final payment, due to the only lending group of banks with which no 
agreement took place. The government had to take care of this last payment. The need 
for governmental intervention at the last stage of the reorganisation was visible since 
the beginning of the reforms. The transformation management clearly articulated this 
inevitability. The positive outcome of the reorganisation gave a substantial justification 
to the minister of transport to prevail over the finance minister and convince the prime 
minister to back up the last disbursement in solving the indebtedness problem. 
Bankruptcy issue was finally sorted out in July 2018 because of the consistency of the 
strategy and the transformational management’s persistence to apply it regardless of 
all the obstacles.      
 
The puzzle with the government  
The behaviour of the governmental institutions was not always consistent with the 
transformation plans of the management. It was complicated to follow reorganisation 
agenda that did not enjoy reliable and continuous support by the owner (the 
governmental institutions). The management had to cope with this wavering behaviour 
and use different tactics to manipulate the more reliable allies. The management’s 
reaction in every critical situation was contingent on various factors, and the problems 
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were resolved case by case. The settlement of the remaining debts can illustrate this 
approach. The government needed a state-aid permit to recompense part of BSRG’s 
outstanding debts at the last stage of the reorganisation. The finance minister was 
reluctant to support the company’s application in front of the European Commission. 
However, the management convinced the banks that had credited the BSRG that the 
permission from the European Commission was mandatory if they want to get repaid. 
Correspondingly, the banks began helping themselves by active lobbying in favour of 
BSRG’s management front of the European Commission and through the national 
governments.  
Furthermore, the progressive reduction of the overdue debts resulting from the 
reorganisation encouraged the European Commission to issue the permit. This fact by 
itself reinforced the management’s arguments in front of the government. Therefore, 
the decision of the European Commission was publicly broadcasted on a considerable 
scale. At the end of the day, the government transferred the money to the accounts of 
the enterprise.  
 
The outmanoeuvre with the hidden players  
The BSRG as one of the biggest state enterprises is an object of intense interest from 
the wider public. The corporation’s management controls significant assets and 
resources. Therefore, it is not surprising that political parties, lobbying groups, 
providers of supply and assets, B2B clients, media and non-profit organisations tried 
to influence the decision makers within the corporation. Some of the players in this field 
even attempted to determine who should be in the top management of the enterprise. 
However, the pressure exercised on the administration was presented as “care for the 
good of the company,” and the real interests of lobbyists in most cases remained 
hidden from the public. The actors in this theatre organised pressure groups. The 
participation in such pressure groups was temporary and contingent on the specific 
interest of the lobbyists and the progress of the situation in BSRG. Throughout the 
entire process of transformation, many public campaigns against the corporation’s 
management and the leader of the change took place. These events created strong 
asperity and in some instances slowed down the reorganisation.  
There was no single recipe for tackling such asperity. However, two approaches 
helped in the process of transformation of BSRG to address the issue. First, the change 
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management was all the time able to give sound justification for the activities 
undertaken and was actively advocating publically the reorganisation goals, status, 
plans and the success of the reforms. Second, the management was asking for public 
support from experts and organisations when it was possible.        
 
The development approach 
Another decent example of dealing with the political challenges was the trial to privatise 
BSRF. In 2012, the government started the procedure of privatisation. The process 
was very optimistic, as buyers were present. However, the government resigned, and 
the new government cancelled the privatisation. The idea behind the sale of BSRF was 
to use the proceeds for the settlement of debts. The transaction was even more 
important for the reorganisation of BSRG as the funds received would fall within the 
category of own contribution to the restructuring of the company.  Such an amount of 
own contribution would guarantee the issue of the state-aid permit in 2012. As the 
government cancelled the privatisation, those benefits were no longer available. 
However, the transformation management’s planning approach alleviated the difficulty 
of the situation. The management had, all the time, alternative scenarios already 
developed. That type of planning approach allowed the management to continue with 
the reorganisation by having readily available another opportunity to apply for a state-
aid permit.  
The entire process of transformation of BSRG was very complicated and dependent 
on severe contingencies, such as the sequence of events and unpredictable reactions 
of the various stakeholders. The opacity of the organisation limited the access of the 
decision makers to operating information. The capabilities of the management allowed 
only quasi-fit to what a transformational manager should be and obscured the 
interpretation of the whole complexity of the business. In this situation, the 
management’s approach was to develop alternative scenarios, mitigate as many risks 
as possible in the plans, and be prepared to develop alternative strategies. The first 
and the second reorganisation plans were purposefully unrestricted for new ideas and 
continuously updated on a regular basis. The managers were purposefully looking for 
new initiatives year after year. The whole planning and budgeting resembled a learning 
system for incorporation of new ideas and development of multi-scenarios of the 
reorganisations.  
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The best business practice in action 
In general, the best business practices trained by business schools and developed by 
corporations equip the managers with powerful tools helping them grow business 
across countries and industries. The problem with the best business practice is 
applicability. The issue with the lack of consistency in the implementation and the 
behavioural aspects of neglecting the best business practices is present in all the 
organisations around the globe. However, three points of the issue were even more 
apparent in the troubled BSRG.  
In troubled companies, inertial executives are not aware of the best business practices. 
Managerial ignorance within BSRG resulted from the long-lasting experience and 
education of the executives. In the internal inertial environment, which was in 
dissonance with the fast-shifting external environment, top managers’ knowledge was 
surely obsolete. Furthermore, the inertial managers were not able to perceive this 
critical fact. Moreover, they tried to solve contemporary problems via outdated means.   
Secondly, many transformation managers did not possess sufficient knowledge of the 
best business practices or did not have enough experience with them. The 
compromise with the attributes they needed in order to be transformation managers 
led to the quasi-fit discussed in the previous parts. In quasi fit, the implementation of 
best business practices was problematic.  
Thirdly, the inertial environment of the troubled BSRG was resistant to changes, 
including the use of otherwise effective and efficient business practices that would 
challenge the comfort and the knowledge of the old cohort (inertial management).   
Finally, the process of institutionalisation was a blocker to the best business practices. 
The stakeholders’ belief that BSRG as a state-owned enterprise should be 
conservative and humble and did not allow the managers to begin a business process 
reengineering. The managers did not receive a permit as they blocked the minister.    
Nevertheless, the use of the best business practices supported the reorganisation of 
BSRG significantly. The most useful was the implementation of the Activity Based 
Planning and Zero-Based Budgeting. These valuable tools made visible the 
inefficiency in the operations and improved the fitness of the company.      
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The unavoidable power of structural inertia  
In the process of BSRG’s reorganisation, I had many meetings and negotiations with 
different players. All the discussions with trade unions, lending institutions, 
governmental officials and NGOs depict the “invisible” strength of inertia. The leaders 
of trade unions confirmed that they understood the reorganisation ideas, but they had 
no other option except to oppose them. The reason for that was that they could not 
convey the reorganisation ideas to the membership of the trade unions. Employees’ 
habits, traditions, perceptions and mentality were so inertial that trade union leaders 
were under the effective control of membership’s inertial thinking. The same trap of 
inertia was controlling the administrative officials responsible for generating support for 
the reorganisation of BSRG on a governmental level. The minister, for example, was 
not able to overcome the inertial thinking of his colleagues. The negotiating bankers 
understood the logic of the reforms and appreciated the successful reorganisation 
outcomes, but did not get support in favour of debt restructuring, because of the 
dominating routines and perceptions of decision makers in the banks. Consequently, 
because of the lack of support, the negotiating bankers opposed the whole process. In 
other words, the representatives of the critical stakeholders comprehended the 
transformation but had to resist it. The structural inertia was so strong that those who 
grasped the reorganisation were not able to support it on many occasions.    
 
The death of the transformation management 
Transformational management was not a compact and homogenous structure. Since 
the very beginning, the team was a compromise between the needed type of 
executives capable of changing the company and managers available on the market. 
Team members’ knowledge, skills, values and goals sometimes varied significantly. 
Some members of the group did not have the talent to be transformational managers. 
More importantly, some of them would not be successful executives even in a stable 
environment. The presence of these people within the transformational management 
was justified only by contingency factors. They took part in the reorganisation just 
because no better managers were available on the market at that time.  
The differing perceptions among the representatives of the transformational cohort 
produced many conflicts and crises inside the group. It was not a simple task to strike 
a balance between all these people. Some managers, feeling more comfortable in the 
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stable environment of the old fashion routines and moral norms, joined the camp of the 
old cohort. Subsequently, they were fired when the transformational managers won 
the internal battle.    
Through the years, the members of the team went through multiple changes. Many 
good professional left and new managers came. Consequently, the configuration 
inside the team and the perceptions of the team members changed, as well. Some of 
the managers, who in the beginning did not fit to the environment of the company 
because of their pro-change orientation, left the company and some of those who 
stayed started liking the new status quo constructed by them. The eagerness to 
undertake challenging reorganisation-oriented actions slowly retreated to the desire for 
comfort. The feeling of being an important boss blurred the perceptions of some 
directors. The ego began dominating over the professional motives. The desire to 
control the corporation got stronger than the motivation to complete the transformation. 
Some managers did not want to undertake any risky activity that could endanger their 
presence in the top management of BSRG. This attitude became the soul of emerging 
conflicts among the leaders who were supposed to rescue the company and recover 
its “going concern” status. Imperceptible with the success of the reorganisation, part of 
the “transformation managers” became inertial managers – a product of the new 
institutionalisation that had taken place as the interaction between the internal and the 
external audience in the process of transformation. The newly born inertial managers 
were mainly those who joined the transformational team because of the necessary 
compromises in the course of reorganisations. Fortunately, the end of the ex-
transformation management came after the resolution of the debt crisis and after the 
recovery of the status of “going concern” of each company in BSRG, i.e., after the 
completion of the rescue reorganisation.  
The new reality was not encouraging: some pro-change managers had become inertial 
managers and were blocking further reorganisations. I would consider this stage as 
the end of the first part of the transformation of BSRG. The transformation 
management rescued the company from bankruptcy but did not have the time to 
transform it into a modern corporation to the extent that it is possible for a state-owned 
enterprise. The team fell apart, and the new owner of the company fired its key 
members. The new minister did not comprehend what was happening in BSRG and 
neither did he understand the need to continue the transformation of the company. 
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Following his private agenda, he appointed managers close to him in the top 
management of company. That was the end of the reorganisation. It is difficult to state 
whether the end of the reforms was inevitable; however, it is clear that the risk of decay 
of any transformational team is an inherent feature of each reorganisation as it is about 
corporation owner’s myopia. Such issues could be overcome only if the contingency 
factors sustainably support the transformation.  
 
My leadership perspective  
My perception since the beginning of the reorganisation was that we had to design an 
appropriate plan to restructure the corporation and build up a team capable of 
implementing the restructuring measures. In the outset of the reform, I believed that 
using the best business practices would allow us to succeed. I was not able to foresee 
all the obstacles that subsequently weakened the effects of the business techniques 
we applied. I did not comprehend the role of the structural inertial entirely and neither 
did I consider the magnitude of the institutionalisation appropriately. However, my goal 
was to rescue the BSRG from bankruptcy, and I was consistently chasing it throughout 
the entire transformation process. The troubles we experienced in the process of 
transformation discouraged many transformational managers, but not me. Many of the 
colleagues left the company. However, my priority was to advance regardless of all the 
difficulties. When concrete transformational measures were blocked, I did not panic 
but instead pushed even harder on the implementation of those measures where 
resistance was weaker. I deliberately ignored the temporal difficulties with the 
implementation of the restructuring measures in the sectors where the opposition was 
strong, working on the progress of the change as a whole. The strategy was to wait 
until the conjuncture changes and the power of the management prevailed over the 
resistance of the opposing side. The advancement of the reforms was accumulating 
argumentation to proceed with those elements of the reorganisation where the 
opposition was strong enough to block them. My formal position of CEO was helping 
me to manage the process, but my leadership capacity, professional competence, and 
charisma played an equally important role. The formal position of CEO without the right 
concept and the ability to implement would bring zero effect.     
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Yordan Nedev: 
„From what I know, a leader is someone who can motivate and empower people. And 
then as a consequence hit strategic goals. 
When speaking about a vast and complex structure like a state-owned quasi-market-
oriented legacy-buried mastodon, managing change requires super-human powers. 
Unfortunately, none of us possesses any of those. However, mystically, when one 
profoundly believes in his rightfulness, has a priorities’ plan in his head, garnished with 
a touch of political will, and is talented at building rapport with a bunch of rather smart 
people that are ready to take insane challenges, things might eventually work out just 
fine. 
There is never a strictly right decision to a managerial problem. However, a well 
thought-out one, swiftly and rigorously implemented is always good enough. This is 
what a leader should foster. 
Vladimir has been at the forefront of BSRG, with a couple of intermittent interruptions, 
for nearly a decade – a record in its own right. As a consultant and then a colleague of 
his, I have witnessed quite some occasions on which his strong leadership was crucial. 
First, onboarding a reasonable team of professional managers willing and able to 
conduct severe restructuring and implement real business practices in a virtually 
bankrupt organisation that was huge (14,000 employees), legacy driven (there were 
and still are valid operational instructions from the 1970s) and utterly political, without 
the adequate remuneration and in a hostile working environment, was a distinguishing 
virtue of Vladimir as a leader. 
Then, after a series of exploratory projects had been run throughout the companies, 
and a set of analytical tasks had been accomplished on top, time for decision-making 
had come. A decision for a severe cut in the workforce had been taken. Some 2000 
employees had to be sacked to give a breath of fresh air to the companies. 
Implementing the decision, though, was the hardest and riskiest part of it all. For that 
to have had any chance of actually starting to happen (not even thinking of its potential 
success), a positive social and political setting had to be created. Thus, Vladimir started 
building allies – another trait of a good leader – with anyone who could positively 
influence the outcome – media, economic analysts, local management, even trade 
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unions. And, it worked. There was a strike, a rather long one, but toothless. Moreover, 
the goal was achieved. 
Lastly, the top view on the company’s balance sheet would tell anyone that the 
abnormal debt burden is suffocating the organisation. An easy priority number one to 
take care of. A battle that no person with lack of long-term vision and determination as 
well as immense patience would dare to get into. Bringing the net debt from close to 
half a billion euro at the beginning of the mandate to virtually zero by its end 10 years 
later is a testimony for real leadership in the making.“ 
 
Conclusion 
The transformation of troubled companies is a very difficult process hindered by many 
internal and external factors. The theoretical framing shows the issues in the right 
lighting. Inertia and institutionalisation have a tremendous negative effect on the ability 
of the organisations to change in order to adapt to the environmental shifts. The power 
of the factors undermining the reorganisations is so strong that in most cases the 
management will probably fail.  
The key findings of the dissertation are: 
Firstly, the crucial role of management’s capacity to reform the organisation or block 
the process of adaption to the environmental shifts presented in Chapter 4. The 
capacity of the management to turn the organisation around is the starting point of 
every reorganisation. It might save the company or speed up the bankruptcy.  
Secondly, the inertial forces inside the organisation that limit the transformational 
efforts could have different manifestations. The blocking role of trade unions depicted 
in Chapter 5 is one of the most powerful forces that could make meaningless the 
reorganisation efforts.  
Thirdly, company’s opacity slows down the reorganisation efforts and prolongs the 
timing of the entire process of transformation making it more expensive. Chapter 6 
presents the negative effects of opacity.  
Fourthly, the combination of external and internal factors sabotaging the 
reorganisation efforts presented in Chapter 7 reveals how the reorganisation process 
complexities by factors outside the control of the management of the organisation. The 
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stakeholders’ contradictory demands, when exercised with strong power could turn the 
reorganisation into ‘mission impossible’.  
Finally, the damaging effect resulting from the combination of all the inertial and 
institutional factors presented in Chapter 8 is tremendous. The cost of the 
reorganisation is huge. The duration of the transformation could be prolonged to an 
extent that shatters all the reorganisation efforts and jeopardises the existence of the 
organisation.    
However, while confirming to certain extend the validity of the ecology population 
theory, the dissertation simultaneously presents managerial approaches that 
potentially increase the likelihood of organisational survival. 
First, every reorganisation needs a strong leader able to understand the problems of 
the company and the complexity of the situation. The leader should be capable of 
developing and motivating the transformational team and skilled enough to implement 
the reforms.  
Second, a strong transformational team should be grown in the organisation. 
Third, the initial diagnoses of the troubled company should happen quickly and the 
reorganisation should begin immediately. Learning and implementing should take 
place as a parallel process.  
Fourth, the inertial managers should be set free from the company as soon as it is 
possible.   
Fifth, the trade unions and else sources of inertia should be tackled on a permanent 
basis as a part of the transformational business plan.  
Sixth, the management should set up priorities in the battles with the demanding 
stakeholders as an integrated part of the transformational agenda.  
Seventh, the best business practices should be put at the place, as they are the only 
tools that bring success to that part of the reorganisation that is under control of the 
management. 
Eighth, the managers should incorporate in the entire execution of the reorganisation 
the understanding that the institutional inertia is an unavoidable source of obstacles at 
every stage of the reorganisation process.  
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Finally, the transformational managers should have the understanding that the death 
of the transformational management, as such, is an almost inevitable process. What is 
more, this understanding should guide the recruitment of turnaround managers since 
the beginning of the process. Moreover, the team that is doing the reorganisation 
should be reviewed and reorganised on a permanent basis.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Collection and storage of data  
The following data was collected in MS Excel to determine the indices and to make 
analytical cross sections. 
General:  
1. Year the data is relevant to 
2. Legal name of company 
3. Name of employee 
4. Sex 
Average age: 
5. Age of employee 
Professional experience: 
6. Years of experience within the BDZ system 
7. Total years of professional experience 
Versatility of education: 
8. Level of education (degree): if there is more than one, each on a new line. 
This include supplementary professional qualifications such as ACCA. Each 
level of education (degree) will require the following: year of award, education 
prior to or upon the transition to market economy (if the exact year of award is 
unknown), name of institution, name of qualifications / specialty 
9. Type of level of education (degree) as per Ministry of Education’s standard 
nomenclature: professional degree, Bachelor, Master’s, Doctoral degree.  
Adequacy of competences and positions in when promoted within the company:  
10. Names of companies where the employee has worked for beyond the BSRG 
11. Names of positions 
12. Length of experience at each position 
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APPENDIX 2 
Statistical analysis of key performance indicators (detailed explanation) 
The study aims to establish whether a significant difference exists between the inertial 
management and the transformational management performance indicators. In order 
to test this objective, by the quantitative employee performance metrics of the BSRH 
management, their overall performance will be evaluated and will be determined 
whether it affects any of the key financial performance indicators of the Holding. 
In the following analysis, the usage of data only for BSRH is because: 
1. The critical reorganisation decisions are predominantly taken on a group level. 
2. The debts are accrued in BSRH.  
3. Costs are one of the key indicators, and some of them cannot be allocated to 
the subsidiaries for certain periods. 
4. Statistical data has longer time-period on group level and better presents the 
trends.     
The first step is to determine how many quality indicators will be used to evaluate the 
management. The initial information available with us is six quantitative variables of 
the management covering the period 2002-2017. 
 
Table 1. Key Management Performance Indicators 
 
 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average 
age (years)
47 47 46 48 50 51 55 53 42 42 42 48 49 46 46 48
Professiona
l experience
(years)
22 21 21 24 26 27 31 28 18 17 16 23 23 20 20 21
Experience 
in BSR
(years)
19 17 16 16 19 18 21 20 7 7 4 12 13 7 7 9
% of
graduates 
after 1990 
6% 7% 14% 8% 6% 5% 5% 10% 64% 63% 90% 33% 38% 75% 78% 75%
% of
educational 
diversity
43% 35% 41% 36% 45% 53% 55% 70% 100% 100% 140% 100% 75% 213% 167% 150%
% adequacy 
to the
occupied 
vacancies 
3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 38% 60% 7% 13% 88% 78% 60%
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In order to determine the number of qualitative variables and which quantitative 
variables to be included (into a set), factor analysis will be applied. The purpose of this 
statistical method is to determine the factors that are common to a set of variables 
among which correlation connections exist. These factors are called hidden because 
they are not directly observable, usually.   
 
The hidden factors are established through the following steps: 
1. The hidden factors are established by exploring the relationships between 
measurable indicators (quality indicators of the management); 
2. The hidden factors modelling - for this purpose the following model is used: 
. . . ... .
1 1 2 2 3 3
F b z b z b z b z
i i i i ik k
    
 
where 1 2
, ,...,
k
z z z
 so-called standardised values are calculated based on the 
measurable indicators 1 2
, ,...,
k
X X X
; 
3. The hidden factors are naming – usually, this is the most challenging part of the 
analysis. 
Initially, all variables are included in the factor analysis in order to establish whether 
any of these variables should be excluded from the factor analysis. 
 
Table 2. Anti-image Correlation 
question Anti-image Correlation Correlation 
coefficient 
Х1 average age (years) 0,650 
Х2 the total length of service (years) 0,762 
Х3 length of service in the field of railway transport 
(years) 
0,727 
Х4 % of those who have completed their education 
after 1990 
0,757 
Х5 % of the variety of completed HEIs 0,757 
Х6 % adequacy of the positions occupied 0,755 
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Correlation coefficients in Anti-Image Correlation table are private correlation 
coefficients that indicate the adequacy of inclusion of the variable into the analysis.  
The rule is that a variable should be excluded if it has a correlation coefficient value of 
less than 0.500. In this case, all variables remain in the further analysis, which implies 
high general adequacy of the model, which amounts to 0.735, determining its character 
as "mean." 
Table 3. KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
.735 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 156.982 
df 15 
Sig. .000 
 
This value allows claiming that all six quantitative variables are related to at least one 
implicit variable, i.e., with at least one hidden factor. 
The number of hidden factors determines through the values of Eigenvalues in Scree 
plot.  
 
Fig. 1 Determination of the Number of Hidden factors  
 
The Determination of the Number of Hidden Factors Figure shows that the graph 
becomes flattered after the second factor and that determines that the number of 
hidden factors consist of two. As a result, the number of hidden factors is fixed to two. 
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However, the Determination of Belonging to a Hidden Factor Table shows that the 
analysis attaches all six factors to only one hidden factor.  
 
Table 4.  Determination of Belonging to a Hidden Factor 
Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 
Average age (years) -.804 .586 
Work experience  (years) -.866 .481 
Experience  (years) -.981 .039 
% of graduets after 1990  .969 .163 
% variety of educational institutions 
.853 .502 
% adequacy for the management 
position  
.907 .374 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Therefore, the rotation is also needed. 
 
Table 5. Total Variance Explained      
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of     
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.848 80.808 80.808 4.848 80.808 80.808 3.204 53.401 53.401 
2 .995 16.584 97.392 .995 16.584 97.392 2.639 43.991 97.392 
3 .096 1.604 98.996       
4 .033 .543 99.539       
5 .019 .317 99.856       
6 .009 .144 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotation is performed through the most commonly used method - Varimax and the last 
part of the Total Variance Explained Table – Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings gives 
information on the factors after the rotation. Most of the total dispersion is due to the 
first hidden factor and is equal to 53.4%. To the second factor are due to 43.9% of the 
total dispersion of quantitative variables. 
 
Table 6. Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 
average age (years) -.226 .969 
total length of service (years) -.341 .930 
length of service in the field of railway 
transport (years) 
-.717 .670 
% of those who have completed their 
education after 1990 
.841 -.510 
% of the variety of completed HEIs .974 -.177 
% adequacy of the positions occupied .931 -.309 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. a. Rotation 
converged in 3 iterations. 
 
Quantitative variables are attributable to the factor with the highest absolute value. The 
Rotated Component Matrix Table shows to which from the two hidden factors is related 
to the variable.  
 
Quality measure Quantitative variables 
QM1 Х1, Х2, Х3 
QM2 Х4, Х5, Х6  
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After attributing the variables to the specific factors, they are named. After careful 
consideration of the essence of the matter to which the questions are addressed and 
what they generally expressed, they can be named in the following way: 
 
 
Quality measure Name 
QM1 Professional experience 
QM2 Professional competence 
 
After determining the number of hidden factors, they are formed as a single indicator. 
This will be made on the basis of the Helvig’s composite indicator. Converting the 
measurable factors into one through this method conditionally turns quantifiable factors 
into one qualitative measure whose name comes out of the factor analysis. The method 
belongs to the group of multidimensional methods of statistical analysis and 
standardises different inhomogeneous values. Its purpose is to turn quantitative 
variables into a qualitative variable to evaluate the level of management over the period 
under review. The composite indicator can occupy values ranging from 0 to 1, and the 
closer it is to 1, the higher the quality evaluation of the management is.  
Initially, the mean of each indicator jx  and its mean diversion (standard deviation) j
is calculated. Then the difference of each indicator value to its mean is determined. 
This difference is divided by its standard deviation, which standardises the distribution 
of this variable with mean 0 and dispersion 1.  
ij j
ij
j
x x
z



 
Thus, each of the variables transforms into a new distribution with the same theoretical 
mean 0 and dispersion 1. Means and dispersion of the indicators constituting: 
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In four of the six variables, there is a significant diversion around the mean, suggesting 
that there was a difference between the units of this indicator over the years. Both 
variables have had approximately equal values over the years and these are the 
"average age (years)" X1 with an average age of 48 years and a dispersion of 4 years 
around the mean and "total length of service (years)" X2 with a total average length of 
service of 22 years and a dispersion about 4 years around the mean. 
The standardised values are calculated in next table.  
 
Table 7. Standardised Values 
Standardized Values QM1 Standardized Values QM2 
 
Показател Zi1 Zi2 Zi3 
 2002 -0,1 -0,1 1,0 
 2003 -0,1 -0,3 0,7 
2004 -0,4 -0,3 0,5 
2005 0,1 0,4 0,5 
2006 0,7 0,9 1,0 
2007 1,0 1,2 0,9 
2008 2,1 2,2 1,4 
2009 1,5 1,4 1,2 
2010 -1,5 -1,1 -1,1 
2011 -1,5 -1,4 -1,1 
2012 -1,5 -1,6 -1,7 
2013 0,1 0,2 -0,2 
2014 0,4 0,2 0,0 
2015 -0,4 -0,6 -1,1 
2016 -0,4 -0,6 -1,1 
2017 0,1 -0,3 -0,8 
 
Показател Zi1 Zi2 Zi3 
2002 -1,0 -0,9 -0,7 
2003 -0,9 -1,0 -0,7 
2004 -0,7 -0,9 -0,8 
2005 -0,9 -1,0 -0,8 
2006 -1,0 -0,8 -0,8 
2007 -1,0 -0,7 -0,8 
2008 -1,0 -0,7 -0,8 
2009 -0,8 -0,4 -0,8 
2010 0,9 0,2 0,2 
2011 0,9 0,2 0,5 
2012 1,7 1,0 1,2 
2013 -0,1 0,2 -0,6 
2014 0,1 -0,3 -0,3 
2015 1,2 2,4 2,1 
2016 1,3 1,5 1,8 
2017 1,2 1,2 1,2 
Once the standardised values are calculated, a reference value is selected among 
them. This is the value farthest from the mean with a positive or a negative sign. This 
value shows the year with the best indicator of the given variable. The references are 
QM1
Х1 48 4
Х2 22 4
Х3 13 6
jx j
QM2
Х4 36% 31%
Х5 89% 52%
Х6 24% 30%
jx j
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also called incentives because they improve the management quality measure. 
Accordingly, the most significant differences, but with a reference sign opposite to the 
values, are called dissimulators as they deteriorate the management quality measure. 
In order to eliminate the negative values, the differences are squared and the total sum 
of the squared values of the three indicators for the year is determined. 
 
 
 
 
2
io ij 0jc z z 
 
 
Where: 
ci0 – a taxonomic distance between the i-th unit and the reference point; 
zij – the standardised value of the j-th indicator at the i-th unit; 
z0j – the reference point for the j-th variable. 
 
The idea is that the higher the total sum of the indicators, the closer they are to the 
dissimulator and vice versa. Dispersion Tables show that the year with the highest 
qualitative evaluation for the first quality measure is 2012 and 2015 for the second one. 
 
Table 8. Dispersion   
Dispersion around the etalon point for QM1 Dispersion around the etalon point for QM2 
Показател Zi1 Zi2 Zi3 SUM Ci0 
2002 1,9 2,3 7,4 11,7 3,4 
2003 1,9 1,6 5,6 9,1 3,0 
2004 1,2 1,6 4,8 7,6 2,8 
2005 2,8 4,1 4,8 11,6 3,4 
2006 5,0 6,4 7,4 18,8 4,3 
2007 6,3 7,8 6,5 20,5 4,5 
2008 13,1 14,4 9,5 37,1 6,1 
2009 9,4 9,2 8,4 27,1 5,2 
2010 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,7 
2011 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,6 
2012 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Показател Zi1 Zi2 Zi3 SUM Ci0 
2002 7,2 10,7 7,9 25,8 5,1 
2003 7,0 11,7 8,0 26,7 5,2 
2004 5,9 10,9 8,4 25,3 5,0 
2005 6,8 11,6 8,4 26,9 5,2 
2006 7,2 10,4 8,4 26,1 5,1 
2007 7,3 9,5 8,4 25,3 5,0 
2008 7,3 9,2 8,4 25,0 5,0 
2009 6,5 7,6 8,4 22,5 4,7 
2010 0,7 4,7 3,8 9,2 3,0 
2011 0,7 4,7 2,8 8,2 2,9 
2012 0,0 2,0 0,8 2,8 1,7 
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2013 2,8 3,1 2,1 8,0 2,8 
2014 3,8 3,1 2,7 9,6 3,1 
2015 1,2 1,0 0,3 2,6 1,6 
2016 1,2 1,0 0,3 2,6 1,6 
2017 2,8 1,6 0,8 5,2 2,3 
 
2013 3,3 4,7 7,2 15,2 3,9 
2014 2,7 7,0 6,1 15,9 4,0 
2015 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,5 
2016 0,1 0,8 0,1 1,0 1,0 
2017 0,2 1,5 0,8 2,5 1,6 
 
However, Helvig's method goes a step further by further standardising once again the 
values thus obtained by placing them in a range from 0 to 1. This facilitates 
interpretation allowing the indicators to be comparable to one another. 
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.   Standardisation at this stage is made as follows: 
 
 
 
 
0c  and 0
s
 are calculated using the formulas of the arithmetic mean and the standard 
deviation. 
The multidimensional indicator is calculated using the following formula: 
                                                           
where: 
ii – the multidimensional indicator for the i-th unit of the studied population. 
00 stcc   
The multidimensional indicator for the two measures changes over time as follows. 
The values themselves can be seen in the Values QM Tables below.   
 
Table 9.  Values of QM 
Values of QM 1        Values of QM 2   
Indicator Ci0  i0 0c c   
2
i0 0c c  
QM
1 
2002 3,4 0,6 0,3 0,4 
2003 3,0 0,2 0,0 0,5 
2004 2,8 -0,1 0,0 0,5 
2005 3,4 0,6 0,3 0,4 
2006 4,3 1,5 2,2 0,3 
2007 4,5 1,7 2,8 0,3 
2008 6,1 3,2 10,5 0,0 
2009 5,2 2,4 5,6 0,1 
2010 0,7 -2,1 4,4 0,9 
2011 0,6 -2,2 5,0 0,9 
2012 0,0 -2,8 8,1 1,0 
2013 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,5 
2014 3,1 0,3 0,1 0,5 
2015 1,6 -1,2 1,5 0,7 
2016 1,6 -1,2 1,5 0,7 
2017 2,3 -0,6 0,3 0,6 
 2,8  1,6   
Indicator Ci0  i0 0c c   
2
i0 0c c  
QM
2 
2002 5,1 1,4 1,9 0,3 
2003 5,2 1,5 2,2 0,3 
2004 5,0 1,3 1,8 0,3 
2005 5,2 1,5 2,3 0,3 
2006 5,1 1,4 2,0 0,3 
2007 5,0 1,3 1,8 0,3 
2008 5,0 1,3 1,7 0,3 
2009 4,7 1,1 1,1 0,3 
2010 3,0 -0,6 0,4 0,6 
2011 2,9 -0,8 0,7 0,6 
2012 1,7 -2,0 4,0 0,8 
2013 3,9 0,2 0,0 0,4 
2014 4,0 0,3 0,1 0,4 
2015 0,5 -3,2 10,3 0,9 
2016 1,0 -2,7 7,1 0,9 
2017 1,6 -2,1 4,4 0,8 
 3,7  1,6   
 
n
cc
s
n
1i
2
0i0
0




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Once the two quality measures are constructed, it is seen that, on average, their values 
with the transformational management are higher than those of the inertial 
management.  
Quality measure 1 is designed the way that when the value decreases, that means that 
the professional experience increases and vice versa, the bigger the value, the lower 
the experience of the managers in the BSRG system. The most experienced are the 
managers in 2008 and least experience are the managers in 2012.    
  
Fig. 2 Quality measure 1 
 
Quality measure 2 is designed the way that the higher values mean higher professional 
competencies of the management. The most competent are the managers in 2015 and 
least competent the managers in 2002 - 2009.    
 
Fig. 3 Quality measure 2 
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0,3
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0,9
0,9
0,8
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0,0
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The Group Statistics Table shows that the average value of the first quality measure 
with the inertial management is 0.368. With the transformational management, it is 
0.814. Similar to the second qualitative variable, the mean for the transformational 
management is higher than that for the inertial management. However, this still does 
not justify claiming that this difference is statistically significant, i.e., that it objectively 
exists.  
 
Table 10. Group Statistics 
 
Management N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Q1 Inertial  10 .368 .1839 .0581 
Transformational 6 .814 .1364 .0557 
Q2 Inertial 10 .303 .0691 .0219 
Transformational 6 .743 .1459 .0596 
 
Therefore, it will be checked whether the quality measures are statistically significantly 
higher with the transformational management compared to those with the inertial one. 
For this purpose, a statistical hypothesis test will be performed. It goes through the 
following stages: 
First stage - Null and alternative hypothesis are defined. 
H0: Quality measures for the transformational and the inertial management do not 
differ. 
H1: Quality measures for the transformational management are higher than those for 
the inertial one. 
Second stage – the risk of a first-order error is determined. The test will be performed 
at a 1% risk of error (α = 1%) and a 99% probability of security. 
Third stage – a selection of a hypothesis test criterion. The criterion may be parametric 
– when the variable is on a substantial scale and has a normal distribution, and 
nonparametric – in all other cases. Parametric methods with equal other conditions 
have a smaller second-order error, and therefore, it is better to apply such a method. 
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Both variables are quantitative, which puts them on a robust measurement scale. It 
remains to be tested whether their distribution is normal for a parametric method used 
to test the hypothesis. The distribution normality will be determined through the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, which is appropriate in a few cases (as is ours). This is also a type 
of hypothesis test that examines both hypotheses: 
H0: Distribution of the variable is normal 
H1: Distribution of the variable differs from the normality 
In order to assume one or the other hypothesis, the significance level (Sig.) is 
compared to the assumed risk of error, which in this case is 1%. In the case of QM1, 
the significance level Sig. = 95.6% is greater than the assumed 1% error risk, which 
does not justify the rejection of the null hypothesis, that QM1 distribution is normal as 
show in Test of Normality Table. In the second case for QM2 the significance level Sig. 
= 0.6% is less than the assumed 1% error risk, which justifies the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and assuming the alternative one that the variable QM2 has not a normal 
distribution as show in Table 11. These findings are also confirmed by a 5% error risk 
and through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which also serves to determine the 
distribution normality but in a large number of cases. 
 
     Table 11. Tests of Normality 
 
 
After testing the distribution normality, it appears that a parametric test method can be 
used for the QM1 variable and it will be based on the t-test. For the QM2 variable, a 
nonparametric analogue of the m-test will be used, namely the Mann-Whitney test. 
Forth stage – the type of critical area is determined. Since the direction of the 
alternative hypothesis is set, the critical area (W) is one-sided. 
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Fifth stage – the amount of theoretical characteristic formed only under the influence 
of random factors is determined. In our case, this will be done automatically based on 
statistical software. 
Sixth stage – it is decided to accept or reject the null hypothesis set out at stage one. 
This takes place on the basis of the significance level Sig. When the significance level 
exceeds the assumed error of 1%, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. When 
the significance level is less than the error, then the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
alternative one is assumed.  
     Table 12. Independent Samples Test 
 
 
Table 13. Test Statisticsa 
 Q2 
Mann-Whitney U .000 
Wilcoxon W 55.000 
Z -3.254 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .000b 
a. Grouping Variable: Management 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
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The significance level of both tests Sig = 0.0% is less than the error risk of 1%, which 
gives reason to reject the null hypothesis for both qualitative measures, which in turn 
means that the quality measures with the transformational management are 
statistically significantly higher than those with the inertial one, and this can be 
confirmed with a 99%. 
Once proven that the quality measures differ with the two types of management, it will 
be determined how they affect the three financial performance measures of the 
Holding, such as EBITDA, EBIT, and DEBT.  
 
Table 14. KPIs BSRG 2002-2017 EUR thousands 
 
 
To account for the impact of each management, the financial performance indicators 
are attributed to the management they refer to. Then the dynamic order of financial 
performance indicators and the quality measures are divided into two periods – 
transformational and inertial management. Thus will be determined the direction of 
impact of each management on the financial performance indicators. This will be done 
through correlation analysis.  
The correlation analysis gives an answer to the question of the strength and direction 
of the relationship between the variables. It ranges from -1 to +1, and the closer it is to 
-1 / + 1, the stronger the relationship between the variables is. At 0, the relationship is 
missing. Provisionally, the factor can be named as per the following limits: 
0 < |R| < 0.3 – weak correlation 
0.3 < |R| < 0.5 – moderate correlation 
0.5 < |R| < 0.7 – significant correlation 
0.7 < |R| < 0.9 – high correlation 
0.9 < |R| < 1.0 - very high correlation 
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Table 15. Correlation relationships with inertial management 
 EBITDA EBIT Debt 
Q1 Pearson Correlation -.310 -.345 -.749 
Sig. (2-tailed) .383 .328 .013 
N 10 10 10 
Q2 Pearson Correlation .651 .022 .347 
Sig. (2-tailed) .041 .951 .326 
N 10 10 10 
 
 
The results of the correlation analysis are obtained at a 5% error risk. 
With the inertial management, a significant relationship is established between the first 
quality measure and the debt, and between the second quality measure and the 
operating profit.  
 
 
Fig. 4 Q1 and debt correlation  
 
The relationship between the first quality measure and the debt is characterised as a 
high reverse correlation. That means that when Q1 decreases, the debt increases and 
because the construction of the indicator is such that with its’ decrease, the 
professional experience within BSRG increases, that means that when the 
professional experience within BSRG increases the debt also increases.  The other 
correlation dependence that emerges is a significant correlation between the second 
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quality measure and the EBITDA. This means that when, on average, the professional 
competence does not change, this leads to an increase in EBITDA with the inertial 
management. However, this correlation makes no sense.  
 
Fig. 5 EBITDA and Q2 correlation  
No other significant correlation dependencies on the inertial management have been 
established. 
With the transformational management, a single significant relationship is established 
at a 5% risk of error, and it is between the second quality measure and the debt. 
Table 16. Correlation relationships with transformational management 
 EBITDA EBIT Debt 
Q1 Pearson 
Correlation 
.624 -.732 .754 
Sig. (2-tailed) .186 .098 .083 
N 6 6 6 
Q2 Pearson 
Correlation 
.325 .769 -.849 
Sig. (2-tailed) .529 .074 .032 
N 6 6 6 
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This means that when, on average, the professional competence increases, this leads 
to debt reduction with the transformational management.  
 
Fig. 6 Q2 and debt correlation  
 
Moreover, at a more significant marginal risk of error of 10%, there are significant 
feedbacks between the first quality measure and the gross profit before interest and 
taxes, a significant direct relationship between the first quality measure and the debt, 
as well as a significant relationship between the second indicator and the gross profit 
before interest and taxes.  
The general trend is that when the transformational management's professional 
experience increases, this leads to an increase in the gross profits and to debt 
reduction with the transformational management. As to the professional competence, 
improving the general professional competence leads to an increase in the gross profit 
and to debt reduction. 
Since the period of the transformational management is too short (only 6 years), it 
cannot be proved that there is a clear correlation between these few marginal 
differentiated relationships. 
Conclusion. It is noteworthy that there is inertia with the inertial management with the 
professional experience indicator, thus with each subsequent year the financial 
performance indicators deteriorate. With the transformational management, this inertia 
is absent and a year of additional experience leads to improved financial performance 
indicators.   
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table 1. Indicators BSRP (in euro) 
 
 
Table 2. Indicators BSRF (in euro) 
 
 
Table 3. Indicators BSRH (in euro) 
 
 
Table 4. Indicators BSRG (in euro) 
 
 
 
 
 
№ 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total
1 Total number of measures 30 4 3 22 10 6 73
2 Implemented measures 26 3 3 17 8 4 59
3 Non-implemented measures 4 1 0 5 2 2 13
4 Total expected effects of planned measures 3113066 7772431 1265977 119110 420181 1660299 14351063
5 Omited effects of untimely  identification 0 5827705 163330 78927 229304 0 6350395
6 Omited effects of late implementation 2438249 7050725 123830 0 360461 0 9973265
№ 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total
1 Total number of measures 16 3 5 8 12 8 52
2 Implemented measures 15 2 4 6 8 6 42
3 Non-implemented measures 1 1 1 2 4 2 10
4 Total expected effects of planned measures 3121545 1686 7473791 9101186 4690451 3386569 27775227
5 Omited effects of untimely  identification 0 1458663 2080871 14236327 18757295 19304223 55837378
6 Omited effects of late implementation 0 7133074 0 20201917 3224722 4701264 35260978
№ 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total
1 Total number of measures 14 5 6 5 1 1 31
2 Implemented measures 13 4 4 4 1 1 26
3 Non-implemented measures 1 1 2 2 0 0 5
4 Total expected effects of planned measures 11479619 3095058 12719951 41968441 27924400 48385440 145572910
5 Omited effects of untimely  identification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Omited effects of late implementation 0 0 557308 0 0 0 557308
№ 2010 2011 2012 2015 2016 2017 Total
1 Total number of measures 59 11 13 35 22 15 156
2 Implemented measures 54 9 10 27 17 11 128
3 Non-implemented measures 5 2 3 9 6 4 28
4 Total expected effects of planned measures 17714230 10869175 21459718 51188737 33035032 53432308 187699200
5 Omited effects of untimely  identification 0 7286368 2295329 14315254 18986599 19304223 62187773
6 Omited effects of late implementation 2438249 14183799 681138 20201917 3585183 4701264 45791551
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